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Chapter 1
Introduction
The theory of strategic interaction or, game theory, for short, plays an important role in
economics. It can oﬀer insights into situations in which two or more interacting individuals
choose actions that jointly aﬀect the payoﬀ of each party. Game-theoretic applications
cover a wide range of economic, political and social situations such as auctions, contract
formation, bargaining situations, political competition, and public good provision, to
only name a few. This broad scope of application makes it a powerful concept. Most
games involve some kind of uncertainty. For instance, players may be uncertain about
the strategy choice of other players or they may lack information about the strategic
environment.
Game theory is closely tied to decision theory. In fact, the former can be viewed as
the natural extension of the latter. In the words of Myerson (1991, p. 5): “The logical
roots of game theory are in Bayesian decision theory. Indeed, game theory can be viewed
as an extension of decision theory [...]. Thus, to understand the fundamental ideas of
game theory, one should begin by studying decision theory.” Bayesian decision theory
assumes that decision makers’ subjective beliefs can be represented by unique probability
measures and that they update their prior beliefs in accordance with Bayes’ rule when
receiving new information. Furthermore, Bayesian decision-makers usually are subjective
expected utility maximizers. Savage (1954) provided an axiomatic foundation for the
Bayesian approach. His subjective expected utility theory has become the leading model
of choice under uncertainty.
1
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However, Ellsberg (1961) questioned the descriptive adequacy of subjective expected
utility theory. He exempliﬁed that the choice behavior of many subjects is not consistent
with Savage’s theory when facing “ambiguous uncertainty”, or “ambiguity”, that is, a
situation in which some events have known probabilities, whereas for other ones the
probabilities are unknown. Ellsberg’s observation has received powerful empirical support
in the last decades (see Camerer and Weber, 1992). In this thesis, the term “uncertainty”
will be used as a generic term to cover both ambiguity and non-ambiguous uncertainty
(“risk”). To represent behavior as observed by Ellsberg, several alternatives to subjective
expected utility theory have been suggested in recent years. Two prominent alternatives
are Choquet expected utility theory of Schmeidler (1989) and the multiple prior approach
of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). More recent examples are the smooth ambiguity model
of Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005) and the variational model of Maccheroni et al. (2006).
The main goal of this thesis is to shed some light on the impact of ambiguity-sensitive
behavior on strategic decision-making in interactive situations. As Crawford (1990, p.
152) appropriately expressed it: “In recent years, non-expected utility decision models
have given us signiﬁcantly better explanations of observed behavior in nonstrategic en-
vironments. These successes, and the weight of the experimental evidence against the
expected utility hypothesis, suggest that much might be learned about strategic behavior
by basing applications of game theory on more general models of individual decisions
under uncertainty.” In this spirit, the present thesis investigates non-cooperative game
models that are based on alternative models of individual decision-making under uncer-
tainty. The main body of this dissertation consists of three chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and
6), each of which studies strategic interaction under uncertainty. Chapter 4 and 5 explore
formal models in which uncertainty arises from exogenous chance moves and incomplete
information, respectively. While the game studied in Chapter 4 does not involve private
information, the model in Chapter 5 allows for private information. Chapter 6 experi-
mentally examines the extent to which a lack of information about others’ preferences
aﬀects subject behavior. It is shown that a strategic ambiguity model as well as a quasi
Bayesian model of incomplete information explain the ﬁndings better than standard Nash
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equilibrium. The results of chapters 4 and 6 are based on collaborative work with Boris
Wiesenfarth (Chapter 4), and Christoph Brunner and Hannes Rau (Chapter 6).
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the decision-theoretic founda-
tions of the interactive models studied in this work. First, the historical development of
modern decision theory is brieﬂy reviewed. I recall in some detail the fundamentals of
subjective expected utility theory as well as the experiments by Ellsberg (1961). Finally,
alternative models of choice under uncertainty are considered, especially, the Choquet
expected utility model and the multiple prior model. These models will be used in sub-
sequent chapters. Chapter 3 discusses some conceptual foundations of non-cooperative
game theory. It starts with sketching the historical roots of modern game theory. Basic
concepts such as the concept of a game and the Nash equilibrium concept are recalled.
The last part of this chapter deals with diﬀerent sources of uncertainty in games. In the
context of strategic uncertainty, I describe generalized equilibrium concepts that allow for
players whose preferences are not represented by expected utility functionals. Further-
more, I review the class of Bayesian games introduced by Harsanyi (1967-68) to analyze
games of incomplete information.
In Chapter 4, a Hotelling duopoly game that incorporates ambiguous uncertainty
about the market demand is examined. The key assumption of this model is that ﬁrms’
beliefs are represented by neo-additive capacities introduced by Chateauneuf et al. (2007).
The related literature is reviewed and the model is speciﬁed. Moreover, this chapter dis-
cusses implications for possible applications of the Capacity model and limitations of
the existing models. Chapter 5 investigates the extent to which we can distinguish ex-
pected and uncertainty-averse non-expected utility players on the basis of their behavior.
A model of incomplete information games is used in which players can choose mixed
strategies. First, this model is illustrated by two examples and described in detail. The
following part of the chapter provides the results. Subsequently, I discuss the underlying
model and introduce a generalized equilibrium concept. Chapter 6 reports on the results
of the aforementioned experimental study testing whether revealing players’ preferences to
each other leads to more equilibrium play. Chapter 7 concludes with an overall summary.
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In terms of the style of this thesis, deﬁnitions, examples, ﬁgures, tables, etc. are num-
bered per chapter (e.g., Example 2.1), except axioms, which are consecutively numbered
as well as footnotes. In the text, italics indicate deﬁnitions. The ﬁrst time an abbreviation
is used, both the spelled-out version and short form are presented, where one of which is
written in parentheses. Notations are deﬁned when they are used for the ﬁrst time in the
text. A uniﬁed notation is used across all of the chapters, with only a few exceptions. For
instance, in Chapter 4, “σ2” denotes the variance of a random variable, while, in the other
chapters, a mixed strategy proﬁle is denoted by “σ”. For the sake of simplicity, generic
female pronouns are used in this thesis, i.e., “she” stands for “he or she” et cetera.
Chapter 2
Decision-theoretic foundations
2.1 Historical background
Theories of decision-making under uncertainty have a long tradition, reaching back
at least to the 18th century. During this time, Daniel Bernoulli (1738/1956) explicitly
formulated the idea of expected utility maximization in order to solve the so-called St.
Petersburg paradox. This paradox is based on a gamble with inﬁnite expected value.
Decision-makers are only willing to pay a ﬁnite (and rather small) price to enter such a
gamble, although its expected value is inﬁnite. At Bernoulli’s time, this was paradoxi-
cal since it contradicted the prevailing opinion that the expected monetary value is an
adequate decision criterion in uncertain situations.
After Bernoulli, no further seminal contributions to decision theory appeared until
the early 20th century. At this time, in particular, Ramsey (1926) and de Finetti (1937)
renewed the idea of “subjective probabilities” in the context of decision problems under
uncertainty. According to this idea, probabilities reﬂect subjective degrees of belief, i.e.,
personal assessments of relative likelihoods. In contrast, for “objectivists” or “frequen-
tists” such as John Venn: “[...] all which Probability discusses is the statistical frequency
of events, or, if we prefer so to put it, the quantity of belief with which any one of these
events should be individually regarded [...]” (Venn, 1888, p. 29). Following this in-
terpretation, probabilities explain stable relative frequencies that remain comparatively
constant across large numbers of trials. Hence, probabilities reﬂect objective evidence, or,
5
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more precisely, probabilities measure the physical tendency of an event to occur.
In the view of Ramsey and de Finetti, individuals act as if they attach subjective
probabilities to the states of the world, even if there is no objective probabilistic informa-
tion available. To put it diﬀerently, individuals maximize expected utility with respect to
their subjective beliefs. Independently, Ramsey and de Finetti suggested to infer subjec-
tive probabilities from choices between bets. In their words: “The old-established way of
measuring a person’s belief is to propose a bet, and see what are the lowest odds which
he will accept. This method I regard as fundamentally sound” (Ramsey, 1926, p. 73) and
“It is a question simply of making mathematically precise the trivial and obvious idea
that the degree of probability attributed by an individual to a given event is revealed by
the conditions under which he would be disposed to bet on that event” (de Finetti, 1937,
p. 101). Ramsey and de Finetti used axiomatic approaches, which take the existence
of utilities and monetary payoﬀs, respectively, as given, to derive subjective probabilities
from preferences over bets. Both papers can be seen as precursors of modern decision
theory, which mainly studies axioms of rational decision-making.
The ﬁrst axiomatic foundation for the concept of utility and expected utility maxi-
mization was published by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). In their theory, the
objects of choice are lotteries, i.e., probability distributions over outcomes. Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern identiﬁed a parsimonious set of seemingly reasonable axioms on
preferences over lotteries which are necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of a util-
ity function on the set of outcomes and for the expected utility criterion. Compared
to Ramsey and de Finetti, the approach from von Neumann and Morgenstern operates
conversely: it takes the existence of the probabilities as given and shows that numerical
utilities of outcomes can be derived from preferences over lotteries.
The seminal paper of Leonard Savage (1954) synthesized the ideas of Ramsey,
de Finetti and von Neumann and Morgenstern. Following Kreps (1988, p. 120), Sav-
age’s theory is “[...] the crowning glory of choice theory [...].” Savage showed how to
obtain utilities, subjective probabilities and the expected utility decision criterion with-
out taking probabilities and utilities as primitives. His approach will be discussed in more
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detail in Section 2.2.
After the papers by von Neumann and Morgenstern and Savage, “paradoxes” were
exposed that questioned the descriptive adequacy of their approaches. Allais (1953) chal-
lenged von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory by showing that in situations where prob-
abilities are given, a decision-maker’s utilities and probabilities may not combine linearly.
Subsequently, Ellsberg (1961) questioned Savage’s subjective expected utility theory. He
exempliﬁed that individuals frequently display preferences which are not consistent with
a subjective probability measure when they face ambiguous uncertainty. Section 2.3 elab-
orates further on the so-called Ellsberg paradox since it gave rise to the non-probabilistic
generalizations of Savage’s theory described in Section 2.4.
In the same time period, apart from the literature on expected utility theory, a notable
contribution to decision theory was made by Wald (1950). Inspired by von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s analysis of games, Wald suggested the maxmin decision criterion,
sometimes also called “Wald criterion”. This criterion is another ancestor to the literature
on non-probabilistic decision theory reviewed in Section 2.4. It is intuitive and easy to
apply: in an uncertain situation, a maxmin decision-maker looks at the worst potential
consequence of each alternative and then chooses the alternative with the best worst-
case outcome. The maxmin principle was generalized by Arrow and Hurwicz (1972).
According to their generalized criterion, a decision-maker evaluates an alternative by a
convex combination of its worst and its best consequence.
2.2 Subjective expected utility theory
This section describes subjective expected utility theory in the sense of Savage (1954).
The focus lies on the elements challenged by Ellsberg (1961). At ﬁrst, we consider Savage’s
original framework and then the framework proposed by Anscombe and Aumann (1963).
Savage’s framework consists of four elements: a set Ω (the states of the world), a set
X (the outcomes or consequences), a set F (the acts), and a binary relation  on the
set F (the decision-maker’s preferences). According to Savage (1954, p. 9), a state of
the world ω ∈ Ω is “a description of the world, leaving no relevant aspect undescribed,”
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and the true state is “the state that does in fact obtain [...].” Ex-ante, the decision-
maker does not know the true state of the world. Hence, we can think of the set Ω as an
exhaustive list of all scenarios that may be encountered. Any subset E ⊂ Ω is called an
event. The set X comprises “[...] anything at all about which the person could possibly
be concerned” (Savage, 1954, p. 14). An object of choice is an act, which is deﬁned as
“[...] a function attaching a consequence to each state of the world” (Savage, 1954, p.
14). In other words, acts are functions from states to consequences. Hence, the set of all
acts is F = {f | f : Ω → X}. Since the decision-maker does not know the true state of
the world, she is uncertain about which consequence f(ω) ∈ X will result from an act
f . However, she knows all possible consequences of an act. Savage’s setting assumes a
binary relation ⊆ F × F , which represents the decision-maker’s preferences.
Savage postulated seven restrictions or axioms on the preference relation. He showed
that a decision-maker, whose preferences satisfy his axioms, will behave as if she possesses
a utility function over the outcomes and a unique subjective prior distribution over the
states. Moreover, when choosing among acts, the decision-maker will choose the one with
the highest expected utility according to her utility function and her subjective belief.
One of Savage’s main axioms is the so-called Sure-Thing Principle. Roughly, it requires
that the preference between two acts should not depend on the states of the world where
both acts have identical consequences. Formally, the axiom is formulated as follows:
Axiom 1 (Sure-Thing Principle). For all acts f, g, f ′, g′ ∈ F and every event E ⊂ Ω, if
f(ω) = f ′(ω) and g(ω) = g′(ω) for all ω ∈ E and
f(ω) = g(ω) and f ′(ω) = g′(ω) for all ω /∈ E,
then f  g ⇔ f ′  g′.
The Sure-Thing Principle is a separability axiom. It says that when comparing two acts,
it suﬃces to consider the states of the world in which these acts yield diﬀerent outcomes.
The following example illustrates the rationale behind this axiom.
Example 2.1. There are three states of the world, Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, and three conse-
quences, X = {a, b, c}. Consider the event E = {ω1, ω2} and a decision-maker who has
to choose between the acts given in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Example for the Sure-Thing Principle
ω1 ω2 ω3
f a b c
g c a c
f ′ a b b
g′ c a b
Suppose that the decision-maker in Example 2.1 prefers, for some reason, act f to act
g. Then, the Sure-Thing Principle requires that she has to prefer f ′ over g′. The reason
behind this is the following. On the one hand, f and g as well as f ′ and g′ diﬀer only if
event E occurs. In this case, f corresponds to f ′ and g corresponds to g′. Therefore, it
seems reasonable that the preference ranking between f and g should be the same as that
of f ′ and g′. To put it diﬀerently, when comparing two acts, we may “eliminate” any state
of the world in which both acts yield identical consequences. The axiom implies a char-
acteristic feature of subjective expected utility theory, namely event-separability. That
is, preferences over acts are separable across mutually exclusive events. The Sure-Thing
Principle seems intuitive and reasonable. In the words of Savage (1954, p. 21): “[...] I
know of no other extralogical principle governing decisions that ﬁnds such ready accep-
tance.” Nonetheless, a considerable share of individuals violate this axiom in Ellsberg’s
experiments, which is further discussed in Section 2.3.
Savage’s representation theorem can be expressed as follows: a preference relation 
over F satisﬁes his seven axioms if and only if there exists a unique probability measure
π on Ω and a function u : X → R, which is unique up to positive linear transformations,
such that for every f, g ∈ F ,
f  g ⇔
∫
Ω
u(f(ω)) dπ(ω) ≥
∫
Ω
u(g(ω)) dπ(ω). (2.1)
In this equation, the probability measure π represents the decision-maker’s subjective
belief, and the utility function u on the outcomes represents her taste.
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Savage does not put any restrictions on the set of outcomes X, e.g., on its topology.
However, this generality comes at the cost of having an inﬁnite set of states Ω. The
main motivation of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) is to develop a simpliﬁed subjective
expected utility framework: “The novelty of our presentation, if any, lies in the double
use of utility theory, permitting the very simple and plausible assumptions and the simple
construction and proof” (Anscombe and Aumann, 1963, p. 203). The key assumption of
Anscombe and Aumann’s approach is that there are two sources of uncertainty: a roulette
lottery, which refers to uncertainty generated by an objective randomization device such
as a roulette wheel and a horse lottery, which refers to a source of subjective uncertainty
like a horse race. By using this setup, Anscombe and Aumann showed that it is possible
to derive subjective expected utility for a ﬁnite set of states and with a smaller set of
axioms. In their framework, the set of roulette lotteries, ∆(X), is the set of all probability
distributions with ﬁnite support on the set of consequences X, formally,
∆(X) =

 µ : X → [0, 1]
#{x ∈ X | µ(x) > 0} <∞,∑
x∈X
µ(x) = 1

 .
The objects of choice are “horse-then-roulette lotteries”, i.e., functions from states to
∆(X). The set of all “Anscombe-Aumann acts” is denoted by H. These acts can be
viewed as two-stage lotteries. At ﬁrst, “horse races” take place to determine the state of
the world, i.e., there is a lottery with unknown probabilities where the outcome is a state
ω ∈ Ω, which determines the roulette lottery h(ω). Afterwards, the roulette lottery h(ω)
is played out, in which outcome x ∈ X obtains with a known probability. Henceforth,
h(ω)(x) denotes the probability that lottery h(ω) assigns to outcome x ∈ X. The set H
is endowed with a mixture operation: mixtures of acts are performed statewise, that is,
for all h, g ∈ H and α ∈ [0, 1], (αh+ (1− α)g)(ω) = αh(ω) + (1− α)g(ω).
A central axiom of Anscombe and Aumann’s approach is the independence axiom,
which is adopted from von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944):
Axiom 2 (Independence). For all h, g, h′ ∈ H and all α ∈ (0, 1),
h  g ⇔ αh+ (1− α)h′  αg + (1− α)h′.
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The approaches, which are discussed in detail in Section 2.4, use an Anscombe-Aumann
setup. A core feature of both approaches is that they weaken Axiom 2.
Anscombe and Aumann showed that a preference relation  over H satisﬁes their
axioms if and only if there exists a unique subjective probability measure π on Ω and
a utility function u, which is unique up to positive linear transformations, such that for
every h, g ∈ H,
h  g ⇔
∫
Ω
[∑
x∈X
h(ω)(x)u(x)
]
dπ(ω) ≥
∫
Ω
[∑
x∈X
g(ω)(x)u(x)
]
dπ(ω). (2.2)
This representation involves double integration: given an act h ∈ H, one ﬁrst determines
the decision-maker’s expected utility of the roulette lottery h(ω) for every state ω ∈
Ω. Then, the expectation of these expected utility values is taken under the subjective
measure π.
In the literature, there are several papers dealing with variations of the two frameworks
described in this section. For instance, Gul (1992) derives the subjective expected utility
theorem in a ﬁnite state variant of Savage’s setting with topological restrictions on the
set of consequences X. Sarin and Wakker (1997) simplify Anscombe and Aumann’s setup
by reducing their two-stage approach to a single-stage approach.
2.3 Ellsberg’s experiments
Daniel Ellsberg (1961) questioned the descriptive adequacy of the subjective expected
utility theory. He illustrated with the help of thought experiments that, when faced with
a special type of uncertainty, called “ambiguity”, the behavior of most subjects is not
consistent with a unique subjective prior distribution. Ellsberg viewed ambiguity as a sit-
uation in which the probabilities of some events are known, while for other events they are
unknown: “What is at issue might be called the ambiguity of this information, a quality
depending on the amount, type, reliability and ‘unanimity’ of information, and giving rise
to one’s degree of ‘conﬁdence’ in an estimate of relative likelihoods” (Ellsberg, 1961, p.
657). In the recent literature, ambiguity is mostly associated with situations where prob-
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abilities are imperfectly known. For instance, according to Camerer and Weber (1992, p.
330): “Ambiguity is uncertainty about probability, created by missing information that
is relevant and could be known.” That means, ambiguity also refers to situations without
known probabilities. The term “Knightian uncertainty” is often used as a synonym for
ambiguity. The reason is that Knight (1921) has already distinguished between measur-
able uncertainty (“risk”), which can be represented by probabilities, and unmeasurable
uncertainty (“uncertainty”), which cannot.
Ellsberg proposed two thought experiments. The ﬁrst experiment stems from Knight
(1921) and is as follows.
Two-urn experiment. There are two urns, I and II, each containing 100 balls, which
are either red or black. In urn I, there are 50 black balls and 50 red balls. The composition
of urn II is unknown. A subject can choose one of the two urns and bet on the color of a
ball drawn from this urn. There are four possible bets: “choose to draw from urn I, bet on
red” (f); “choose to draw from urn I, bet on black” (g); “choose to draw from urn II, bet
on red” (f ′) and “choose to draw from urn II, bet on black” (g′). If the subject wins the
bet, she gets $ 100, otherwise nothing. Table 2.2 summarizes the bets in the experiments.
Table 2.2: Ellsberg’s two-urn experiment
Urn I
Red Black
f 100 0
g 0 100
Urn II
Red Black
f ′ 100 0
g′ 0 100
Ellsberg reports that a majority of the people he asked “under nonexperimental condi-
tions” are indiﬀerent between betting on red and on black, given that the ball is drawn
from the same urn. That is, f ∼ g and f ′ ∼ g′. Given a bet on a particular color, they
strictly prefer the urn with known proportions, i.e., f ≻ f ′ and g ≻ g′. Furthermore, Ells-
berg observed a small minority of subjects with exactly opposite preferences, i.e., these
subjects strictly prefer to bet on Urn II. Both patterns of choices are not compatible with
the idea that the decision-maker has probabilistic beliefs. To see why, consider a subject
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with preferences f ≻ f ′ and g ≻ g′. From the observation f ≻ f ′, we may infer that the
subject considers it as more probable that a red ball is drawn from Urn I than from Urn
II. Similarly, from g ≻ g′, we may infer that she considers it to be more probable that
a black ball is drawn from Urn I than from Urn II. Apparently, these judgments are not
consistent with a well-deﬁned probability distribution. Hence, the choices of the subject
cannot be explained by subjective expected utility maximization. We can conclude that
the subject must violate some of the Savage axioms.
Ellsberg’s second experiment is a direct test of Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle.
One-urn experiment. There is an urn containing 30 red balls and 60 others that are
black and yellow in unknown proportion. One ball is to be drawn random from the urn.
There are two choice situations. In the ﬁrst choice situation, a subject is asked to choose
between the following bets: “bet on red” (f) and “bet on black” (g). In the second choice
situation, the subject can choose between the options: “bet on red or yellow” (f ′) and “bet
on black or yellow” (g′). The subject gets $ 100 if she wins the bet and nothing otherwise.
Table 2.3 summarizes the bets in the experiments.
Table 2.3: Ellsberg’s one-urn experiment
Red Black Yellow
f 100 0 0
g 0 100 0
f ′ 100 0 100
g′ 0 100 100
In the second experiment, Ellsberg frequently observed the following choice pattern: f ≻ g
and g′ ≻ f ′. This pattern is a direct violation of Axiom 1. Again, it is not consistent with
a subjective prior distribution. To see why, let R,B and Y denote the event that the ball
drawn is red, black or yellow and denote by π(E) the subjective probability of event E.
From f ≻ g, we may infer that π(R) > π(B), and from g′ ≻ f ′ that π(R∪Y ) < π(B∪Y ).
Obviously, this is not consistent with a probability distribution.
To sum up, Ellsberg observed that a majority of his subjects strictly prefer the urn
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with known proportions in the two-urn experiment and bets with known probabilities
in the one-urn experiment. These subjects can be termed “ambiguity averse” since they
apparently try to avoid ambiguous uncertainty. By now, there is ample empirical evidence
supporting Ellsberg’s observations, for a survey see Camerer and Weber (1992).
In an early reply to Ellsberg, Howard Raiﬀa (1961) suggested that ambiguous uncer-
tainty can be eliminated by randomization over acts. He proposed the following example:
Example 2.2 (cf. Raiﬀa, 1961, p. 693-694). Consider Ellsberg’s one-urn experiment.
Suppose a fair coin is tossed and the subject is asked to choose between the following
options: “Act f is taken if heads appears and act g′ is taken if tails appears” (A) and
“Act g is taken if heads appears and act f ′ is taken if tails appears” (B).
The options in Raiﬀa’s example can be viewed as objective 50-50 mixtures over Ellsberg’s
one-urn bets, i.e., Option A corresponds to 1/2 f+1/2 g’ and Option B to 1/2 g+ 1/2
f’. The consequences of either option depend on the coin toss and the selection of a ball.
Following Raiﬀa, either option leads to an “objective” 50-50 chance of getting $ 100 and
0. He claimed that “[..] options A and B are objectively identical!” (Raiﬀa, 1961, p. 694).
If we accept Raiﬀa’s view, we can conclude that ambiguity averse subjects must prefer
mixtures over acts. The uncertainty aversion axiom of Schmeidler (1989) is in line with
this conclusion (see Axiom 3 in Section 2.4). However, Raiﬀa’s view is controversial. To
my knowledge, there exists no strong evidence for his view.
2.4 Non-expected utility theory
Subjective expected utility theory has two characteristic features (see equation (2.1)
and (2.2)): (1) The decision-maker’s beliefs are probabilistic, i.e., her beliefs can be
represented by a single probability distribution deﬁned over the states of the world and (2)
the decision-maker applies the subjective expected utility decision criterion. Consequently,
by taking expectations, beliefs are used in a linear manner.
The features (1) and (2) are not inseparable. Machina and Schmeidler (1992) charac-
terize decision-makers that meet (1), but fail (2). In the words of Machina and Schmeidler
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(1992, p. 747): “[...] ’What does it take for choice behavior that does not necessarily
conform to the expected utility hypothesis to nonetheless be based on probabilistic be-
liefs?’ We will call such an agent a probabilistically sophisticated non-expected utility
maximizer.” Probabilistic sophistication is a weaker criterion than expected utility. Any
subjective expected utility maximizer is probabilistically sophisticated, but the converse is
not true. Apparently, the Ellsberg paradox, described in the previous section, challenges
not only subjective expected utility theory but also probabilistic sophistication.
Non-expected utility models can be roughly divided into two groups. In the ﬁrst
group, we ﬁnd non-expected utility models in which decision-makers are probabilistically
sophisticated. The second group consists of those which allow for non-probabilistic beliefs.
In the last decades, various non-expected utility models were developed. It is beyond the
scope of the present work to discuss all these models. Therefore, this section describes two
prominent approaches, which are relevant for this work: the non-additive prior or Choquet
model and the multiple prior model. Both approaches have been suggested in the wake
of the overwhelming empirical evidence conﬁrming Ellsberg’s observations. Hence, they
belong to the second group of non-expected utility models where decision-makers do not
necessarily have probabilistic beliefs. In the Choquet approach, subjective beliefs are
represented by a non-additive measure called capacity, in the multiple priors model, by a
set of priors.
Non-additive prior
Following Etner et al. (2012), the Choquet expected utility model, developed by David
Schmeidler (1989), is the ﬁrst axiomatically sound model of decision-making under ambi-
guity. In this model, beliefs are characterized by capacities.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (cf. Schmeidler, 1986, p. 255). Let Ω be a set of states of nature and
A a nonempty sigma-algebra of subsets of Ω. A capacity is a real-valued set function
ν : A → R that satisﬁes the following properties:
(i) ν(∅) = 0 and ν(Ω) = 1 (normalization),
(ii) for any E,F ∈ A, E ⊆ F implies ν(E) ≤ ν(F ) (monotonicity).
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A capacity is a generalization of a probability measure that does not necessarily satisfy
the property of sigma-additivity. Hence, a capacity can be seen as a non-additive measure
or prior. Choquet (1954) introduced an integration operation with respect to capacities:
Deﬁnition 2.2 (cf. Schmeidler, 1986, p. 255-256). The Choquet integral of a bounded
and A−measurable function φ : Ω→ R with respect to a capacity ν is
∫
Ω
φ dν =
0∫
−∞
[
ν({ω | φ(ω) ≥ t})− 1
]
dt+
∞∫
0
[
ν({ω | φ(ω) ≥ t})
]
dt,
where the integrals on the right-hand side of this equation are Riemann integrals.
Remark 2.1 (cf. Schmeidler, 1986, p. 257). Suppose φ has a ﬁnite range and takes the
values φ1 > φ2 > · · · > φk > 0. That is, φi, i = 1, . . . , k, denotes the ith highest value
of φ. Let Ei ⊆ Ω be the event in which outcome φi occurs, i.e., Ei is the preimage of φi
under φ. Note that the collection of sets {Ei}
n
i=1 is a partition of Ω. Let φk+1 := 0, then,
the Choquet integral of φ with respect to a capacity ν can be expressed as :
∫
Ω
φ dν =
k∑
i=1
(φi − φi+1) ν
( i⋃
j=1
Ej
)
.
In economic applications, we often consider situations in which the function φ has a
ﬁnite range, e.g., if the state space is assumed to be ﬁnite. The expression of the Choquet
integral in Remark 2.1 is helpful for gaining intuition about it. We may view the capacity ν
as a decision-maker’s belief, the function φ as an act and the values φi as the consequences
of φ. Interpreted in this way, the decision-maker evaluates an act according to the Choquet
integral as follows. She considers ﬁrst the lowest outcome of the act and then she adds
subsequent potential gains, weighted by her subjective assessments of the occurrence of
these gains.
Schmeidler (1989) uses the Anscombe-Aumann setup described in Section 2.2. His
axiomatization of Choquet expected utility theory is based on a weaker independence
axiom. In contrast to Axiom 2, Schmeidler’s comonotonic independence axiom postulates
independence only for comonotonic acts. One important property of the Choquet Integral
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is that it is additive for comonotonic functions. Comonotonicity stands for common
monotonicity and is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.3 (cf. Schmeidler, 1989, p. 575). Two acts h, g ∈ H are said to be comono-
tonic if there are no ω, ω′ ∈ Ω such that h(ω) ≻ h(ω′) and g(ω′) ≻ g(ω).
In the Anscombe-Aumann setting, the ﬁrst-stage outcomes are roulette lotteries. For this
reason, in Deﬁnition 2.3, monotonicity refers to preference orderings over lotteries. The
deﬁnition says that two acts are comonotonic if they induce the same ranking of states
in terms of the desirability of their outcomes. In other words, the same state yields the
most preferred lottery under both acts, the same state yields the second most preferred
lottery, and so on down the line.
Schmeidler (1989) proved that a preference relation  over H satisﬁes his axioms if
and only if there exists a unique capacity ν on Ω and a utility function u, which is unique
up to positive linear transformations, such that for every h, g ∈ H,
h  g ⇔
∫
Ω
[∑
x∈X
h(ω)(x)u(x)
]
dν ≥
∫
Ω
[∑
x∈X
g(ω)(x)u(x)
]
dν. (2.3)
This representation diﬀers from the Anscombe-Aumann representation (2.2) solely in that
the outer integral is a Choquet integral taken with respect to a capacity ν.
The following example illustrates that the Ellsberg paradox can be resolved by using
the Choquet approach.
Example 2.3. Consider Ellsberg’s one-urn experiment and a decision-maker with Cho-
quet expected utility preferences. Denote by ν the capacity which represents the decision-
maker’s belief. Let Ω = {R,B, Y } be the state space where R,B and Y denote the event
that the ball drawn is red, black or yellow.
If we assume that u(100) > u(0) and take the normalization u(0) := 0, the decision-maker
in Example 2.3 evaluates the four one-urn bets as follows:∫
Ω
u(f) dν = u(100)ν(R) and
∫
Ω
u(g) dν = u(100)ν(B),∫
Ω
u(f ′) dν = u(100)ν(R ∪ Y ) and
∫
Ω
u(g′) dν = u(100)ν(B ∪ Y ).
For some capacities, e.g., for the capacity
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ν(E) =


1/3 ifR ⊆ E,
2/3 ifB ∪ Y ⊆ E
0 otherwise
for E ⊂ Ω, and ν(Ω) = 1,
the decision-maker prefers f over g and g′ over f ′. This is the pattern that Ellsberg (1961)
frequently observed in his one-urn experiment.
Schmeidler (1989) also introduced a deﬁnition of uncertainty aversion, which is one
of the most commonly used deﬁnitions in the literature. However, there are alternative
deﬁnitions of uncertainty aversion, e.g., those provided by Epstein (1999) and Ghirardato
and Marinacci (2002). According to Schmeidler’s deﬁnition, a preference relation reveals
uncertainty aversion if a mixture over any two acts is weakly preferred to whichever of
the two acts that is not strictly preferred over the other.
Axiom 3 (Uncertainty aversion). A preference relation  on H reveals uncertainty aver-
sion if for all h, g ∈ H and any α ∈ [0, 1], h  g implies αh+ (1− α)g  g.
This deﬁnition is in line with the argument of Raiﬀa (1961) in that it requires a prefer-
ence for mixtures. Preferences that satisfy Axiom 3 are represented by a quasiconcave
function.1 In the context of the Choquet expected utility functional, Schmeidler (1989)
shows that quasiconcavity is equivalent to a convex capacity:
Deﬁnition 2.4. A capacity ν is said to be convex, if for all events E,F ∈ A, it holds
that ν(E) + ν(F ) ≤ ν(E ∪ F ) + ν(E ∩ F ).
A decision-maker whose beliefs are represented by a proper convex capacity puts more
weight on bad outcomes than an expected utility maximizer would. If the inequality in
Deﬁnition 2.4 is reversed, the capacity ν is called concave. When integrating with respect
to a concave capacity, more weight is placed on good outcomes. If a capacity is both
concave and convex, then it is additive, that is, a probability measure.
1A function V : M → R is called quasiconcave on a convex subset M of a real vector space if for all
x, y ∈M and all α ∈ [0, 1], it holds that V (αx+ (1− α)y) ≥ min{V (x), V (y)}.
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The Choquet expected utility model is a very general approach. For instance, Wakker
(1990) showed that the anticipated utility model by Quiggin (1982) and Yaari (1987) can
be considered as a special case of the Choquet approach.
Multiple priors
Another prominent model of decision-making under ambiguity is the multiple prior
model introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The key idea of this approach is
that, in case of ambiguous uncertainty, an individual has too little information to form a
unique prior probability distribution. Therefore, this model assumes that the individual
considers a set of priors as possible.
The maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is closely related
to the criterion suggested by Wald (1950) (cf. Section 2.1). In the words of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989, p. 143): “Hence our main result can be considered as an axiomatic
foundation of Wald’s criterion.”
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) also use the Anscombe-Aumann framework. The cru-
cial axioms in their setting are uncertainty aversion and certainty-independence. The
uncertainty aversion axiom is similar to Axiom 3. Certainty-independence is weaker than
Axiom 2 in that it only requires independence with respect to constant acts, i.e., acts that
yield the same roulette lottery in every state of the world.
The beliefs of a decision-maker whose preferences satisfy the axioms of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) can be represented by a closed and convex set of probability measures
on the states of the world, C. Furthermore, the decision-maker evaluates an act by the
minimal expected utility over all priors in her prior set. Consequently, she maximizes her
minimal expected utility when choosing among acts, formally, for every h, g ∈ H,
h  g ⇔ min
π∈C
∫
Ω
[∑
x∈X
h(ω)(x)u(x)
]
dπ(ω) ≥ min
π∈C
∫
Ω
[∑
x∈X
g(ω)(x)u(x)
]
dπ(ω). (2.4)
It can be easily shown that ambiguity-averse behavior in Ellsberg’s experiments can be
explained by the maxmin expected utility model. For instance, consider Example 2.3 and
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suppose that the decision-maker is a maxmin expected utility maximizer and her beliefs
are represented by the prior set
C =
{
π | π is a probability distribution over {R,B, Y } and π(R) = 1/3
}
.
Ghirardato et al. (2004) provide an axiomatization of the so-called α−maxmin ex-
pected utility model. This model is akin to the decision rule proposed by Arrow and
Hurwicz (1972). An α−maxmin expected utility decision-maker considers not only the
minimal expected utility over all priors in her prior set as in the representation (2.4)
but also the maximal expected utility. She evaluates an act by a convex combination of
minimal and maximal expected utility, where the parameter of the convex combination,
α ∈ [0, 1], can be interpreted as a measure of the decision-maker’s ambiguity attitude.
However, as shown by Eichberger et al. (2011), Ghirardato et al.’s axiomatization has a
ﬂaw: if we restrict attention to ﬁnite state spaces, α−MEU preferences satisfy Ghirardato
et al.’s axioms if and only if α = 0 or α = 1. That is, the preferences are either maxmin
or maxmax expected utility preferences.
The maxmin and Choquet expected utility model have a nonempty intersection. As
shown by Schmeidler (1986), the models coincide if the prior set, which represents the
decision-maker’s beliefs, is the core of a convex capacity. The core of a capacity is the
set of all probability measures that assign a higher probability to each event than the
capacity.
Deﬁnition 2.5. Let ν be a capacity deﬁned on a nonempty sigma-algebra of subsets A
of a state space Ω. The core of the capacity ν is the set
{
π : A → R | π is additive, π(Ω) = ν(Ω), and π(E) ≥ ν(E) for all E ∈ A
}
.
The Choquet expected utility of an act f with respect to a convex capacity ν coincides
with maxmin expected utility of f when the prior set C equals the set of probabilities in
the core of ν: ∫
Ω
u(f) dν = min
π∈core(ν)
∫
Ω
u(f) dπ(ω).
Chapter 3
Game-theoretic foundations
3.1 Historical background
The birth of formal game theory is often attributed to Zermelo (1913).2 Some text-
books state comparatively general propositions under the heading of Zermelo such as
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 91): “A ﬁnite game of perfect information has a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium.” Others stick closer to Zermelo’s original work, for example,
Eichberger (1993, p. 9): “In Chess, either white can force a win, or black can force a win,
or both sides can force a draw.” In fact, Zermelo presented his analysis in the context
of the game of chess. However, in his introductory words, Zermelo remarked that his
considerations also apply, in principle, to all two-person games without chance moves.
Subsequently, in the 1920s, several papers on game theory were published. For in-
stance, Kalma´r (1928-1929) oﬀered a generalization of Zermelo’s work. Particularly
important for the further development of game theory were a series of notes by Emile
Borel that appeared between 1921 and 1927,3 and, especially, the paper “Zur Theorie der
Gesellschaftsspiele” of von Neumann (1928).
Borel introduced the idea of pure and randomized strategies. Given a game, he wanted
to know whether it is possible to ﬁnd an optimal strategy, that is, a strategy “[...] that
gives the player who adopts it a superiority over every player who does not adopt it”
2However, applications of game theory to economics were published considerably earlier, e.g., Cournot
(1838/1897).
3See, for instance, Borel (1921/1953 , 1924/1953 , 1927/1953).
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(Borel, 1921/1953, p. 97). However, Borel’s investigations were restricted either to sym-
metric two-person zero-sum games or to speciﬁc examples of games.
Von Neumann’s paper can be viewed as the starting point of modern game theory. He
introduced a general description of the concept of a game based on its “rules” and proved
the well-known minimax theorem.4 By using this theorem, von Neumann showed that,
for every ﬁnite two-person zero-sum game, there exists a unique numerical value m (the
maxmin value) and a mixed strategy for each player (the maxmin strategy) such that,
given the other player’s maxmin strategy, player 1’s highest possible payoﬀ is m and that
of player 2 is −m. Moreover, player 1’s maxmin strategy is a best response to player 2’s
maxmin strategy and vice versa. In the last part of his paper, von Neumann aimed at
determining values analogous to the maxmin value for the players of three-person zero-
sum games. In this context, he developed the basic ideas of cooperative game theory. He
argued that two of the players can form a coalition against the third one and suggested
a solution based on the basic values for the players together with gains and losses, which
depend on which of the players actually cooperate with each other.
The ideas of von Neumann (1928) were further developed and extended by von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (1944). In their pathbreaking treatise, they provided a com-
prehensive conceptual framework for the theory of games, which includes a general set-
theoretical deﬁnition of a game. Without such a systematic framework, game theory
would be a collection of individual examples and special families of games. The ﬁrst part
of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s book (approximately the ﬁrst 200 pages) is devoted
to the conceptual framework and to two-person zero-sum games, while the remaining part
is mainly concerned with cooperative game theory. Their book did not provide a solution
concept for ﬁnite non-cooperative n-player games. This gap was closed by the celebrated
equilibrium concept of Nash (1950, 1951). The treatise of von Neumann and Morgen-
stern and Nash’s equilibrium concept are the cornerstones of modern game theory. The
following subsection further discusses some of these basic concepts.
4The minimax theorem can be expressed as follows (see von Neumann, 1928, p. 307-311). Let X ⊂ Rn
and Y ⊂ Rm be compact and convex sets. If f : X×Y → R is a continuous function that is quasiconcave in
x for each ﬁxed y ∈ Y and quasiconvex in y for each ﬁxed x ∈ X, then max
x
min
y
f(x, y) = min
y
max
x
f(x, y).
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3.2 Basic concepts of non-cooperative game theory
The forms that are usually used for representing games are the extensive form and the
normal (or strategic) form. An extensive-form game is a detailed description of a game
that captures its dynamic structure. It speciﬁes, amongst others, the game tree (i.e., who
moves when), what the players can do when they move, and what players know when it is
their turn to move. A formal deﬁnition of this representation is omitted here because it is
not directly relevant for the present thesis, and it would require additional notation which
would be of little use in the remainder of this work. The reader is referred to textbooks
such as Eichberger (1993) and Mas-Colell et al. (1995). A simpler way to describe a game
is to use the normal form, which can be viewed as a reduced version of the extensive form.
Deﬁnition 3.1. A normal-form game is a set GN =
〈
I, {Si}i∈I , X, γ, {vi}i∈I
〉
, where
(1) I is a ﬁnite set of players ;
(2) Si is the ﬁnite set of pure strategies of player i. Let S =×
i∈I
Si;
(3) X is a set of outcomes ;
(4) γ : S → X is an outcome function, which maps from strategy proﬁles onto outcomes;
(5) vi : X → R is the utility function of player i, which assigns a number to each outcome.
Note that an element of the set X captures the consequences for all players that are
induced by a strategy combination. For instance, an outcome of a strategy proﬁle can be
a vector of real numbers which represent monetary gains and losses of the players.
Remark 3.1. The set which consists of the elements (1)-(4) of the normal-form descrip-
tion above is called normal game-form.
Remark 3.2. Deﬁnition 3.1 is often simpliﬁed by leaving out the elements (3)-(5) and
replacing these by the payoﬀ function of each player i, ui : S → R, which corresponds to
the composition ui := vi ◦ γ.
Henceforth, unless noted otherwise, I will use the simpliﬁcation described in Remark 3.2.
The key elements of any game are players’ strategies. Several games can be analyzed
by using strategic dominance, which occurs when a player’s strategy is “better” than
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another strategy, no matter what the other players do. More precisely, a player’s strategy
strictly dominates another of her strategies if it leads to a strictly higher payoﬀ, regardless
of the strategies played by the opponents of that player. A strategy weakly dominates
another strategy if it never yields a lower payoﬀ and, for some of the opponents’ strategy
proﬁles, it yields a higher payoﬀ. We say that a strategy is strictly (weakly) dominant if
it strictly (weakly) dominates all other strategies. These notions of dominance also apply
to mixed strategies.
The concept of mixed strategies captures the idea that a player may randomize over
her pure strategies by using a random device for selecting a pure strategy. Another
possible interpretation is that mixed strategies represent a player’s uncertainty about the
pure strategy choices of her opponents. We will come back to this point in Section 3.3.
A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over pure strategies. Formally, a mixed
strategy of player i is a function σi : Si → [0, 1], which assigns to each pure strategy
si ∈ Si a probability σi(si) ≥ 0, where
∑
si∈Si
σi(si) = 1. Denote by Σi the set of all
mixed strategies of player i (i.e., the set of all probability distributions over Si), and let
Σ =×
i∈I
Σi. Nash (1950, 1951) assumed that players are expected utility maximizers,
and that they have rational expectations, i.e., their beliefs are consistent with the mixed
strategies that are actually played.
Assumption 3.1. Player i’s payoﬀ, EUi(σ), from a mixed strategy combination σ ∈ Σ
is the expected value of the payoﬀs from the corresponding pure strategy proﬁles:
EUi(σ) =
∑
s∈S
( ∏
j∈I
σj(sj)
)
ui(s).
Since, according to Assumption 3.1, any combination of degenerate mixed strategies is
payoﬀ equivalent to a pure strategy proﬁle, one can view a pure strategy as the special case
of a mixed strategy. Consequently, mixed strategies can be seen as a natural generalization
of pure strategies.
We may now turn to Nash’s solution concept for non-cooperative games. A Nash
equilibrium of a game is a strategy proﬁle in which each player plays a best response to
the strategies of the other players. From now on, denote “player i’s opponents” by “−i”.
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Deﬁnition 3.2. A strategy combination (σ∗i , σ
∗
−i) ∈ Σ is an equilibrium point (or, a Nash
equilibrium) in game GN if
σ∗i ∈ argmax
σi∈Σi
EUi (σi, σ
∗
−i) for each player i.
As shown by Nash (1950, 1951), there exists an equilibrium point in every ﬁnite normal-
form game. Furthermore, for the special case of two-person zero-sum games, Nash’s
concept coincides with the solution concept suggested by von Neumann (1928). In these
games, Nash equilibrium strategies are maxmin strategies, which are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.3. A strategy of player i is a maxmin strategy if it solves
max
σi∈Σi
min
σ−i∈Σ−i
EUi (σi, σ−i).
Several reﬁnements of Nash equilibrium have been proposed. A comprehensive survey
can be found in van Damme (1983). The remaining part of this subsection describes the
concept of subgame perfection since this reﬁnement will be used in Chapter 4. Subgame
perfection was introduced by Selten (1965) and captures the requirement of sequential
rationality in dynamic games. Firstly, we need to specify what a subgame is. Many
extensive-form games contain parts that could be viewed as games in themselves. Such
smaller games that are embedded in a larger one and the game as a whole are called
subgames.
Deﬁnition 3.4. A subgame is a subset of a game that meets the following properties:
(i) It starts with a single node, i.e., the initial node is a singleton information set.
(ii) It contains all the nodes that are successors of the initial node and only these nodes.
(iii) If a node in a particular information set is contained in the subgame, then so are all
of the nodes that are elements of this information set.
The notion of a subgame shall be brieﬂy illustrated with the help of Example 3.1 below.
The game in the example has two subgames: the game itself and a proper subgame that
corresponds to the part of the game beginning with player 1’s decision between H and D.
Furthermore, the game has three pure strategy Nash equilibria:
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(Play L and H if R, Play H),
(Play L and D if R, Play H),
(Play R and D if R, Play D).
Example 3.1 (cf. Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p. 274). Consider the following game.
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However, (Play D, Play D) is the sole Nash equilibrium in the proper subgame when we
consider it separately. Therefore, player 2’s intention to play H should the game reach
the subgame can be considered as a “non-credible threat”. Since player 1 can expect that
both players will play D in the subgame, she should play R. Hence, only the last of the
three Nash equilibria above is sequentially rational. The concept of subgame perfection
eliminates non-credible threats by requiring that a solution to a dynamic game must
induce a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
Deﬁnition 3.5. A strategy combination σ∗ ∈ Σ in a game is a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPNE) if it induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the game.
3.3 Uncertainty in games
In general, one can distinguish between two sources of uncertainty in games. The ﬁrst
source can be termed strategic or endogenous uncertainty and refers to a player’s uncer-
tainty about the strategy choice of other players. This source is inherent in the strategic
situation. The second source, environmental or exogenous uncertainty, arises from chance
moves or from incomplete information.5 The latter refers to a situation in which some or
5The distinction between chance moves and incomplete information is fuzzy. For instance, a game
with payoﬀ uncertainty can also be viewed as a very special case of an incomplete information game.
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all players may lack information about the “rules” of a game or, equivalently, about its
normal (or extensive) form. For instance, a player can be uncertain about other players’
or her own payoﬀs, strategy spaces, et cetera. In the model of Harsanyi (1967-68), which
will be described in this section, exogenous uncertainty can be associated with nature’s
move at the beginning of the game. Furthermore, this section describes several approaches
that have been suggested to capture more generally strategic uncertainty.
Strategic uncertainty
In Section 3.2, it was pointed out that mixed strategies can be interpreted as a player’s
uncertainty about the strategy choice of other players. According to this interpretation,
Assumption 3.1 can be questioned since it implicitly requires that a player must bear
as much uncertainty about her own strategy choice as her opponents do. This section
discusses generalizations of Nash equilibrium for complete information games that do not
require Assumption 3.1. That is, these equilibrium concepts allow for players with non-
expected utility preferences over the lotteries induced by mixed strategy combinations.
Crawford (1990) shows that Nash equilibrium may fail to exist when players prefer-
ences cannot be represented by functions that are quasiconcave in the probabilities. To
accommodate more general preferences, he introduces an “equilibrium in beliefs”, which
exists in any ﬁnite complete information normal-form game where players have contin-
uous preference functions. For simplicity, we will introduce this concept for two-person
games, as Crawford does. In Chapter 5, a n-player version of equilibrium in beliefs
will be described and used. Suppose that instead of Assumption 3.1, player i’s prefer-
ences over mixed strategy proﬁles are represented by an arbitrary continuous function
Vi : Σ1 × Σ2 → R. For any set T ⊆ Σ−i of mixed strategies, conv[T ] ⊆ Σ−i denotes the
convex hull of T . An element βi ∈ conv[T ] can be viewed as a representation of player i’s
beliefs about the other player’s strategy choice from T since any expectation taken with
respect to a second-order probability distribution over T will lie in its convex hull. Player
i’s best responses to a belief βi about her opponent’s strategy choice are
Ri(βi) = {σi | σi ∈ argmax
σi∈Σi
Vi (σi, βi)}.
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An equilibrium in beliefs is a belief system in which player 1’s belief β1 about player
2’s mixed strategy lies in the convex hull of 2’s best replies, given her belief β2 about
player 1’s mixed strategy, and vice versa.
Deﬁnition 3.6 (cf. Crawford, 1990, p. 139). An equilibrium in beliefs in a two-person
game GN is a belief system (β
∗
1 , β
∗
2) such that
β∗2 ∈ conv[R1(β
∗
1)] and β
∗
1 ∈ conv[R2(β
∗
2)].
The notion of equilibrium in beliefs coincides with Nash equilibrium if players’ prefer-
ences are quasiconcave. In this case, the concept can be considered as a formal foundation
for the interpretation of mixed strategies as players’ beliefs: “[...] what I have called equi-
librium in beliefs is therefore often viewed simply as an alternative interpretation of Nash
equilibrium, with the equilibrating variables viewed not as players’ strategy choices, but
as their beliefs” (Crawford, 1990, p. 140).
The equilibrium in beliefs approach maintains the assumption that players have prob-
abilistic beliefs. In the literature, there are several equilibrium concepts that allow for
players with non-probabilistic beliefs. These papers on strategic ambiguity can be roughly
divided into two groups. The ﬁrst group consists of Klibanoﬀ (1996), Lo (1996), and
Lehrer (2012), who assume that players explicitly randomize. They provide equilibrium
concepts with weaker requirements regarding the consistency between beliefs and strate-
gies than Nash equilibrium. In contrast, the approach of the second group, which includes
Dow and Werlang (1994), Eichberger and Kelsey (2000, 2014), and Marinacci (2000), is
based on the interpretation of a mixed strategy as a player’s belief about the pure strategy
choices of his opponents. The equilibrium deﬁnitions of these papers require consistency
conditions between the beliefs that players hold. In Chapter 6, the concept of Eichberger
and Kelsey (2014) will be applied and described in some detail.
The approach of the ﬁrst group has the drawback that, typically, players’ beliefs will
not coincide with the strategies that are actually played. A criticism of the approach of
the second group is that it has limited abilities to predict behavior since it usually does
not specify the strategies that are played.
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Incomplete information
In analyzing a game with incomplete information, we need to deal with inﬁnite hier-
archies of beliefs. For example, consider a game in which player i does not know some
parameter of the game. In such a game, player i’s strategy choice will depend on her
beliefs about this parameter, her beliefs about the beliefs of the other players about the
parameter, her beliefs about the other players’ beliefs about her own beliefs about the
parameter, and so on ad inﬁnitum. A game model that explicitly captures these processes
would be very complicated and diﬃcult to analyze.
To overcome this diﬃculty, Harsanyi (1967-68) suggested another approach in which
each player’s hierarchy of beliefs is summarized in a single entity, called the player’s type.
At the beginning of a game, a “nature move” determines each player’s type. Players’
uncertainty about the rules of the game is fully represented by the uncertainty about
the types. Harsanyi assumed that players are Bayesian expected utility maximizers and
that they have a common prior distribution over the type space.6 He showed that, under
this assumption, his approach can be used to transform incomplete information games
into game-theoretically equivalent games with complete, but imperfect, information, com-
monly known as Bayesian games.7 Formally, a Bayesian game is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.7. A Bayesian game is an ordered set GB =
〈
I, {Ai,Θi, ui, πi}i∈I
〉
, where
(1) I is a ﬁnite set of players.
(2) Ai is the ﬁnite set of actions of player i. Let A =×
i∈I
Ai.
(3) Θi is the ﬁnite set of potential types of player i. Let Θ =×
i∈I
Θi.
(4) ui : A×Θ→ R is player i’s payoﬀ function.
(5) πi is player i’s belief about the other players’ types.
In a Bayesian game, a strategy σi ∈ Σi of player i prescribes a mixed action for each
possible type of player i, formally, a strategy is a mapping σi : Θi → ∆(Ai), where ∆(Ai)
denotes the set of all probability measures over Ai.
6Decision-makers are said to be Bayesian expected utility maximizers if they have expected utility
preferences and update their beliefs according to Bayes’ rule in light of new information.
7A game has imperfect information if all or some players, when making any decision, are not perfectly
informed about other players’ and/or own previous moves and/or about previous chance moves.
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A Bayesian game can be solved by using either players’ interim or their ex-ante ex-
pected utility. These notions of expected utility can be thought of as issues of timing.
At the “interim stage”, each player has learned her type but not the types of the other
players. The interim expected utility of player i with type θi of a strategy proﬁle σ is
EUi(σ | θi) =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
π(θ−i|θi)
(∑
a∈A
(∏
j∈I
σj(aj | θj)
)
ui(a, θi, θ−i)
)
, (3.1)
where π(θ−i|θi) denotes the probability of θ−i under the condition that i knows she is of
type θi, and σj(aj | θj) is the probability of action aj that strategy σj prescribes for θj.
At the “ex-ante stage”, players know nothing about anyone’s actual type. The ex-ante
expected utility of player i from a mixed strategy proﬁle σ is
EUi(σ) =
∑
θi∈Θi
π(θi)
(
EUi(σ | θi)
)
. (3.2)
A solution to a Bayesian game can be deﬁned by using either (3.1) or (3.2).
Deﬁnition 3.8. A strategy combination σ∗ ∈ Σ is
(i) an interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium in game GB if
σ∗i ∈ argmax
σi∈Σi
EUi (σi, σ
∗
−i | θi) for each player i and all θi ∈ Θi,
(ii) an ex-ante Bayesian Nash equilibrium in game GB if
σ∗i ∈ argmax
σi∈Σi
EUi (σi, σ
∗
−i) for each player i.
The two equilibrium notions in Deﬁnition 3.8 are equivalent if π(θi) > 0 for all θi ∈ Θi (see
Harsanyi, 1967-68, p. 181, 321). In Harsanyi’s framework, this equivalence results from
the fact that Bayesian expected utility maximizers show dynamically consistent behavior.
In models with non-expected utility players, interim equilibrium concepts may diﬀer from
ex-ante equilibrium concepts. In games without private information, players do not know
their types. Consequently, interim approaches cannot be used to analyze these games. In
Chapter 4 and 5, an ex-ante equilibrium concept will be used since we mainly consider
games with payoﬀ uncertainty but without private information. In Chapter 6, an interim
concept will be used in the context of the quasi Bayesian model.
Chapter 4
Spatial competition under
uncertainty
This chapter, based on Kauﬀeldt andWiesenfarth (2014), aims at analyzing the impact
of demand uncertainty on ﬁrms’ product design decisions under duopolistic competition.
A well-known and widely studied model of product diﬀerentiation is the location-then-
price duopoly game by Hotelling (1929).8 While there is a vast literature on extensions
of Hotelling’s model, there are almost no models that incorporate demand ambiguity (see
Section 4.1.1). To our knowledge, the only exception is Kro´l (2012). In his model, ﬁrms
face complete ignorance, i.e., they do not have any probabilistic information.
In this chapter, we develop a general Hotelling model that incorporates partial ambigu-
ous uncertainty about the market demand which can also be interpreted as the degree of
ﬁrms’ conﬁdence in their prior beliefs. Our model is based on the Choquet expected util-
ity approach of Schmeidler (1989) described in Section 2.4. More speciﬁcally, the model
assumes that ﬁrms’ beliefs are represented by so-called neo-additive capacities introduced
by Chateauneuf et al. (2007).9 This type of capacity is particularly useful in the context
of ﬁrms since it explicitly incorporates the classical decision criteria as special cases, i.e.,
it incorporates the expected utility criterion and the Wald and Arrow/Hurwicz criterion
8The ”location” in Hotelling’s game is typically interpreted as a position in a geographical or product
type space. In this chapter, we focus on the latter interpretation.
9Neo stands for “non-extreme-outcome”.
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addressed in Section 2.1.10
This study makes a valuable contribution to the literature by providing additional
analytical tools for understanding product diﬀerentiation under demand uncertainty.11 In
our view, the capacity model oﬀers more plausible explanations for some real-life phenom-
ena. Furthermore, it provides a unifying framework for the model of Kro´l (2012) and the
probabilistic model of Meagher and Zauner (2004). In fact, the models of Meagher and
Zauner12 (or MZ, for short) and Kro´l are special cases of the capacity model. We believe
that our model adds to these models by ﬁlling their gaps. This will be explained in more
detail in Section 4.3. In particular, Kro´l’s analysis is based on variations of the size of
the support of the uncertainty. However, according to the commonly used updating rules,
new information will decrease the size of the support but it will not increase the support.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the related lit-
erature and describe our model in detail. Section 4.2 provides our results. First, we
derive ﬁrms’ pure strategy subgame-perfect product design choices for the Hotelling game
with ambiguity. Then, we carry out a comparative static analysis with respect to all
model parameters and discuss their implications for equilibrium product characteristics
and Choquet expected proﬁts. Section 4.3 is concerned with implications for possible
applications of the Hotelling model under demand location uncertainty. Finally, Section
4.4 concludes with a summary of the main results and a discussion of our ﬁndings. Unless
noted otherwise, the proofs of the propositions are given in Section 4.5.
4.1 Preliminaries
4.1.1 Related literature
Hotelling’s original model consists of two ﬁrms and uniformly distributed consumers
along a compact interval facing linear transportation costs. At the ﬁrst stage of the game,
10This aspect will be further elaborated in Section 4.1.3 and Remark 4.1 and 4.4.
11Besides ﬁrms’ ambiguity attitude, we distinguish four diﬀerent sources of ambiguous uncertainty
and determine their inﬂuence on ﬁrms’ product design choices: the variance of ﬁrms’ prior beliefs, the
degree of ambiguity, the size of the support of the uncertainty and the magnitude of the parameter of
consumers’ quadratic cost functions.
12With a technical restriction. For more details, see Section 4.2, especially Remark 4.1 and 4.3.
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ﬁrms choose simultaneously their locations on this interval. At the second stage, ﬁrms
face price competition. Several papers study extensions or variants of Hotelling ’s model,
see, e.g., Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992) for a survey. In an early paper, D’Aspre´mont
et al. (1979) show that a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed under
linear cost functions. As a resort to this complication, D’Aspre´mont et al. replaced
Hotelling’s original assumption of linear transportation costs by quadratic ones. In the
literature, Hotelling models with quadratic cost functions are frequently referred to as
“AGT-models”, where AGT stands for “D’Aspre´mont, Gabszewicz and Thisse”.
There are several papers that examine Hotelling models with demand uncertainty. For
instance, Balvers and Szerb (1996) consider a Hotelling model that incorporates random
shocks on the quality of each ﬁrm’s product under the assumption that there is no price
competition. Harter (1996) studies a model with demand location uncertainty where ﬁrms
enter the market sequentially. Similar to Harter, Casado-Izaga (2000),13 and MZ (2004,
2005) discuss extensions of Hotelling’s model in which demand uncertainty is introduced
by enabling the midpoint of the consumer interval to be probabilistic. MZ (2005) gen-
eralize Casado-Izaga (2000) by parametrizing the length of the support. They ﬁnd that
equilibrium diﬀerentiation increases in the size of the support. MZ (2004) restrict this
support to compact subsets of the interval
[
−1
2
, 1
2
]
but allow for a broad class of density
functions. Again, MZ show that uncertainty constitutes a diﬀerentiation force.
All the contributions above assume that ﬁrms’ beliefs are represented by a unique
and common prior. As mentioned above, an exception is the model of Kro´l (2012).
He introduces complete ignorance into the framework of MZ and examines, amongst
others, the inﬂuence of ﬁrms’ ambiguity attitudes on their decisions given ﬁrms use the
Arrow/Hurwicz decision criterion. Kro´l ﬁnds that uncertainty can be an agglomeration
force if ﬁrms are suﬃciently pessimistic.
13Casado-Izaga (2000) assume that consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval [Θ,Θ + 1]
where Θ is drawn from a uniform distribution [0, 1]. Consequently, the midpoint of the consumer interval
follows implicitly a uniform distribution on [12 ,
3
2 ].
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4.1.2 The basic model
Our framework is inspired by the modiﬁed AGT-model of MZ (2004). There are two
ﬁrms, i = 1, 2, interacting in a two-stage Hotelling duopoly game. Each ﬁrm produces a
homogeneous commodity at constant marginal production costs which are normalized to
zero. At the ﬁrst stage of the game, ﬁrms select simultaneously their product character-
istics xi from the real line under the assumption that x1 ≤ x2. At the second stage, ﬁrms
face price competition setting prices pi ∈ R+ simultaneously as well.
Furthermore, there is a unit mass of consumers, each consumer being uniquely character-
ized by a speciﬁc taste, s ∈ R, representing her ideal commodity. Consumer tastes are
assumed to be uniformly distributed on an interval of the form [M − 1
2
,M + 1
2
] where
M ∈ R. A customer whose taste is located at s and consumes product i, faces a disutility
from not consuming her ideal product. Consumers’ utility losses depend on the squared
distance between s and the selected product design xi, formally t(s−xi)
2 where t ∈ R++.14
In addition, customers need to pay the price pi of product i. As a consequence, total costs
are given by pi + t(s − xi)
2. Moreover, we assume that customers purchase one unit of
the homogeneous good from the ﬁrm that brings about the lowest total costs. Implicitly,
this guarantees that consumers’ outside option is non-binding. In other words, there is
no reservation price.
In the certainty model M and t are ﬁxed and exogenously given parameters known to
both ﬁrms throughout the game. In the risk model of MZ (2004), M is unknown to both
ﬁrms, whereas the scaling parameter t is normalized to 1. In the model of Kro´l (2012),
ﬁrms face ambiguity with respect to (t,M) resolving ambiguity with the Arrow/Hurwicz
α-maxmin criterion. Similar to these models, we presume that the realization (tˆ, Mˆ) of
(t,M) is revealed to both ﬁrms before the price competition.
Assumption 4.1. Uncertainty is resolved at the second stage of the game before the
price competition.
The rationale behind this assumption lies in the fact that most ﬁrms are able to adjust
prices more easily than product designs (see MZ, 2004). For instance, if actual sales
14The parameter t allows for an up- or downward distortion of this quadratic disutility.
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volumes diﬀer from estimated sales volumes, ﬁrm managers usually are in the position to
readjust retail prices accordingly.
In addition, we assume that ﬁrms dispose of some probabilistic information condensed
in a common prior π. We refer to π as “reference probability distribution” or “reference
prior”. Henceforth, let Eπ denote the expectation taken with respect to π. Similar to the
risk case, we need several assumptions concerning the reference probability π which are
summarized in Assumption 4.2.
Assumption 4.2. The reference prior π on (t,M) satisﬁes the subsequent requirements:
(R1) The variance of M exist: Eπ[M
2] <∞.
(R2) The expectation of M is normalized to zero: Eπ[M ] = 0.
(R3) The distribution of M has no atoms.
(R4) The support of M is given by the symmetric interval [−L,L] ⊆
[
−1
2
, 1
2
]
.
(R5) The support of t is given by the interval [t, t] where t ∈ (0, 1] and t ≥ 1.
(R6) The expectation of t is normalized to 1: Eπ[t] = 1.
(R7) The random variables t and M are uncorrelated.
At the ﬁrst stage of the game, the random variable M enters quadratically into each
ﬁrm’s objective function.15 This observation provides a justiﬁcation why ﬁrms’ product
design choices solely depend on the ﬁrst and second moment of M . On these grounds,
Assumption (R1) guarantees the existence of best-response functions. Moreover, taking
(R1) and (R4) together, we can formulate the following lemma which proves to be very
useful for the mathematical considerations in the comparative statics section.
Lemma 4.1. The Requirements (R1) and (R4) imply
Eπ[M ] ∈ [−L,L] and Varπ(M) ∈ [0, L
2].
15See equation (4.1) and Lemma 4.5.
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The Requirements (R2) and (R6) are introduced for reasons of symmetry and tractabil-
ity. Requirement (R3) is purely technical in nature and can be replaced in order to allow
for discrete distributions or mixtures of continuous and discrete distributions. (R4) makes
sure that the support of M is a compact subset of the interval [−1
2
, 1
2
] restricting the size
of uncertainty to be relatively small. Furthermore, it assures that the extreme intervals
for possible realizations of the consumer distribution [−L− 1
2
,−L+ 1
2
] and [L− 1
2
, L+ 1
2
] al-
ways have a non-empty intersection. Without this assumption, we would have to consider
three cases:
(1) The ﬁrm located left becomes a monopolist.
(2) Both ﬁrms share the market.
(3) The ﬁrm located right becomes a monopolist.
Cases (1) and (3) only occur if the size of uncertainty is large enough.16 In this study, we
intend to restrict the analysis to the duopoly case (2). Therefore, we restrict the size of
uncertainty so that only the second case applies. Furthermore, (R4) and (R5) imply that
the support of π is a subset of [t, t]× [−L,L]. Lastly, (R7) ensures that we can disentangle
the eﬀects of t and M .
4.1.3 Demand ambiguity
We introduce ambiguity by assuming that ﬁrms’ beliefs are represented by non-additive
probabilities or capacities. Our analysis relies on a distinct class of capacities, called neo-
additive capacities, axiomatized by Chateauneuf et al. (2007).
Deﬁnition 4.1 (cf. Eichberger et al., 2009, p. 359). Let π be a probability distribution
on Ω = [t, t]× [−L,L] satisfying Assumption 4.2 and let A be an algebra of events deﬁned
on Ω. Then, for α, δ ∈ [0, 1], a neo-additive capacity ν is deﬁned by ν(∅) = 0, ν(Ω) = 1,
and ν(E) = δα + (1− δ)π(E) where E ∈ A is a nonempty and strict subset of Ω.
16See MZ (2005) for a detailed investigation of these cases for the risk model.
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From our point of view, neo-additive capacities display several nice features. The param-
eter δ can be interpreted as a measure of ambiguity or of ﬁrms’ conﬁdence in the common
reference prior π. Thus, one can contemplate our model as a setting where ﬁrms exhibit
uncertainty with respect to their prior beliefs due to imprecise or unreliable information.
Moreover, the parameter α describes ﬁrms’ attitude towards ambiguity. The higher α, the
more pessimistic ﬁrm managers are. As a result, neo-additive capacities allow for a clear
separation between the degree of ambiguity and ﬁrms’ ambiguity attitude which is, as we
want to argue in this chapter, essential for many economic applications. Consequently,
we assume that the neo-additive capacity represents ﬁrms’ ex-ante uncertainty.
Assumption 4.3. Each ﬁrm’s belief on (t,M) is represented by a neo-additive capacity.
The rationale speaking for the introduction of neo-additive capacities lies in the fact
that ﬁrms might not completely trust the information available at the time of making
their product choice. There are multiple reasons why this might be the case, e.g., ﬁrms
introducing newly innovated products into the market might dispose of data on similar
products that are already established in the market but have no data on the new good.
It seems plausible that ﬁrms use this data to predict the market outcome, still ﬁrms
cannot account for short-term trends in consumer tastes. Furthermore, data reliability
is closely tied to the comparability of the reference product with the newly innovated
product. The more heterogeneous both products are, the less plausible it seems to rely
on available data on the reference product. Neo-additive capacities allow for a model of
partial information in which ﬁrms have a certain stock of data available whose reliability
might be questionable up to a certain degree. Interpreted in this way, the model by
Kro´l (2012) represents a situation where ﬁrms have ex-ante no information about the
distribution of consumer tastes or completely distrust the information available at the time
of making their product design choices. Neo-additive capacities allow for an additional
interpretative component with respect to a multitude of possible real-world applications
of Hotelling models under uncertainty by adding an additional explanatory source for
increasing or decreasing product diﬀerentiation under ambiguity.
4. Spatial competition under uncertainty 38
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium with ambiguity
In this section, we determine equilibrium product diﬀerentiation under ambiguity by
backward induction. In a ﬁrst step, we solve the price subgame at the second stage where
the midpoint M of the consumer distribution and the cost parameter t are ﬁxed and
known to both ﬁrms.
Price subgame
According to Assumption 4.1, the realization (tˆ, Mˆ) is known to both ﬁrms at the
second stage. Equilibrium prices are zero if ﬁrms do not diﬀerentiate their products. Oth-
erwise, ﬁrms’ equilibrium prices depend on the distance between ﬁrms’ averaged product
design x¯ := x1+x2
2
and the realized midpoint Mˆ . There is an interior equilibrium where
each ﬁrm charges a positive price:
Lemma 4.2 (Interior price equilibrium). If x1 ≤ x2 and (Mˆ − x¯) ∈ [−
3
2
, 3
2
], ﬁrms charge
the subsequent equilibrium prices:
p∗1 =
2
3
tˆ∆x
(
x¯− Mˆ +
3
2
)
and p∗2 =
2
3
tˆ∆x
(
−x¯+ Mˆ +
3
2
)
Proof. See Anderson et al. (1997, p. 107) and Meagher and Zauner (2004, p. 203).
Apart from the interior equilibrium, there are two more boundary equilibria where one of
the two ﬁrms becomes a monopolist:
Lemma 4.3 (Boundary price equilibria). If x1 ≤ x2 and (Mˆ − x¯) /∈ [−
3
2
, 3
2
], ﬁrms charge
the subsequent equilibrium prices:
p∗1 = 2tˆ∆x
(
x¯− Mˆ − 1
2
)
and p∗2 = 0 if (Mˆ − x¯) < −
3
2
or
p∗2 = 2tˆ∆x
(
Mˆ − x¯− 1
2
)
and p∗1 = 0 if (Mˆ − x¯) >
3
2
.
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Proof. See Anderson et al. (1997, p. 107) and Meagher and Zauner (2004, p. 203).
Product design competition
As shown in the previous subsection, one obtains for a ﬁxed pair (x1, x2) of prod-
uct characteristics a unique equilibrium for the price subgame. By making use of the
equilibrium prices from Lemma 4.2 and 4.3, we obtain ﬁrms’ second stage proﬁts for the
realization (tˆ, Mˆ) depending on ﬁrms’ product characteristics:
Πi(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ) =


tˆ∆x
[
1 + 2 (−1)i(Mˆ − x¯)
]
for (−1)i (Mˆ − x¯) > 3
2
tˆ∆x
[
3(−1)i + 2(Mˆ − x¯)
]2
/18 for (Mˆ − x¯) ∈ [−3
2
, 3
2
]
0 otherwise
, (4.1)
where x¯ := x1+x2
2
, ∆x := x2 − x1 and j := 3− i.
In the following, we elaborate on each ﬁrm’s objective function at the ﬁrst stage of the
game. In order to do so, we rely on the fact that the second piece of (4.1) is monotonic
in (tˆ, Mˆ) as speciﬁed in Lemma 4.4 below.
Lemma 4.4. If the condition (Mˆ − x¯) ∈ [−3
2
, 3
2
] is met, ﬁrm i’s proﬁt function
Πi(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ) is strictly increasing in tˆ, strictly decreasing in Mˆ for ﬁrm 1, and strictly
increasing for ﬁrm 2, provided that x1 < x2.
At the ﬁrst stage of the game, the distribution of (t,M) is unknown. In accordance with
Assumption 4.3 and Deﬁnition 4.1, ﬁrms consider the Choquet expected value of their
ﬁrst stage proﬁts, which we denote by CEUi[xi, xj, t,M ] for ﬁrm i ∈ {1, 2}. Note that
the Choquet-expectation is taken with respect to a neo-additive capacity ν. Following
Lemma 3.1 in Chateauneuf et al. (2007), we obtain the representation (4.2) of ﬁrm i’s
Choquet expected proﬁt at the ﬁrst stage of the game.
CEUi[xi, xj, t,M ] =
∫
Πi(xi, xj, t,M)dν = (1− δ) Eπ[Πi(xi, xj, t,M)]
+ δ[(1− α)max{Πi(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ) | (tˆ, Mˆ) ∈ supp(t,M)}
+ αmin{Πi(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ) | (tˆ, Mˆ) ∈ supp(t,M)}]
. (4.2)
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Remark 4.1. These Choquet expected proﬁts allow for a nice interpretation, namely
that they generalize Hotelling models treated in the literature before. For δ = 0 and a
constant scaling factor t = 1, we obtain the model of MZ (2004) with a normalized mean
of M . In case of δ = 1 and t = 1, the framework boils down to the model of Kro´l (2012).
Thus, we can consider these speciﬁcations as extreme cases of the capacity model.
At ﬁrst, consider the second part of equation (4.2). Making use of Lemma 4.4, we
obtain for (Mˆ − x¯) ∈ [−3
2
, 3
2
] the following explicit functional relationships:
max{Π1(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ) | (tˆ, Mˆ) ∈ supp(t,M)} = Π1(x1, x2, t,−L)
min{Π1(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ) | (tˆ, Mˆ) ∈ supp(t,M)}] = Π1(x1, x2, t, L)
max{Π2(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ) | (tˆ, Mˆ) ∈ supp(t,M)} = Π2(x1, x2, t, L)
min{Π2(xi, xj, tˆ, Mˆ) | (tˆ, Mˆ) ∈ supp(t,M)}] = Π2(x1, x2, t,−L)
. (4.3)
Remark 4.2. One can interpret these results as follows. Firm 1’s best-case scenario
occurs when the realized midpoint Mˆ of the consumer interval equals the lower support
boundary −L. This is true since we assume, w.l.o.g. (without loss of generality), that ﬁrm
1 is the ﬁrm whose product characteristic is located left of ﬁrm 2’s product characteristic.
Therefore, it is more convenient for ﬁrm 1 if the consumer distribution is located closer to
its own product design. Similarly, ﬁrm 1’s worst-case scenario occurs when the midpoint
of the consumer interval takes as realization the upper support boundary L. For ﬁrm 2
the opposite is true.
The ﬁrst term of ﬁrm i’s Choquet expected proﬁt equals the “usual” expectation of
its proﬁt function with respect to the reference prior Eπ[Πi(x1, x1, t,M)]. In order to
elaborate on this part, we need the following Lemma which can be considered as an
analogue to the global competition lemma in Meagher and Zauner (2004).17
Lemma 4.5 (Global competition). Under Assumptions 1,2, and 3, one has at any pure
strategy SPNE for the Hotelling game with ambiguous demand location uncertainty that
the support [−L,L] of M is contained in [x¯− 3
2
, x¯+ 3
2
], formally [−L,L] ⊂
[
x¯− 3
2
, x¯+ 3
2
]
.
17For the Hotelling model under certainty, Anderson et al. (1997) point out a similar property in
footnote 8.
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Lemma 4.5 proves very useful when it comes to determining ﬁrms’ subgame-perfect prod-
uct design choices. In fact, due to Lemma 4.3, one could expect that there are equilibria
where, for some realizations of uncertainty, one or the other ﬁrm can monopolize the
market. However, according to Lemma 4.5, ﬁrm i’s objective function at the ﬁrst stage of
the game is given by the Choquet expected value of the second piece of (4.1). The global
competition lemma implies that Eπ[Πi(xi, xj, t,M)] depends solely on the the mean vector
Eπ[(t,M)] = (µt, µM) and the variance-covariance matrix
Covπ(t,M) =

 σ2t 0
0 σ2M

 .
The following lemma provides an explicit mathematical form for Eπ[Πi(xi, xj, t,M)].
Lemma 4.6. If x1 ≤ x2 w.l.o.g., then, under Assumptions 1,2, and 3, at any pure strategy
SPNE for the Hotelling game under uncertainty, ﬁrms choose product characteristics,
(x∗1, x
∗
2), such that ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt w.r.t. the reference prior π is
Eπ[Πi(x
∗
i , x
∗
j , t,M)] = µt
L∫
−L
(−1)j
2
9
(x∗j − x
∗
i )
(
x¯∗ −
(
M +
3
2
(−1)i
))2
fπ(M)dM
=
(−1)j
18
µt (x
∗
j − x
∗
i )
{
(2x¯∗ − 3(−1)i)2
− 4µM(2x¯
∗ − 3(−1)i) + 4(µM + σ
2
M)
}
,
(4.4)
where x¯∗ = x∗i + x
∗
j .
Next, after specifying ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-stage objective functions, we derive subgame-perfect
product designs. Firm i’s best reply, R∗i (xˆj), given the product characteristic choice of
ﬁrm j, xˆj, is
R∗i (xˆj) := argmax
xi∈R
{
(1− δ) Eπ[Πi(xi, xˆj , t,M)] + δ
[
(1− α)Πi(xi, xˆj , t,−L) + αΠi(xi, xˆj , t, L)
]}
.
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Solving for ﬁrms’ mutual best replies, one obtain ﬁrms’ subgame-perfect equilibrium dif-
ferentiation as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Under Assumptions 1,2, and 3, there is a unique pure strategy SPNE
for the Hotelling game under ambiguity. Firms’ equilibrium locations are given by
x∗1 =
δ
(
−(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t+ α(3− 2L)2t− 4σ2 − 9
)
+ 4σ2 + 9
4(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
x∗2 =
δ
(
(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t− α(3− 2L)2t+ 4σ2 + 9
)
− 4σ2 − 9
4(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
.
The equilibrium diﬀerentiation, ∆∗x := x
∗
2 − x
∗
1, is
∆∗x =
δ
(
(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t− α(3− 2L)2t+ 4σ2 + 9
)
− 4σ2 − 9
2(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
,
and ﬁrms’ Choquet expected equilibrium proﬁts are given by
CEUi[x
∗
1, x
∗
2, t,M ] = −
(
δ
(
−(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t+ α(3− 2L)2t− 4σ2 − 9
)
+ 4σ2 + 9
)2
36(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
.
Remark 4.3. It is worthwhile to highlight and discuss some special cases of this equi-
librium. Setting δ = 1 and t = 1, which corresponds to a situation under complete
ignorance, one obtains the equilibrium of Kro´l (2012) in its full generality. Setting δ = 0
and t = t = 1, we obtain the equilibrium in MZ (2004) with the slight diﬀerence that we
impose a probability with zero mean. The normalization Eπ[M ] = 0 ensures symmetry
and is, in our view, not a strong restriction. We can interpret this assumption in the
following way: both ﬁrms determine the expected midpoint of the consumer interval and
align all possible product designs symmetrically around this mean. If the mean is nonzero,
ﬁrms can transform the set of all product characteristics to be centered around zero. Af-
ter determining their product characteristic choices in the normalized setting, ﬁrms may
retransform their product characteristic decision into the non-normalized product space
and obtain the optimal product design. For consumer distributions with nonzero mean
there are no solutions in closed-form for ﬁrms’ subgame-perfect product characteristic
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choices. Nevertheless, it is plausible to argue that both ﬁrms shift their subgame-perfect
locations into the direction of this mean.
4.2.2 Comparative statics
The capacity model yields interesting comparative static results. In this section, we
discuss basic properties of ﬁrms’ product design choices with respect to changes in the
underlying model parameters. Similar to Kro´l (2012), the following proposition examines
c.p. (ceteris paribus) variations in the global ambiguity attitude α.
Proposition 4.2 (Variation in ﬁrms’ ambiguity attitude α). Under the Assumptions 1,2,
and 3, one can observe at any SPNE of the Hotelling game under ambiguity the subsequent
eﬀects on optimal product designs:
∂x∗1
∂α
≥ 0 and
∂x∗2
∂α
≤ 0.
The results of Proposition 4.2 are related to the ﬁndings in Kro´l (2012) stating that a
higher degree of pessimism leads to lower product diﬀerentiation. This ﬁnding extends
to our model, with the diﬀerence that the magnitude of the eﬀect is weakened the more
conﬁdence ﬁrms have in the reference prior π. In case of full conﬁdence, or absence of
ambiguity, ﬁrms’ attitude towards ambiguity becomes irrelevant for their product diﬀer-
entiation choices. To give some intuition: for a high degree of pessimism α, each ﬁrm puts
a higher weight on the maxmin criterion than on the maxmax criterion. Therefore, the
worst-case scenario becomes increasingly important. The worst-case of ﬁrm 1 is that the
expectation ofM equals L. As the expectation moves to the right and ﬁrm 1 considers this
expectation as relevant, ﬁrm 1 has an incentive to select a product characteristic located
on the right hand side of its initial characteristics. Similarly, for ﬁrm 2, the worst-case
scenario corresponds to left boundary of the support −L. Since ﬁrm 2 places increasingly
more weight to this worst-case, there is an incentive for the latter to relocate to the left.
All in all, equilibrium diﬀerentiation decreases. To sum up these ﬁndings, we conclude
that, contrary to risk in the models of MZ, ambiguous uncertainty is not per se a diﬀer-
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entiation force. What matters is ambiguity attitude of both ﬁrms. We call this attitude
the degree of global optimism or pessimism since we consider a market where both ﬁrms
exhibit the same ambiguity attitude. Hence, attitude towards ambiguity becomes a global
characteristic of the market and could be interpreted as “market sentiment”.
As a next step, we examine c.p. variations in the variance of the reference prior σ2.
Proposition 4.3 (Variation in the variance σ2). If 0 ≤ δ < 1 and the Assumptions 1, 2,
and 3 hold, one has at any SPNE for the Hotelling game under ambiguity that optimal
product designs react in the following way to an increase in σ2:
∂x∗1
∂σ2
< 0 and
∂x∗2
∂σ2
> 0.
Uncertainty, as measured by the variance of the underlying distribution, constitutes a
diﬀerentiation force. As argued by MZ (2004), the intuition here is that, in the Hotelling
game, ﬁrms are confronted with two countervailing eﬀects. If a ﬁrm selects, at given
prices, a product characteristic that is more far away from the realized midpoint Mˆ than
the characteristic selected by its competitor, it loses market share (demand eﬀect). At
the same time, however, one can observe that increasing product diﬀerentiation weak-
ens price competition and leads to higher equilibrium prices (price eﬀect). Due to the
assumption of quadratic cost functions, the price eﬀect dominates the demand eﬀect. If
a ﬁrm faces demand location uncertainty, the negative eﬀect of loosing market shares in
some realizations of uncertainty is not so dramatic as in the certainty case since there are
other realizations of M where the latter’s product design is better located than before.
Consequently, an increasing variance of the underlying probability distribution strength-
ens the dominance of the price eﬀect. Therefore, equilibrium diﬀerentiation is even more
excessive than under certainty. Of course, the same interpretation applies for the capacity
model as long as 0 ≤ δ < 1 with the sole diﬀerence that the eﬀect of a c.p. increase in σ2
is weaker the less conﬁdent ﬁrms are in the reference prior π.
The following proposition examines c.p. variations in the lower and upper support
boundary of the transportation cost parameter.
4. Spatial competition under uncertainty 45
Proposition 4.4 (Variations in the magnitude of the support boundaries of t). If 0 <
α ≤ 1 and 0 < δ ≤ 1, then, under the Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, one has at any SPNE for
the Hotelling game under ambiguity that
∂x∗1
∂t
> 0 and
∂x∗2
∂t
< 0.
Similarly, for 0 ≤ α < 1 and 0 < δ ≤ 1, one obtains
∂x∗1
∂t
< 0 and
∂x∗2
∂t
> 0.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 4.4 is quite similar to the respective statement in Kro´l (2012).
Variations in the support of the transportation cost parameter can be interpreted as ﬂuc-
tuations in the magnitude of uncertainty around t. As t approaches one, the overall size of
uncertainty with respect to t decreases. A c.p. increase in t solely aﬀects the pessimistic
part of ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-stage proﬁt functions. This deceases ﬁrms’ equilibrium product dif-
ferentiation. The following considerations explain why this is the case. Comparing the
Hotelling model with a standard symmetric Bertrand competition, we observe the fol-
lowing important diﬀerence. In the standard Bertrand scenario, ﬁrms oﬀer homogeneous
products. The only Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is that ﬁrms set prices equal to
marginal costs, implying zero proﬁts for both ﬁrms. In a Bertrand world with heteroge-
neous products this ﬁnding is no longer true. By introducing transportation costs, the
Hotelling framework adds an additional distinctive feature to a homogeneous and symmet-
ric Bertrand competition rendering products per se more heterogeneous. It is therefore
intuitive that a higher transportation cost weakens competition between ﬁrms.
In the Hotelling model there are two countervailing incentives at work that determine
ﬁrms’ product design choices. One is that ﬁrms want to locate in the center of the
Hotelling interval in order to obtain a higher market share. This is because ﬁrms’ market
share depends on the so-called indiﬀerent consumer ξ.18 All consumers located left of
ξ strictly prefer to purchase the good from the ﬁrm located left. On the other hand,
18The indiﬀerent consumer ξ can be obtained by equating total costs p1 + t(ξ− x1)
2 = p2 + t(ξ− x2)
2
and solving this expression for ξ.
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consumers located right of ξ strictly prefer to purchase the good from the other ﬁrm. If
the ﬁrm located left c.p. relocates to the right, then the indiﬀerent consumer also shifts
to the right. In this case, the market share of this ﬁrm increases and, as a consequence,
also its proﬁts. A similar argument holds for the rival ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm located at the
right c.p. relocates to the left, then its market share increases, and hence also its proﬁt.
To sum up, the ﬁrm located left has an incentive to relocate to the right and the ﬁrm
located to the right has an incentive to relocate to the left.
The second incentive is that ﬁrms want to diﬀerentiate their products more in order
to weaken price competition. If product diﬀerentiation gets lower, price competition
gets stronger since both products become increasingly homogeneous. Therefore, in the
limit, the only distinguishing feature of a product boils down to its price. Now, if price
competition is weakened by a higher transportation cost, it is plausible that ﬁrms have
an incentive to reduce product diﬀerentiation in order to obtain a higher market share.
To summarize the results. Increasing uncertainty with respect to the transportation cost
parameter t entail a higher degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Next, we explore a c.p. increase in ﬁrms’ conﬁdence level δ. Our ﬁndings can be sum-
marized in the following way: if ﬁrms’ attitude towards ambiguity exhibits suﬃciently
strong optimism, one can conclude that a lower conﬁdence into the reference prior in-
creases equilibrium diﬀerentiation. Opposite results hold for suﬃciently pessimistic ﬁrms.
Furthermore, there is an intermediate value of global pessimism α∗ such that ﬁrms’ equi-
librium diﬀerentiation remains unchanged no matter which global conﬁdence level ﬁrms
might assign to the reference probability distribution of the midpoint M . The following
proposition makes this precise.
Proposition 4.5 (Variation in the conﬁdence level δ). Under the Assumptions 1, 2, and
3, one has at any SPNE for the Hotelling game under ambiguity that
∂x∗1
∂δ
= −
∂x∗2
∂δ
=


< 0 for 0 ≤ α < α∗
= 0 for α = α∗
> 0 for 1 ≥ α > α∗
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where α∗ = α∗(t, t, σ2, L) is a cutoﬀ-value deﬁned by
α∗ =
(2L+ 3)(3L− 2σ2)
(2L+ 3)t(3L− 2σ2)− (2L− 3)t(3L+ 2σ2)
.
Taking these results together we obtain for ∆∗
∂∆∗
∂δ
=


> 0 for 0 ≤ α < α∗
= 0 for α = α∗
< 0 for 1 ≥ α > α∗.
Finally, we consider variations in the support size L. As Proposition 4.6 shows, our
model replicates similar comparative static results as in Kro´l (2012) by varying the length
L of the support of the midpointM : an increase in the support fosters decreasing product
diﬀerentiation if ﬁrms are suﬃciently pessimistic. For an intermediate value of pessimism
ﬁrms do not relocate. If ﬁrms are suﬃciently optimistic, an increase in L yields higher
equilibrium diﬀerentiation. Apparently, similar product diﬀerentiation choices might be
generated by variations in the size of the support L, as compared to variations in the
conﬁdence level δ. It indispensable to notice meaningful diﬀerences between the two
sources of ambiguity since the degree of ambiguity or of ﬁrms’ conﬁdence in the reference
prior plays a central role in this chapter (see Remark 4.4 and the subsequent discussion).
Proposition 4.6 (Variation in the size of the support L). If 0 < δ ≤ 1 and Assumptions
1, 2, and 3 hold, on has at any SPNE for the Hotelling game under ambiguity that
∂x∗1
∂L
= −
∂x∗2
∂L
=


< 0 for 0 ≤ α < αˆ
= 0 for α = αˆ
> 0 for 1 ≥ α > αˆ
where αˆ ∈ [0, 1] is a cutoﬀ-value with αˆ = αˆ(δ, t, t, σ2). Taking these results together we
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obtain for ∆∗
∂∆∗
∂L
=


> 0 for 0 ≤ α < αˆ
= 0 for α = αˆ
< 0 for 1 ≥ α > αˆ.
Remark 4.4. The eﬀects of c.p. variations of L and δ might go in similar directions, but
the magnitude of both eﬀects is diﬀerent. In fact, both eﬀects are interrelated. An increase
in the support has a stronger impact on equilibrium diﬀerentiation if ﬁrms’ conﬁdence in
the reference prior is low. In case of full conﬁdence, changes in the support do not aﬀect
ﬁrms’ product design decisions.
Besides the magnitude of the eﬀects, there is a clear diﬀerence between both sources of
uncertainty concerning economic applications. The support [−L,L] of M consists of all
midpoint realizations of the consumer interval which ﬁrms view as possible before they
perform their design choices. What would it actually mean if L were an endogenous
variable? It would mean that ﬁrms adjust their views on possible demand realizations
in light of new information by including or excluding certain market demand scenarios.
However, this is problematic since it does not take into account how ﬁrms update their
beliefs. None of the commonly used updating rules lead to an increase in the support size.
In the context of the multiple prior approach on which Kro´l’s model is based, the most
commonly used updating rule is the generalized Bayesian updating rule. According to
this rule, a decision-maker updates each prior from her prior set in accordance with Bayes’
rule19 when receiving new information (see Jaﬀray, 1992). It is well-known that Bayesian
updating reduces the support of the prior distribution by shifting the whole probability
mass to the “true” event.
Eichberger et al. (2010) analyze three updating rules for neo-additive capacities on
which our model is based.20 They show that under all three rules the updated capac-
ity is still neo-additive with new optimism and conﬁdence parameters, and a reference
19Bayes’ rule follows from the law of conditional probability. Let Ω be a ﬁnite state space. For any
two events E,F ⊆ Ω with prior probabilities pi(E) and pi(F ), the posterior probability of E conditional
on F is pi(E | F ) = pi(E∩F )
pi(F ) =
pi(F |E)·pi(E)
pi(F ) .
20These updating rules are the optimistic updating rule, the pessimistic updating rule, also called
Dempster-Shafer updating rule, and the generalized Bayesian updating rule.
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probability distribution that is updated in accordance with Bayes’ rule. Consequently,
the support of the posterior reference distribution is a subset of the support of the prior
reference distribution.
The c.p. eﬀect of variations in the support size shows how ﬁrms would behave in a
diﬀerent environment where they face less or more uncertainty, as measured by the support
size. However, the previous considerations suggest that c.p. increases in the support size
should not be used to explain changes in ﬁrms’ behavior in the same environment when
they receive new information.
In contrast, c.p. variations in the conﬁdence level δ retain the assumption of an ex-
ogenously ﬁxed support length. Firms know possible upper and lower bounds of demand
and consider demand uncertainty deﬁned on a ﬁxed support. The reference prior π might
reﬂect ﬁrms’ ex-ante information about the market environment, e.g., ﬁrms might have
observable data or can pursue market research to estimate an underlying probability dis-
tribution for market demand. Under the assumption that ﬁrm managers are suﬃciently
pessimistic, increasing product diﬀerentiation might have diﬀerent reasons. One explana-
tion could be that ﬁrms become more optimistic, that is, due to a change in the market
environment ﬁrms adjust their ambiguity attitudes to account for the new situation. On
the other hand, it is possible that ﬁrms obtain more reliable data on market outcomes
which increases their conﬁdence in the data available. However, they do not readjust their
attitude towards ambiguity. In such a scenario, a higher conﬁdence in the reference prior
weakens the impact of pessimism on product diﬀerentiation choices.
4.3 Applications
The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with additional insight into the
mechanics of the capacity approach. First, we describe the limitations of the models of
MZ (2004) and Kro´l (2012). Subsequently, we reconsider the real-life example proposed
by Kro´l. In particular, we discuss implications of conﬁdence and pessimism in the context
of this example.
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Limitations of the existing models
Meagher and Zauner’s probabilistic model predicts that uncertainty, as measured by
the variance of the underlying distribution, constitutes a diﬀerentiation force. Their
model presupposes that ﬁrms have a common prior about the distribution of the market
demand. This is plausible when ﬁrms can rely on suﬃcient past data and consumer
preferences are comparatively stable. If these assumptions are not met, the model may
fail to accurately predict ﬁrms’ behavior. For instance, the model predicts that there will
be low product diﬀerentiation in markets that have little demand ﬂuctuations. However,
it is possible that ﬁrms highly diﬀerentiate their products even if the market demand does
not ﬂuctuate much. For example, think of ﬁrms which introduce products with a new
design into an existing market.
In the model of Kro´l (2012), uncertainty, as measured by the size of the support
of the midpoint, can either be a diﬀerentiation or an agglomeration force depending on
ﬁrms’ attitudes towards uncertainty. The model predicts that pessimistic ﬁrms tend
to diﬀerentiate their products less which seems not implausible. Kro´l’s model has the
advantage that ﬁrms may end up acting as if they have diﬀerent priors. On the other
hand, it has the drawback that it does not incorporate probabilistic information. In
other words, ﬁrms’ choices are governed by degenerate probability measures. Instead
of probabilistic information, Kro´l examines variations in the size of the support of the
midpoint. In our view, in many economic applications, it is more plausible that the size
of the support is an exogenously ﬁxed parameter, see, e.g., the discussion of Example 4.1.
Furthermore, as argued in Section 4.2.2, an increasing support size cannot be justiﬁed on
the basis of commonly used updating rules.
An example
In the following, we reconsider Kro´l’s example of the mutual funds market. One reason
why this market is so apt to be discussed in a Hotelling framework is that there exists
a relatively clear measure of ﬁrms’ product diﬀerentiation. We will discuss this measure
in the sequel. Moreover, demand ﬂuctuates due to partially unobservable factors, e.g.,
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subjective evaluations. For this reason, it is plausible that ambiguity is prevalent in this
market.
Example 4.1 (Kro´l, 2012, p. 599). Consider the managed mutual funds market. We
may interpret a portfolio’s position ranging from safe investments to risky portfolios as
a location in the product space. Data about the daily returns of the ﬁfteen most popular
actively managed US mutual funds indicate that, after the ﬁnancial crisis 2008, fund
managers tend to diﬀerentiate their products less.
What is the reason for fund managers’ behavior in Example 4.1? Kro´l’s explanation
is based on two arguments. Firstly, he claims that, before the crisis, ﬁnancial ﬁrms’
did not consider the post-crisis range of investor behavior as possible.21 Therefore, the
crisis forced ﬁrms to revise their beliefs. Secondly, Kro´l interprets conservative stress test
simulations following the crisis as a signal sent out to the competitors that a ﬁrm uses a
worst-case-based approach for decision-making.
As already argued earlier in this chapter, the weakness of the ﬁrst argument is that
it does not take into account how ﬁrms update their beliefs. The second argument refers
to government-imposed stress tests after the crisis. If we interpret these stress tests as
signals, then the strategy of a ﬁrm is independent of its type. Since each type sends
the same signal, no new information is revealed to the other ﬁrms. In our view, it is
debatable whether stress test simulations induced a shift in fund managers’ ambiguity
attitude towards a more pessimistic preference approach, or whether exactly those fund
managers knew more clearly that investors would prefer more secure assets after the crisis.
In our view, a more plausible explanation for lower post-crisis product diﬀerentiation
is that ﬁrms were more conﬁdent about investors’ demand. In the context of this explana-
tion, we may keep the standard assumption of stable preferences. That is, we assume that
fund managers’ ambiguity attitudes remained relatively stable even though government
stress tests were imposed. It is not implausible to assume that fund managers are rather
optimistic individuals. Moreover, it is likely that fund managers know the whole range of
21In particular, the shift of consumer preferences toward safe investments due to decreasing stock
prices during the crisis.
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possible investor behavior due to market research and historical data.22 This means that
variations in the support of the midpoint of the consumer distribution cannot account for
the observation of decreasing product diﬀerentiation. The demand of investors is governed
by subjective evaluations that depend on numerous observable and unobservable factors
such as recent stock market developments or individual future expectations. Therefore,
it is plausible to assume that ﬁrms faced highly ﬂuctuating demand before the ﬁnancial
crisis. At the end and shortly after the crisis, one may assume that ﬁrms were more con-
ﬁdent about investors’ demand since it was obvious that the majority of investors would
go for rather safe assets. To sum up, given that fund managers are suﬃciently optimistic,
an increase of their conﬁdence, δ < 0, leads to lower equilibrium diﬀerentiation. This is
in line with the capacity model, see Proposition 4.5.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we develop a general Hotelling model incorporating demand ambiguity
that provides a unifying framework for the model under risk of Meagher and Zauner (2004)
and the model under complete ignorance of Kro´l (2012). Ambiguity is introduced by
assuming that ﬁrms’ beliefs are represented by neo-additive capacities. We analyze ﬁrms’
optimal product characteristic choices and ﬁnd that there exists a unique subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the Hotelling game under ambiguity.
Our model incorporates a variety of diﬀerent sources of uncertainty. First of all, as in
MZ’s model, there is the variance σ2 of the reference probability π. Secondly, as in Kro´l’s
model, we have the length L of the support interval of the midpoint of the consumer
interval M . A third measure of uncertainty is given by the conﬁdence, or degree of
ambiguity, parameter δ. The last source of uncertainty lies in the support [t, t] of the
transportation cost parameter t.
While a ceteris paribus increase in σ2 leads to a higher equilibrium product diﬀeren-
tiation, the direction of the eﬀect of an increase of L is not clear. As our results show,
22Financial ﬁrms’ can rely on past data of various historical economic crises including stock market
crashes (e.g., the Great Depression in the 1930s), bubbles (e.g. dot-com bubble in 2000), and ﬁnancial
crises (e.g., Asian ﬁnancial crisis in 1997).
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this eﬀect strongly depends on ﬁrms’ ambiguity attitude α and the degree of ambiguity
δ. Similarly, an increase of δ can trigger oﬀ opposing eﬀects. When ﬁrms are pessimistic
enough, equilibrium diﬀerentiation decreases, when ﬁrms are rather optimistic product
diﬀerentiation is going to increase. One can also argue the other way round. For a given
conﬁdence level, increasing pessimism yields lower equilibrium diﬀerentiation, whereas an
increase in optimism increases equilibrium diﬀerentiation.
These considerations show that one should be very cautious when it comes to drawing
conclusions from real-world applications of Hotelling models under uncertainty. In our
view, it is indispensable to clearly identify the driving factors of an observed increase or
decrease in product diﬀerentiation since the conclusions from observed ﬁrm behavior might
change in light of diﬀerent sources of uncertainty. In particular, it might be very important
for oﬃcial regulatory procedures whether observed product diﬀerentiation choices are to
be attributed to perceived changes in data-reliability or whether ﬁrms feature more or less
optimistic behavioral patterns. Hence, it seems worthwhile for policymakers to disentangle
the eﬀect of conﬁdence and ambiguity attitude on product diﬀerentiation.
4.5 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.1. The support ofM is restricted to the interval [−L,L] ⊂
[
−1
2
, 1
2
]
.
The mean and the variance of M exists. For the mean we can perform the following line
of estimates:
Eπ[M ] =
∫
R
MdP ≤
∫
R
LdP = L
∫
R
1dP = L
and
Eπ[M ] =
∫
R
MdP ≥
∫
R
−LdP = −L
∫
R
1dP = −L
Similarly, for the second moment of M we obtain
Eπ[M
2] =
∫
R
M2dP ≤
∫
R
L2dP = L2 and Eπ[M
2] =
∫
R
M2dP ≥ 0
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and for the variance σ2 we conclude
σ2M = Eπ[M
2]− Eπ[M ]
2 ≤ Eπ[M ]
2 ≤ L2 and σ2M ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. Lemma 4.5 implies that ﬁrms’ second-stage proﬁts at the real-
ization (tˆ, Mˆ) equal the second piece of (4.1):
Π1 =
1
18
tˆ(x2 − x1)[−3 + 2(Mˆ − x¯)]
2 and Π2 =
1
18
tˆ(x2 − x1)[3 + 2(Mˆ − x¯)]
2.
Both proﬁt functions are continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to tˆ and Mˆ . Diﬀer-
entiation with respect to tˆ yields
∂Π1
∂tˆ
=
2
9
(x2 − x1)
[
x1 + x2
2
− Mˆ +
3
2
]2
> 0
∂Π2
∂tˆ
= −
2
9
(x1 − x2)
[
x1 + x2
2
− Mˆ −
3
2
]2
> 0.
Diﬀerentiation with respect to Mˆ yields
∂Π∗1
∂Mˆ
= −
4
9
tˆ(x2 − x1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
[
x1 + x2
2
− Mˆ +
3
2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0
∂Π∗2
∂Mˆ
=
4
9
tˆ(x1 − x2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
[
x1 + x2
2
− Mˆ −
3
2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 4.5. The proof of the lemma follows exactly the same line of argu-
ments as in the proof of Lemma 3.1 in Kro´l (2012, p. 602) with a slight modiﬁcation in
case 3. There are three diﬀerent cases to be considered.
1. Case 1 refers to a situation where either ﬁrm 1 or ﬁrm 2 can monopolize the market
for certain realizations of the midpoint M . If ﬁrm 1 can monopolize the market for
certain realizations of M , we can conclude that ﬁrm 1 will monopolize the market
if Mˆ = −L, since w.lo.g. ﬁrm 1 is the ﬁrm left of ﬁrm 2. Similarly, we can conclude
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that ﬁrm 2 can monopolize the market for Mˆ = L. This is ﬁnding is impossible. If
ﬁrm 1 monopolizes the market for the realization Mˆ = −L, we have by Lemma 3.1,
equation (4.3) that x1+x2
2
− 3
2
> −L. If ﬁrm 2 monopolizes the market, we have by
(4.3) that x1+x2
2
+ 3
2
< L. Thus, we must have that L+ x1+x2
2
> 3
2
and L− x1+x2
2
> 3
2
holds at the same time implying
∣∣x1+x2
2
∣∣ < L− 3
2
. This is a contradiction since L is
assumed to be smaller than 1
2
.
2. Case 2 describes a scenario where one of the two ﬁrms can monopolize the market
for each realization Mˆ of uncertainty. If ﬁrm j is a monopolist, the other ﬁrm can
deviate from its original location in order to obtain a positive market share and
therefore make strictly positive proﬁts. Kro´l suggests the location x−j = −xj.
3. Case 3 refers to a situation where, w.l.o.g., ﬁrm 1 can monopolize the market for
some realizations of uncertainty, in particular the realization Mˆ = −L and for the
remaining realizations, in particular the realization Mˆ = L, there exists a competi-
tive equilibrium. Consider now the proﬁt function of ﬁrm 2 in case of a competitive
equilibrium23 :
∂Π2
∂x2
(x1, x2, L, t) =
t (2L− 3 x2 + x1 + 3) (2L− x2 − x1 + 3)
18
We want to show that
∂Π2
∂x2
(x1, x2, L, t) < 0.
We determine the sign of both brackets. Consider the expression in within the
second bracket ﬁrst. We have
2L+ 3− x1 − x2 > 0 ⇔ 2L+ 3 > x1 + x2 ⇔ L+
3
2
> x¯
The last condition corresponds to the requirement for a competitive solution in cases
where the midpoint M = L realizes. Therefore it must be, by assumption, posi-
tive. The second bracket is negative. The monopolistic outcome for the midpoint
23We consider the proﬁt function of ﬁrm 2, Kro´l considers the proﬁt function of ﬁrm 1.
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realization M = −L requires L + x¯ > 3
2
. Solving this inequality for x2, we obtain
x2 > 3 − 2L − x1. By using this inequality, we can conduct an estimation for the
expression in the ﬁrst bracket:
3 + 2L+ x1 − 3x2 < 8L− 6 + 4x1 < 8L− 8 < 0
The last inequality follows from the fact that L < 1
2
and x1 < 0. Thus, we proved
that
∂Π2
∂x2
(x1, x2, L, t) < 0.
This ﬁnding shows that ﬁrm 2 has an incentive to move leftwards in order to reduce
both ﬁrms’ product diﬀerentiation and that a strict competitive solution does not
exist under the above stated parameter restrictions. Since we consider a symmetric
scenario, a similar argument holds for a scenario where ﬁrm 2 becomes a monopolist.
For the remaining cases Mˆ = L and Mˆ = −L there is a competitive solution.
Proof of Lemma 4.6. The ﬁrst part of ﬁrms’ Choquet expected proﬁt is
Eπ[Πi(x1, x2, t,M)] =
L∫
−L
(−1)j
2
9
t (xj − xi)
(
xi + xj
2
−
(
M +
3
2
(−1)i
))2
f(M)dM.
This expectation is of the form
Eπ[gi(t)hi(M)]
with real-valued Borel-measurable functions gi and hi for i = 1, 2. We deﬁne
gi(t) = t and hi(M) = (−1)
j 2
9
t (xj − xi)
(
xi + xj
2
−
(
M +
3
2
(−1)i
))2
.
By (R7), t and M are uncorrelated. By Lemma 5.20 in Meintrup and Scha¨ﬄer (2005, p.
131), we obtain that gi(t) and hi(M) are uncorrelated as well. Thus, we can conclude
Eπ[Π
∗
i (x1, x2, t,M)] = Eπ[gi(t)hi(M)] = Eπ[gi(t)] Eπ[hi(M)] = µt Eπ[hi(M)].
4. Spatial competition under uncertainty 57
In the following, we can rely on the results in Meagher and Zauner (2004, p. 205), since
Eπ[hi(M)] is equal to ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt function in the risk case. Thus,
Eπ[Πi(x1, x2, t,M)] = tµ
L∫
−L
(−1)j
2
9
(xj − xi)
(
xi + xj
2
−
(
M +
3
2
(−1)i
))2
f(M)dM
=
(−1)j
18
tµ (xj − xi){(xi + xj − 3(−1)
i)2
− 4µM(xi + xj − 3(−1)
i) + 4(µM + σ
2
M)}.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. We derive expected CEU proﬁts at the ﬁrst stage of the
game. We obtain for ﬁrm 1:
CEU1[x1, x2, α, δ, t, t, σ
2, L]
:= δ
(
2 (1− α) t (x2 − x1)
(
L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2
)2
9
+
2α t (x2 − x1)
(
−L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2
)2
9
)
+
(1− δ) (x2 − x1)
(
(x2 + x1 + 3)
2 + 4 σ2
)
18
.
(4.5)
Similarly, we obtain for ﬁrm 2
CEU2[x1, x2, α, δ, t, t, σ
2, L]
:= δ
(
2α t (x2 − x1)
(
L+ x2+x1
2
− 3
2
)2
9
+
2 (1− α) t (x2 − x1)
(
−L+ x2+x1
2
− 3
2
)2
9
)
+
(1− δ) (x2 − x1)
(
(x2 + x1 − 3)
2 + 4 σ
)
18
.
(4.6)
4. Spatial competition under uncertainty 58
Taking the derivative of (4.5) with respect to x1 yields
∂ CEU1
∂x1
:= −
2δ (1− α) t
(
L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2
)2
9
+
2δ (1− α) t (x2 − x1)
(
L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2
)
9
+
2δ α t (x2 − x1)
(
−L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2
)
9
−
2δ α t
(
−L+ x2+x1
2
+ 3
2
)2
9
−
(1− δ)
(
(x2 + x1 + 3)
2 + 4 σ
)
18
+
(1− δ) (x2 − x1) (x2 + x1 + 3)
9
.
(4.7)
Similarly, we take the derivative of (4.6) with respect to x2
∂ CEU2
∂x2
:=
2δ α t
(
L+ x2+x1
2
− 3
2
)2
9
+
2δ α t (x2 − x1)
(
L+ x2+x1
2
− 3
2
)
9
+
2δ (1− α) t (x2 − x1)
(
−L+ x2+x1
2
− 3
2
)
9
+
2δ (1− α) t
(
−L+ x2+x1
2
− 3
2
)2
9
+
(1− δ)
(
(x2 + x1 − 3)
2 + 4 σ
)
18
+
(1− δ) (x2 − x1) (x2 + x1 − 3)
9
.
(4.8)
Now, we solve the following system of equations:
∂ CEU1
∂x1
= 0 and
∂ CEU2
∂x2
= 0. (4.9)
and obtain three solution pairs. The ﬁrst solution pair (x∗1, x
∗
2) is given by:
x∗1 =
δ
(
−(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t+ α(3− 2L)2t− 4σ2 − 9
)
+ 4σ2 + 9
4(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
x∗2 =
δ
(
(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t− α(3− 2L)2t+ 4σ2 + 9
)
− 4σ2 − 9
4(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
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The second pair of solutions (x∗∗1 , x
∗∗
2 ) is given by:
x∗∗1 =
(
−
(
δ(δ((α− 1)2(2L+ 3)2t
2
+ 2(α− 1)t(2L(6αLt− L+ 3)− 9αt+ 9)
+ αt(4L(α(L− 3)t+ L+ 3) + 9(αt− 2)) + 4σ2(−αt+ αt+ t− 1) + 9)
+ 4(α− 1)t((L− 3)L+ σ2)− 2αt(2L(L+ 3)
+ 2σ2 − 9) + 2(−9(α− 1)t+ 4σ2 − 9))− 4σ2 + 9
) 1
2
+ δ(−(α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(3− 2L)t− 3) + 3
)
·
(
2(δ((α− 1)t− αt+ 1)− 1)
)−1
and
x∗∗2 = −
((
δ(δ((α− 1)2(2L+ 3)2t
2
+ 2(α− 1)t(2L(6αLt− L+ 3)− 9αt+ 9)
+ αt(4L(α(L− 3)t+ L+ 3) + 9(αt− 2)) + 4σ2(−αt+ αt+ t− 1) + 9)
+ 4(α− 1)t((L− 3)L+ σ2)− 2αt(2L(L+ 3) + 2σ2 − 9)
+ 2(−9(α− 1)t+ 4σ2 − 9))− 4σ2 + 9
) 1
2
− δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3) + 3
)
·
(
2(δ((α− 1)t− αt+ 1)− 1)
)−1
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Finally, the last pair of solutions (x∗∗∗1 , x
∗∗∗
2 ) is given by:
x∗∗∗1 =
((
δ(δ((α− 1)2(2L+ 3)2t
2
+ 2(α− 1)t(2L(6αLt− L+ 3)− 9αt+ 9)
+ αt(4L(α(L− 3)t+ L+ 3) + 9(αt− 2)) + 4σ2(−αt+ αt
+ t− 1) + 9) + 4(α− 1)t((L− 3)L+ σ2)− 2αt(2L(L+ 3) + 2σ2 − 9)
+ 2(−9(α− 1)t+ 4σ2 − 9))− 4σ2 + 9
) 1
2
+ δ(−(α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(3− 2L)t− 3) + 3
)
·
(
2(δ((α− 1)t− αt+ 1)− 1)
)−1
and
x∗∗∗2 =
((
δ(δ((α− 1)2(2L+ 3)2t
2
+ 2(α− 1)t(2L(6αLt− L+ 3)
− 9αt+ 9) + αt(4L(α(L− 3)t+ L+ 3) + 9(αt− 2)) + 4σ2(−αt+ αt
+ t− 1) + 9) + 4(α− 1)t((L− 3)L+ σ2)− 2αt(2L(L+ 3) + 2σ2 − 9)
+ 2(−9(α− 1)t+ 4σ2 − 9))− 4σ2 + 9
) 1
2
+ δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3
)
·
(
2(δ((α− 1)t− αt+ 1)− 1)
)−1
The ﬁrst pair of solutions (x∗1, x
∗
2) satisﬁes the global competition condition according to
Lemma 4.5. We demonstrate this by using Wolfram Mathematica version 10.0.0.0. You
can ﬁnd the code at the end of the proof section. The problem is analyzed in sections 5
to 7 of the code. Mathematica returns the value ”true” for the ﬁrst pair of solutions.
The solution pairs (x∗∗1 , x
∗∗
2 ) and (x
∗∗∗
1 , x
∗∗∗
2 ) do not fulﬁll the global competition condition
L−
3
2
< x¯ < −L+
3
2
.
This is examined in sections 8 and 9 of our code. Therefore, we deﬁne, in a ﬁrst step, the
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means
x2 =
x∗∗1 + x
∗∗
2
2
and x3 =
x∗∗∗1 + x
∗∗∗
2
2
.
Using numerical optimization techniques, we obtain that the range of x2 is given by [1, 2].
Similarly, the range of x3 is given by [−2,−1]. Moreover, x2 attains its minimum value
1 for L = 1
2
. This implies that x2 ≥ 1. However, the global competition condition would
require that x2 < −
1
2
+ 3
2
= 1. This is a contradiction. Similarly, x3 attains its maximum
value −1 for L = 1
2
. As a consequence, we can infer that x3 ≤ −1. In order to meet
the requirements of Lemma 4.5, x3 also needs to satisfy x3 >
1
2
− 3
2
= −1. This excludes
(x∗∗∗1 , x
∗∗∗
2 ) as a feasible solution.
As a next step, we show that the ﬁrst pair of solutions is indeed a maximizer for both
ﬁrms. The second order derivative of equation (4.5) and (4.6) evaluated at (x∗1, x
∗
2) yields
∂2CEUi
∂x2i
: =
(
δ(δ(3(α− 1)2(2L+ 3)2t
2
+ 2(α− 1)t(2L(10αLt− L+ 9)− 27αt+ 27)
+ αt(3α(3− 2L)2t+ 4L(L+ 9)− 54)
+ 4σ2(−αt+ αt+ t− 1) + 27) + 4(α− 1)t((L− 9)L
+ σ2)− 2αt(2L(L+ 9) + 2σ2 − 27)− 54((α− 1)t+ 1)
+ 8σ2)− 4σ2 + 27
)
·
(
18(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
)−1
for both ﬁrms. First, we examine the sign of the denominator. It is
18(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
= 36αδLt+ 36αδLt+ 54αδt− 54αδt− 36δLt− 54δt+ 54δ − 54
≤ 36δLt+ 18αδt+ 54δt− 54αδt− 36δLt− 54δt+ 54− 54
= −36αδt
≤ 0.
Hence, the denominator is negative. Subsequently, we show that the numerator is non-
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negative. Taking the derivative of the numerator with respect to t yields
− 2(1− α)δ(δ(3(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t+ 2L(L(10αt− 1) + 9)
− 27αt− 2σ2 + 27) + 2((L− 9)L+ σ2)− 27)
Given the parameter restrictions of the model, this expression is non-negative. We verify
this in sections 13 and 14 of the Mathematica code. Hence, the numerator becomes
smaller as we insert the minimum value 1 for t. Doing so, we obtain after several steps of
algebra
h =
(
α2δ2
(
4L2(t+ 3)(3t+ 1)− 36L
(
t2 − 1
)
+ 27(t− 1)2
)
− 2αδ
(
2L2(9δt+ 7δ + t− 1)
+ 18L(δ(−t) + δ + t+ 1)− (t− 1)(2(δ − 1)σ2 + 27)
)
+ 4δ(L((4δ − 1)L+ 9) + σ2)− 4σ2 + 27
)
It remains to be demonstrated that this expression is non-negative. Using Mathematica,
we check whether h can be negative under the restrictions 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1,
0 ≤ t ≤ 1, 0 ≤ L ≤ 1
2
and 0 ≤ σ2 ≤ 1
4
, see sections 15 and 16 of the code. Mathematica
returns the value ”false”.
We obtain the equilibrium proﬁts by inserting the equilibrium locations x∗i for i = 1, 2
into (4.5) and (4.6). After several steps of algebra, we obtain
CEUi = −
(
δ
(
−(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t+ α(3− 2L)2t− 4σ2 − 9
)
+ 4σ2 + 9
)2
36(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
.
The competitive diﬀerentiation is given by
∆∗x = x
∗
2 − x
∗
1 = 2x
∗
2
=
δ
(
(α− 1)(2L+ 3)2t− α(3− 2L)2t+ 4σ2 + 9
)
− 4σ2 − 9
2(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)
.
What remains to show is that non of the ﬁrms has an incentive to “jump over” its
opponent. That is, ﬁrm 1 has no incentive to choose a product design to the right of
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that from ﬁrm 2. Similarly, ﬁrm 2 does not want to be on the left of ﬁrm 1. Our proof
follows the proof of Anderson et al. (1997, p. 113-114). Given any location x2, if ﬁrm
1 chooses its best reply, R∗1(x2), under the restriction x1 ≤ x2, its proﬁt equals ĈEU1 =
CEU1[R
∗
1(x2), x2, α, δ, t, t), σ
2, L]. At ﬁrst, we show that under global competition, cf.
Lemma 4.5, ﬁrm 1’s optimal proﬁt is increasing in x2. By using the envelope theorem on
ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt function, we obtain:
ĈEU1
∂x2
=
2t (1− α) δ
((
L+
x2+R∗1(x2)
2
+ 3
2
)2
+ (x2 −R
∗
1(x2))
(
L+
x2+R∗1(x2)
2
+ 3
2
))
9
+
2α t δ
(
(x2 −R
∗
1(x2))
(
−L+
x2+R∗1(x2)
2
+ 3
2
)
+
(
−L+
x2+R∗1(x2)
2
+ 3
2
)2)
9
+ (1− δ)
((
4 σ2 + (x2 +R
∗
1(x2) + 3)
2)
18
+
(x2 −R
∗
1(x2)) (x2 +R
∗
1(x2) + 3)
9
)
> 0.
To see that the sign of this derivative is positive, note that the quadratic terms are
positive and the distance (x2 − R
∗
1(x2)) is nonnegative. Furthermore, by assumption,
the parameters t, t, α and δ are all nonnegative. Let us consider the other terms. The
term
(
L+
x2+R∗1(x2)
2
+ 3
2
)
in the ﬁrst part of the derivative is positive, since, by the global
competition lemma,
x2+R∗1(x2)
2
+ 3
2
> −L. Since it holds also that
x2+R∗1(x2)
2
+ 3
2
> L, the term(
−L+
x2+R∗1(x2)
2
+ 3
2
)
in the second part of the derivative is positive. Finally, the term
(x2 +R
∗
1(x2) + 3) is positive, since by the global competition lemma:
x2+R∗1(x2)
2
≥ L − 3
2
and due to the restriction of L, see Assumption 4.2 (R4): L − 3
2
≥ −2. Taken together,
all terms are positive or nonnegative, which proves that ∂ĈEU1
∂x2
> 0. Now, suppose ﬁrm
1 locates to the other side of its rival. Then, given any location x2, if ﬁrm 1 chooses its
best reply, R∗1(x2), now, restricting its location to x1 ≥ x2, its proﬁt is decreasing in x2.
4. Spatial competition under uncertainty 64
Applying the envelope theorem yields:
∂ĈEU1
∂x2
=
2 (1− α) δt
(
(R∗1(x2)− x2)
(
−L+
R∗
1
(x2)+x2
2
− 3
2
)
−
(
−L+
R∗
1
(x2)+x2
2
− 3
2
)2)
9
+
2α δ t
(
(R∗1(x2)− x2)
(
L+
R∗
1
(x2)+x2
2
− 3
2
)
−
(
L+
R∗
1
(x2)+x2
2
− 3
2
)2)
9
+ (1− δ)
(
−4 σ2 − (R∗1(x2) + x2 − 3)
2
18
+
(R∗1(x2)− x2) (R
∗
1(x2) + x2 − 3)
9
)
< 0.
By using the global competition lemma, the sign of the derivative can be proved analo-
gously as before.
To sum up, we have that ∂ĈEU1
∂x2
> 0 for x1 ≤ x2 and
∂ĈEU1
∂x2
< 0 for x1 ≥ x2. This
means that there is a unique ”straddle” point, x˜, such that if ﬁrm 2 chooses a characteristic
x2 > x˜, ﬁrm 1 will optimally locate to the left of ﬁrm 2. Otherwise, if x2 < x˜, ﬁrm 1
chooses an optimal characteristic to the right of ﬁrm 2. Due to the symmetry of the
model, the same line of arguments apply to ﬁrm 2. Hence, given ﬁrms’ equilibrium
product characteristics from the ﬁrst part of the proof, it holds that x∗1 < x˜ < x
∗
2. That
is, neither ﬁrm has an incentive to jump over its opponent, which completes our proof.
Before starting with the proofs of the comparative static analysis, we want to point
out that for many of the estimations performed in the subsequent ﬁve proofs, we make
use of the following intrinsic parameter restrictions:
• upper and lower support boundaries for M : 0 < L ≤ 1
2
• upper and lower bound of the conﬁdence parameter: 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
• upper and lower bound of ambiguity attitude: 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
• upper and lower bound of the variance of M : 0 ≤ σ2 ≤ L2 ≤ 1
4
• upper and lower bound of the transportation cost parameter: 0 < t ≤ 1 ≤ t
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Proof of Proposition 4.2. The derivative of x∗1 with respect to α is given by
∂x∗1
∂α
= −
δ(2L− 3)t(2δL(2L+ 3)t− (δ − 1)(3L+ 2σ2)) + (δ − 1)δ(2L+ 3)t(3L− 2σ2)
2(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)2
The denominator is positive. Therefore, the sign of the derivative is determined by its
numerator. We analyze the sign of this expression in two steps. The ﬁrst part of the
numerator is
g1 := −δ(2L− 3)t(2δL(2L+ 3)t+ (1− δ)(3L+ 2σ
2))
Due to the fact that L < 1
2
, one can infer that 2L − 3 < 0. Hence, one obtains g1 > 0.
The second part of the numerator is
g2 := (1− δ)δ(2L+ 3)t(3L− 2σ
2)
Since σ2 < L2 < L, one can infer that
3L− 2σ2 > 3L− 2L = L > 0.
Therefore, one has g2 > 0 as well. This proves that
∂x∗
1
∂α
> 0 and
∂x∗
2
∂α
= −
∂x∗
1
∂α
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. The derivative of x∗1 with respect to σ
2 is given by
∂x∗1
∂σ2
=
1− δ
δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3
The numerator is non-negative since 1− δ ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ δ ≥ 1. It is strictly positive for 0 ≤
δ < 1. For the denominator, observe that δ(α−1)(2L+3)t ≤ 0 and δ(α(2L−3)t+3) ≤ 0,
since L < 1
2
. Hence, the denominator is smaller or equal −3 and therefore negative. Thus,
∂x∗
1
∂σ2
≤ 0 and
∂x∗
2
∂σ2
= −
∂x∗
1
∂σ2
≥ 0. For δ = 1 both x∗1 and x
∗
2 are independent of σ
2. Therefore
∂x∗
2
∂σ2
=
∂x∗
1
∂σ2
= 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. We have
∂x∗1
∂t
=
αδ
(
2(α− 1)δL (4L2 − 9) t+ (δ − 1)(2L− 3)(3L+ 2σ2)
)
2(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)2
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It is obvious that the denominator is positive. Turning to the numerator, we can see that
4L2 − 9 ≤ 0 since L < 1
2
. Therefore, we can conclude that
2αδ(α− 1)δL
(
4L2 − 9
)
t ≥ 0.
Similarly, since 2L− 3 < 0 and α− 1 ≤ 0, one can infer that
αδ(δ − 1)(2L− 3)(3L+ 2σ2) ≥ 0.
Consequently, the numerator is positive and
∂x∗
1
∂t
> 0. Since x∗2 = −x
∗
1, it follows that
∂x∗
2
∂t
= −
∂x∗
1
∂t
< 0. The derivative of x∗1 with respect to t is given by
∂x∗1
∂t
= −
(α− 1)δ(2L+ 3)(2αδL(2L− 3)t+ (δ − 1)(3L− 2σ2))
2(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)2
Clearly, the denominator is positive. Turning to the numerator, observe that the factor
−(α− 1)δ(2L+ 3) is positive. Moreover, since L < 1
2
, one can infer
2αδL(2L− 3)t ≤ 0.
As a next step, we can show that
3L− 2σ2 ≥ 3L− 2L2 > 3L− 2L = L > 0.
This implies (δ − 1)(3L− 2σ2)) ≤ 0. In total, the numerator is negative. Therefore, one
has
∂x∗
1
∂t
< 0 and
∂x∗
2
∂t
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.5. The derivative of x∗1 with respect to δ is given by
∂x∗1
∂δ
=
(α− 1)(2L+ 3)t(3L− 2σ2)− α(2L− 3)t(3L+ 2σ2)
2(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)2
It is straightforward to see that the denominator is positive. The ﬁrst part of the numer-
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ator is given by
g3 := (α− 1)(2L+ 3)t(3L− 2σ
2).
Since
3L− 2σ2 ≥ 3L− 2L = L > 0,
one can infer that g3 ≤ 0. Deﬁning
g4 := −α(2L− 3)t(3L+ 2σ
2),
one obtains by 2L − 3 < 0 that g4 ≥ 0. As a consequence, one can infer that
∂x∗
1
∂δ
> 0 if
g3 + g4 > 0 and
∂x∗
1
∂δ
< 0 if g3 + g4 < 0. Moreover, one has
∂x∗
1
∂δ
= 0 if g3 + g4 = 0. Solving
the equation −g3 = g4 for α, one obtains the unique solution
α∗ :=
(2L+ 3)(3L− 2σ2)
(2L+ 3)t(3L− 2σ2)− (2L− 3)t(3L+ 2σ2)
Besides, one can see that g3 + g4 > 0 whenever α > α
∗ and g3 + g4 < 0 whenever α < α
∗.
This establishes that the numerator has, for every parameter constellation, a unique zero
α∗ where
∂x∗
1
∂δ
< 0 for all 0 ≤ α < α∗,
∂x∗
1
∂δ
= 0 for α = α∗ and
∂x∗
1
∂δ
> 0 for all 1 ≥ α > α∗.
Since x∗2 = −x
∗
1, we obtain the postulated result for x
∗
2 without reexamining the respective
derivative.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. The derivative of x1
∗ with respect to L is given by
∂x∗1
∂L
=− δ((α− 1)t((δ − 1)(12L− 4σ2 + 9)− 24αδLt)
+ αt(−αδ(3− 2L)2t− (δ − 1)(12L+ 4σ2 − 9)) + (α− 1)2δ(2L+ 3)2t
2
)
· (2(δ((α− 1)(2L+ 3)t+ α(2L− 3)t+ 3)− 3)2)−1
As we can see, the denominator is positive. Therefore the sign of the derivative solely
depends on the numerator. Since δ ≥ 0 it is suﬃcient to consider the sign of numerator
divided by δ. We denote this expression with (∗). Inserting α = 0 into expression (∗)
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yields
t
(
(δ − 1)(12L− 4σ2 + 9)− δ(2L+ 3)2t
)
≤ δ[−12L+ 4σ2 − 9]
≤ δ[−12L− 8]
= −4δ(3L+ 2)
< 0
This shows that the derivative is strictly negative for α = 0. Similarly, inserting α = 1
into (∗), we obtain
t
(
(δ − 1)(12L+ 4σ2 − 9) + δ(3− 2L)2t
)
(4.10)
We establish that expression (4.10) is strictly positive. It is
12L+ 4σ2 − 9 ≤ 6 + 1− 9 = −2 < 0.
As a consequence, we obtain
(δ − 1)(12L+ 4σ2 − 9) ≥ 0.
This shows that the numerator is positive. Now, we demonstrated that
∂x∗
1
∂L
< 0 for α = 0,
and
∂x∗
1
∂L
> 0 for α = 1. The derivative is continuous. By the intermediate value theorem
for continuous functions, we obtain that there is αˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that
∂x∗
1
∂L
= 0 for α = αˆ.
What remains to be shown is that αˆ is unique. In this case, we know that x∗1 is strictly
decreasing in L for values of α smaller that αˆ, constant for α = αˆ, and increasing for
1 ≥ α > αˆ. Solving expression (∗) for α, we know that we ﬁnd at least one zero, the
zero αˆ in the interval [0, 1]. Since (∗) is a quadratic function in α, we can conclude that
it has one more root ˆˆα. This root cannot be located in the interval [0, 1] as well. This
we show by making use of a proof by contradiction. Assume, w.l.o.g., that ˆˆα was in the
interval [0, 1] as well and that αˆ < ˆˆα. We can distinguish two cases. Case 1 is that the
quadratic function has a global maximum, and case 2 is that the quadratic function has a
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global minimum. Since we can ﬁnd both roots in the interval [0, 1], the global maximum,
or alternatively the global minimum, are also located in this interval. Assume now that
we have a quadratic function with a global maximum. In this case, we have that (∗) is
smaller zero for α < αˆ, equal to zero for α ∈ {αˆ, ˆˆα}, and smaller zero for α ∈ ( ˆˆα, 1].
The last statement contradicts that (∗) is larger zero for α = 1 what we already showed
above. For a global minimum a similar line of arguments holds. Since both roots are
located in the interval [0, 1], we can deduce that the minimum is located in this interval
as well. In this case we can conclude that (∗) is larger than zero for α < αˆ, equal to zero
for α ∈ {αˆ, ˆˆα}, and again larger zero for α ∈ ( ˆˆα, 1]. The ﬁrst statement contradicts that
(∗) is smaller zero for α = 0. To sum up, we have only one root in [0, 1].
"1. Define Objectives for Firm 1 and Firm 2";
f1[x1_, x2_, alpha_, delta_, tlow_, thigh_, sigma_, L_] :=
delta * ((2 * thigh * (1 - alpha) * (x2 - x1) * (L + (x2 + x1) / 2 + 3 / 2)^2) / 9 +(2 * alpha * tlow * (x2 - x1) * (-L + (x2 + x1) / 2 + 3 / 2)^2) / 9) +((1 - delta) * (x2 - x1) * ((x2 + x1 + 3)^2 + 4 * sigma)) / 18;
f2[x1_, x2_, alpha_, delta_, tlow_, thigh_, sigma_, L_] :=
delta * ((2 * alpha * tlow * (x2 - x1) * (L + (x2 + x1) / 2 - 3 / 2)^2) / 9 +(2 * (1 - alpha) * thigh * (x2 - x1) * (-L + (x2 + x1) / 2 - 3 / 2)^2) / 9) +((1 - delta) * (x2 - x1) * ((x2 + x1 - 3)^2 + 4 * sigma)) / 18;
"2. Introduce Parameter Restrictions";
assumptions = And[L ? 1 / 2, 0 ? alpha ? 1,
0 < tlow <= 1, 0 <= delta ? 1, 0 <= sigma ? L^2, thigh ? 1];
"3. Define the Midpoint Between Both Firms";
mean = (x1 + x2) / 2;
"4. Solving for Mutual Best Responses";
solutions =
FullSimplify[Solve[{D[f1[x1, x2, alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L], x1] ? 0,
D[f2[x1, x2, alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L], x2] ? 0}, {x1, x2}]];
"5. Store Solutions in a Table";
TableForm[Table[{solutions[[i, 1, 2]], solutions[[i, 2, 2]]},{i, Length[solutions]}], TableHeadings ? {{"1", "2", "3"}, {"x1", "x2"}},
TableAlignments ? Center, TableSpacing ? {3, 4}];
"6. Verify Whether Solution
Satisfies the Global Competition Condition";
Printed by Wolfram Mathematica Student Edition
Table[{i, FullSimplify[(And[-3 / 2 < -L - mean, L - mean < 3 / 2] /. solutions[[i]]),
assumptions]}, {i, Length[solutions]}]?{1, True}, ?2, 2 + 2 delta (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) >??9 - 4 sigma + delta ?-18 - 23 (-1 + alpha) thigh + 11 alpha tlow +
4 sigma (2 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow) + delta ?9 + 16 (-1 + alpha)2
thigh2 + 4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) + alpha tlow(-11 + 4 alpha tlow) - (-1 + alpha) thigh (-23 + 12 alpha tlow)??? &&
2 delta (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow) <
2 +??9 - 4 sigma + delta ?-18 - 23 (-1 + alpha) thigh + 11 alpha tlow +
4 sigma (2 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow) + delta ?9 + 16 (-1 + alpha)2
thigh2 + 4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) + alpha tlow(-11 + 4 alpha tlow) - (-1 + alpha) thigh (-23 + 12 alpha tlow)????,?3, 2 delta (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow) <
2 +??9 - 4 sigma + delta ?-18 - 23 (-1 + alpha) thigh + 11 alpha tlow +
4 sigma (2 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow) + delta ?9 + 16 (-1 + alpha)2
thigh2 + 4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) + alpha tlow(-11 + 4 alpha tlow) - (-1 + alpha) thigh (-23 + 12 alpha tlow)??? &&
2 delta (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow) +??9 - 4 sigma +
delta ?-18 - 23 (-1 + alpha) thigh + 11 alpha tlow + 4 sigma(2 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow) + delta ?9 + 16 (-1 + alpha)2 thigh2 +
4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) + alpha tlow (-11 +
4 alpha tlow) - (-1 + alpha) thigh (-23 + 12 alpha tlow)??? < 2??
"7. Verify That the First Pair of Solutions
Satisfies the Global Competition Condition";
x1st = ?9 + 4 sigma +
delta ?-9 - 4 sigma - (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L)2 thigh + alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow?? ?(4 (-3 + delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow)));
x2st = -x1st;
Simplify[x2st > 3 / 2 - L, assumptions]
3 delta + 4 sigma > 3 + 4 delta (sigma + alpha tlow)
Reduce[{3 delta + 4 sigma > 3 + 4 delta (sigma + alpha tlow), assumptions},{alpha, delta, sigma, tlow}]
False
"8. Define the Mean for the
Second and Third Pair of Solutions";
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Printed by Wolfram Mathematica Student Edition
mean2 =??3 + delta (-3 - (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (3 - 2 L) tlow) -??9 - 4 sigma +
delta ?4 (-1 + alpha) ((-3 + L) L + sigma) thigh + 2 (-9 + 4 sigma -
9 (-1 + alpha) thigh) - 2 alpha (-9 + 2 L (3 + L) + 2 sigma) tlow +
delta ?9 + (-1 + alpha)2 (3 + 2 L)2 thigh2 + 4 sigma(-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) + alpha tlow(9 (-2 + alpha tlow) + 4 L (3 + L + alpha (-3 + L) tlow)) + 2 (-1 +
alpha) thigh (9 - 9 alpha tlow + 2 L (3 - L + 6 alpha L tlow))???? ?(2 (-1 + delta (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow))) -??3 - delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow) +??9 - 4 sigma + delta ?4 (-1 + alpha) ((-3 + L) L + sigma)
thigh + 2 (-9 + 4 sigma - 9 (-1 + alpha) thigh) - 2 alpha(-9 + 2 L (3 + L) + 2 sigma) tlow + delta ?9 + (-1 + alpha)2 (3 + 2 L)2
thigh2 + 4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) + alpha
tlow (9 (-2 + alpha tlow) + 4 L (3 + L + alpha (-3 + L) tlow)) +
2 (-1 + alpha) thigh (9 - 9 alpha tlow + 2 L(3 - L + 6 alpha L tlow))???? ?(2 (-1 + delta (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow)))?? ? 2;
mean3 =??3 + delta (-3 - (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (3 - 2 L) tlow) +??9 - 4 sigma +
delta ?4 (-1 + alpha) ((-3 + L) L + sigma) thigh + 2 (-9 + 4 sigma -
9 (-1 + alpha) thigh) - 2 alpha (-9 + 2 L (3 + L) + 2 sigma) tlow +
delta ?9 + (-1 + alpha)2 (3 + 2 L)2 thigh2 + 4 sigma(-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) + alpha tlow(9 (-2 + alpha tlow) + 4 L (3 + L + alpha (-3 + L) tlow)) + 2 (-1 +
alpha) thigh (9 - 9 alpha tlow + 2 L (3 - L + 6 alpha L tlow))???? ?(2 (-1 + delta (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow))) +?-3 + delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow) +??9 - 4 sigma + delta ?4 (-1 + alpha) ((-3 + L) L + sigma) thigh +
2 (-9 + 4 sigma - 9 (-1 + alpha) thigh) - 2 alpha (-9 + 2 L (3 + L) +
2 sigma) tlow + delta ?9 + (-1 + alpha)2 (3 + 2 L)2 thigh2 +
4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) + alpha tlow(9 (-2 + alpha tlow) + 4 L (3 + L + alpha (-3 + L) tlow)) + 2 (-1 +
alpha) thigh (9 - 9 alpha tlow + 2 L (3 - L + 6 alpha L tlow))???? ?(2 (-1 + delta (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh - alpha tlow)))? ? 2;
"9. Determine the Mean's Range for
the Second and Third Pair of Solutions";
NMinimize[{mean2, 0 <= L ? 1 / 2, 0 ? alpha ? 1, 0 <= tlow <= 1, 0 <= delta ? 1,
0 <= sigma ? L^2, thigh ? 1}, {alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L}]{1., {alpha ? 1., delta ? 1., tlow ? 0.878054, thigh ? 1., sigma ? 0.139562, L ? 0.5}}
NMaximize[{mean2, 0 <= L ? 1 / 2, 0 ? alpha ? 1, 0 <= tlow <= 1, 0 <= delta ? 1,
0 <= sigma ? L^2, thigh ? 1}, {alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L}]?2., ?alpha ? 2.6438 × 10-9, delta ? 1.,
tlow ? 0.0272573, thigh ? 2.23364, sigma ? 0.234253, L ? 0.5??
mathematica_hotelling.nb    3
Printed by Wolfram Mathematica Student Edition
NMinimize[{mean3, 0 <= L ? 1 / 2, 0 ? alpha ? 1, 0 <= tlow <= 1, 0 <= delta ? 1,
0 <= sigma ? L^2, thigh ? 1}, {alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L}]?-2., ?alpha ? 2.6438 × 10-9, delta ? 1.,
tlow ? 0.0272573, thigh ? 2.23364, sigma ? 0.234253, L ? 0.5??
NMaximize[{mean3, 0 <= L ? 1 / 2, 0 ? alpha ? 1, 0 <= tlow <= 1, 0 <= delta ? 1,
0 <= sigma ? L^2, thigh ? 1}, {alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L}]
?-1., ?alpha ? 1., delta ? 1., tlow ? 0.365717,
thigh ? 1.79008, sigma ? 1.80912 × 10-22, L ? 0.5??
"10. Second-Order Derivative Firm 1";
FullSimplify[ D[f1[x1, x2, alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L], {x1, 2}]]
1
9 (-6 - 3 x1 - x2 + delta (6 + 3 x1 +
alpha tlow (-6 + 4 L - 3 x1 - x2) + x2 + (-1 + alpha) thigh (6 + 4 L + 3 x1 + x2)))
Secondorderderivative1[x1_, x2_, alpha_, delta_, tlow_, thigh_, sigma_, L_] :=
1
9
(-6 - 3 x1 - x2 + delta (6 + 3 x1 + alpha tlow (-6 + 4 L - 3 x1 - x2) +
x2 + (-1 + alpha) thigh (6 + 4 L + 3 x1 + x2)));
"11. Second-Order Derivative Firm 2";
FullSimplify[D[f2[x1, x2, alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L], {x2, 2}]]
1
9 (-6 + x1 + 3 x2 + delta (6 - x1 +(-1 + alpha) thigh (6 + 4 L - x1 - 3 x2) - 3 x2 + alpha tlow (-6 + 4 L + x1 + 3 x2)))
Secondorderderivative2[x1_, x2_, alpha_, delta_, tlow_, thigh_, sigma_, L_] :=
1
9
(-6 + x1 + 3 x2 + delta (6 - x1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh (6 + 4 L - x1 - 3 x2) -
3 x2 + alpha tlow (-6 + 4 L + x1 + 3 x2)))
"12. Second-Order Derivatives
Evaluated at Equilibrium Candidate Positions";
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FullSimplify?Secondorderderivative1??9 + 4 sigma +
delta ?-9 - 4 sigma - (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L)2 thigh + alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow?? ?(4 (-3 + delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow))), ?-9 -
4 sigma + delta ?9 + 4 sigma + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L)2 thigh - alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow?? ?(4 (-3 + delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow))),
alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L???27 - 4 sigma + delta?8 sigma + 4 (-1 + alpha) ((-9 + L) L + sigma) thigh - 54 (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh) -
2 alpha (-27 + 2 L (9 + L) + 2 sigma) tlow + delta ?27 + 3 (-1 + alpha)2(3 + 2 L)2 thigh2 + 4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) +
alpha tlow ?-54 + 4 L (9 + L) + 3 alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow? +
2 (-1 + alpha) thigh (27 - 27 alpha tlow + 2 L (9 - L + 10 alpha L tlow))??? ?(18 (-3 + delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow)))
FullSimplify?Secondorderderivative2??9 + 4 sigma +
delta ?-9 - 4 sigma - (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L)2 thigh + alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow?? ?(4 (-3 + delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow))), ?-9 -
4 sigma + delta ?9 + 4 sigma + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L)2 thigh - alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow?? ?(4 (-3 + delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow))),
alpha, delta, tlow, thigh, sigma, L???27 - 4 sigma + delta?8 sigma + 4 (-1 + alpha) ((-9 + L) L + sigma) thigh - 54 (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh) -
2 alpha (-27 + 2 L (9 + L) + 2 sigma) tlow + delta ?27 + 3 (-1 + alpha)2(3 + 2 L)2 thigh2 + 4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) +
alpha tlow ?-54 + 4 L (9 + L) + 3 alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow? +
2 (-1 + alpha) thigh (27 - 27 alpha tlow + 2 L (9 - L + 10 alpha L tlow))??? ?(18 (-3 + delta (3 + (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L) thigh + alpha (-3 + 2 L) tlow)))
"13. Take the Derivative of
the Numerator With Respect to Thigh";
FullSimplify?
D??27 - 4 sigma + delta ?8 sigma + 4 (-1 + alpha) ((-9 + L) L + sigma) thigh - 54(1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh) - 2 alpha (-27 + 2 L (9 + L) + 2 sigma) tlow +
delta ?27 + 3 (-1 + alpha)2 (3 + 2 L)2 thigh2 +
4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh + alpha tlow) +
alpha tlow ?-54 + 4 L (9 + L) + 3 alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow? + 2 (-1 + alpha)
thigh (27 - 27 alpha tlow + 2 L (9 - L + 10 alpha L tlow))???, thigh??
2 (-1 + alpha) delta?-27 + 2 ((-9 + L) L + sigma) + delta ?27 - 2 sigma + 3 (-1 + alpha) (3 + 2 L)2 thigh -
27 alpha tlow + 2 L (9 + L (-1 + 10 alpha tlow))??
"14. Check Whether the Derivative Can be Negative";
assumptions = And[0 <= L ? 1 / 2, 0 ? alpha ? 1,
0 < tlow ? 1, 0 <= delta ? 1, 0 <= sigma ? L^2, thigh >= 1];
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Reduce??2 (-1 + alpha) delta ?-27 + 2 ((-9 + L) L + sigma) + delta ?27 - 2 sigma + 3 (-1 + alpha)(3 + 2 L)2 thigh - 27 alpha tlow + 2 L (9 + L (-1 + 10 alpha tlow))?? < 0,
assumptions?, {alpha, delta, sigma, L, tlow, thigh}?
False
"15. Evaluate the Numerator of
the Second-Order Derivative at Thigh=1";
Num[alpha_, delta_, tlow_, thigh_, sigma_, L_] :=?27 - 4 sigma + delta ?8 sigma + 4 (-1 + alpha) ((-9 + L) L + sigma) thigh -
54 (1 + (-1 + alpha) thigh) - 2 alpha (-27 + 2 L (9 + L) + 2 sigma) tlow +
delta ?27 + 3 (-1 + alpha)2 (3 + 2 L)2 thigh2 + 4 sigma (-1 + thigh - alpha thigh +
alpha tlow) + alpha tlow ?-54 + 4 L (9 + L) + 3 alpha (3 - 2 L)2 tlow? +
2 (-1 + alpha) thigh (27 - 27 alpha tlow + 2 L (9 - L + 10 alpha L tlow))???;
FullSimplify[Num[alpha, delta, tlow, 1, sigma, L]]
27 - 4 sigma + delta ?4 (L (9 + (-1 + 4 delta) L) + sigma) +
alpha2 delta ?27 (-1 + tlow)2 + 4 L2 (3 + tlow) (1 + 3 tlow) - 36 L ?-1 + tlow2?? -
2 alpha ?-(27 + 2 (-1 + delta) sigma) (-1 + tlow) +
18 L (1 + delta + tlow - delta tlow) + 2 L2 (-1 + tlow + delta (7 + 9 tlow))??
27 - 4 sigma + delta ?4 (L (9 + (-1 + 4 delta) L) + sigma) +
alpha2 delta ?27 (-1 + tlow)2 + 4 L2 (3 + tlow) (1 + 3 tlow) - 36 L ?-1 + tlow2?? -
2 alpha ?-(27 + 2 (-1 + delta) sigma) (-1 + tlow) +
18 L (1 + delta + tlow - delta tlow) + 2 L2 (-1 + tlow + delta (7 + 9 tlow))??
27 - 4 sigma + delta ?4 (L (9 + (-1 + 4 delta) L) + sigma) +
alpha2 delta ?27 (-1 + tlow)2 + 4 L2 (3 + tlow) (1 + 3 tlow) - 36 L ?-1 + tlow2?? -
2 alpha ?(-27 - 2 (-1 + delta) sigma) (-1 + tlow) +
18 L (1 + delta + tlow - delta tlow) + 2 L2 (-1 + tlow + delta (7 + 9 tlow))??
6     mathematica_hotelling.nb
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"16. Can The Numerator
Evaluated at Thigh=1 Become Negative?";
Reduce??27 - 4 sigma + delta ?4 (L (9 + (-1 + 4 delta) L) + sigma) +
alpha2 delta ?27 (-1 + tlow)2 + 4 L2 (3 + tlow) (1 + 3 tlow) - 36 L ?-1 + tlow2?? -
2 alpha ?-(27 + 2 (-1 + delta) sigma) (-1 + tlow) +
18 L (1 + delta + tlow - delta tlow) + 2 L2 (-1 + tlow + delta (7 + 9 tlow))?? <
0, 0 <= L ? 1 / 2, 0 ? alpha ? 1, 0 <= tlow ? 1, 0 <= delta ? 1,
0 <= sigma ? L^2?, {alpha, delta,
tlow,
sigma,
L}?
False
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Chapter 5
Strategic behavior in games with
payoﬀ uncertainty
This Chapter, which is based on Kauﬀeldt (2016), investigates the extent to which we
can distinguish between expected and non-expected utility players on the basis of their
behavior. A model of incomplete information games is used in which players can choose
mixed strategies.
Most real-life strategic situations involve incomplete information. To analyze games
of incomplete information, Harsanyi (1967-68) introduced the concept of Bayesian games.
One key assumption of Harsanyi’s approach is that players are Bayesian expected utility
maximizers and share a prior distribution over the state space (see Chapter 3). However,
as exempliﬁed by Ellsberg (1961), individuals frequently violate the expected utility (or,
brieﬂy, EU) hypothesis when they face ambiguity (see Chapter 2).
A number of models of incomplete information games with non-EU players have been
proposed (see the literature below). However, to my knowledge, it has not been sys-
tematically investigated whether, and if so, under which conditions, these models predict
behavior that diﬀers from the behavior predicted by models with EU players. Such an
investigation is useful not only for gaining theoretical insights, but also as a guide to
design experiments testing one model against another.
In this chapter, I oﬀer a ﬁrst attempt at systematically examining the question of when
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one can distinguish EU from non-EU players in the context of an increasingly used model.
The key assumption of this model is that players behave as expected utility maximizers
with correct beliefs concerning mixed strategy combinations but face ambiguity24 about
the environment. Comparable models were ﬁrst introduced by Bade (2011a) and Azrieli
and Teper (2011). Therefore, I shall occasionally refer to this model as the “Bade-Azrieli-
Teper-model” (or, brieﬂy, BAT-model). For instance, the applications described later on
in this section are based on BAT-type models.
Unfortunately, ambiguity-neutral and ambiguity-averse players sometimes behave ob-
servationally equivalent, which means that it is impossible to identify non-EU players by
observing equilibrium actions. I show that EU and non-EU players can be distinguished
from each other by looking at their best-response correspondences. More precisely, the
strategic behavior of uncertainty-averse non-EU players can diﬀer substantially from the
behavior of EU players in both: the use (hedging behavior) and the response (reversal be-
havior) to mixed strategies. From a decision theory perspective, both characteristics are
due to the same cause, namely a preference for mixtures. However, from a game theory
perspective, it does matter whether a player prefers to randomize over her strategies or
whether she exhibits a preference for mixed strategy combinations of the opponents.
In the formal analysis, attention is restricted to games with payoﬀ uncertainty but
without private information. However, the results can also be applied to incomplete in-
formation games with private information (see Remark 5.2). The ﬁrst main theorem
shows that EU and non-EU players behave observationally equivalent whenever the non-
EU players do not exhibit hedging behavior. In other words, the absence of hedging
behavior is suﬃcient for observational equivalence. That is, we need hedging behavior if
we want to distinguish EU from non-EU players by observing equilibrium actions. The
second main theorem shows that non-EU players behave as if they were EU players if and
only if they do not exhibit hedging and reversal behavior. To put it diﬀerently, hedging
and/or reversal behavior are necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of behavioral diﬀer-
ences between EU and non-EU players, which means that there are no other behavioral
24The main theorems also apply to non-EU players who are probabilistically sophisticated in the sense
of Machina and Schmeidler (1992), but this chapter focuses on players with non-probabilistic beliefs.
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diﬀerences. The propositions provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence
of hedging and reversal behavior in terms of the payoﬀ structure of a game. However, for
tractability reasons, we consider here only two-person two-strategies games and players
with maxmin expected utility preferences (see Chapter 2). In laboratory experiments,
both restrictions are frequently satisﬁed.
The majority of the literature on games played by non-EU players has focused on games
with complete information in which players face only strategic uncertainty (see Chapter 3).
There is a relatively small, but growing, literature on incomplete information games played
by non-EU players. Epstein and Wang (1996) oﬀer a general framework that provides a
foundation for a “type-space” approach a` la Harsanyi with non-EU players. Eichberger
and Kelsey (2004) generalize perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the case of two-person
games where players have non-additive beliefs. In their Dempster-Shafer equilibrium,
players maximize Choquet expected utility. Kajii and Ui (2005) investigate a model in
which all players have maxmin expected utility preferences. Their model diﬀers from
Bayesian games in that it does not assume a common prior over the states. Instead, there
is a set of priors for each player, which may vary among players. Bade (2011a) and Azrieli
and Teper (2011) consider more general preferences. Their models assume that players
choose mixtures as their strategies, and there is no ambiguity about the probabilities
of mixed strategies, i.e., no strategic ambiguity. However, players face ambiguity about
the environment. The papers diﬀer in that Bade (2011a) requires payoﬀs to be state-
independent, and in that Azrieli and Teper (2011) do not rule out correlation devices and
diverging beliefs.
There is an increasing number of papers on applications of incomplete information
games that use BAT-type models. These papers examine games with payoﬀ ambiguity
but without private information. For instance, Bade (2011b) studies electoral competition
between two parties in a two-stage game by assuming that parties are uncertain about
voters’ marginal rates of substitution between issues. Kro´l (2012) investigates ambiguous
demand in the context of a two-stage product-type-then-price competition game. Aﬂaki
(2013) examines the tragedy of the commons in which players face ambiguity concerning
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the size of the resource endowment. Bade (2011a) and Kro´l (2012) use maxmin expected
utility preferences. Aﬂaki (2013) additionally considers Choquet expected utility, and
smooth ambiguity preferences introduced by Klibanoﬀ et al. (2005). Another example is
the Hotelling model under demand ambiguity developed in the previous chapter.
This chapter is organized as follows. The following section gives two examples to
illustrate the BAT-model, and the notions of hedging and reversal behavior. Furthermore,
the BAT-model is described in detail. Section 5.2 provides the results. The subsequent
section discusses the underlying model, and introduces a generalized equilibrium concept.
Finally, Section 5.4 concludes with a summary of the main results. Unless noted otherwise,
the proofs of the results are given in Section 5.5.
5.1 Preliminaries
5.1.1 Two examples
In the following, we consider two examples.25 These examples illustrate the BAT-
model and our notions of hedging and reversal behavior. In addition, they show potential
economic applications of the BAT-model.
Example 5.1 (Discrete Cournot duopoly with uncertain demand). There are two ﬁrms,
i ∈ {1, 2}, which produce a homogeneous product. The ﬁrms compete in quantities, and
decide simultaneously whether to produce a low quantity normalized to one, ql = 1, or
a high quantity, qh = 2. Marginal costs of production are constant and normalized to
one. The market price, p, depends on the total quantity in the industry, Q, and on an
uncertain state of the world, ω ∈ {ω1, ω2}: p = A(ω)− b(ω) ·Q, where (A, b)(ω1) = (6,
3
2
)
and (A, b)(ω2) = (2, 0). When choosing whether to produce ql or qh, neither ﬁrm knows
the state of the world. Firms’ state-dependent proﬁts are:
25The equilibria for the games in the examples and the formal derivation of players’ best-response
correspondences are given in Section 5.5.
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ql qh
ql 2, 2
1
2
, 1
qh 1,
1
2
−2,−2
ω1
ql qh
ql 1, 1 1, 2
qh 2, 1 2, 2
ω2
Since ﬁrms’ proﬁts depend on a state of nature, every pure strategy proﬁle induces a
state-contingent vector of proﬁts for both ﬁrms. For instance, the strategy proﬁle (ql, ql)
induces the vector fi(ql, ql) = (f
ω1
i (ql, ql), f
ω2
i (ql, ql)) = (2, 1) for each ﬁrm i. Every mixed
strategy proﬁle generates a probability distribution over pure strategy proﬁles. In a given
state ω, each ﬁrm’s payoﬀ from a mixed proﬁle corresponds to its expected proﬁt with
respect to this distribution. Hence, every mixed proﬁle induces state-contingent vectors
of expected proﬁts. For example, suppose ﬁrm 2 (column) plays ql with 1/4 probability
(and qh with 3/4 probability). Denote ﬁrm 2’s strategy by σ2(ql) =
1
4
.26 If ﬁrm 1 (row)
plays ql with certainty (i.e., the strategy σ1(ql) = 1), then its vector induced by the mixed
proﬁle (σ1(ql), σ2(ql)) = (1,
1
4
) equals f1(1,
1
4
) = 1
4
f1(ql, ql) +
3
4
f1(ql, qh) = (
7
8
, 1).
Now, assume that each ﬁrm i ∈ {1, 2} has the following non-EU preferences over
state-contingent (expected) proﬁts: Vi(fi) = min{f
ω1
i , f
ω2
i }. Then, ﬁrm i’s best-response
correspondence, Ri, takes the form illustrated in Figure 5.1.
✲
✻
σj(ql)
Ri(σj(ql))
1
1
1/3
1/2
Figure 5.1: Best-response correspondence of a ﬁrm in Example 5.1
26In this section, mixed strategies are denoted by their ﬁrst component, σj(ql) = (σj(ql), σj(qh)), since
σj(ql) = 1− σj(qh).
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As Figure 5.1 shows, ﬁrm i has a unique best response to all strategies of ﬁrm j.
Furthermore, its unique best response is a mixed strategy if j plays ql with more than 1/3
probability. EU players would never show this type of strategic behavior. They use mixed
strategies to make the other players indiﬀerent between playing their pure strategies, for
instance, like in matching pennies-type games, to avoid exploitation by their opponents.
However, for an EU player, mixed strategies are always weakly optimal: if a mixed strategy
is a best response to some strategy proﬁle of the other players, then, at the same time, all
pure strategies to which it assigns positive probability are best responses. Consequently,
mixed strategies are never unique best responses.
Why are non-EU players able to behave diﬀerently? The reason is that they randomize
over their pure strategies not only for strategic purposes, but also as a kind of “hedging”
against environmental uncertainty. In Example 5.1, ql is a strictly dominant strategy in
ω1 and qh in ω2 for both ﬁrms. If ﬁrm j chooses a strategy σj(ql) ≤ 1/3, then ﬁrm i’s
expected proﬁt in state ω1 is lower than in ω2, regardless of its strategy choice. Therefore,
ﬁrm i will play its strictly dominant strategy in ω1, σi(ql) = 1. Otherwise, if σj(ql) > 1/3,
ﬁrm i seeks to smooth its expected proﬁts across states by playing a mixed strategy. For
instance, given σj(ql) = 1, ﬁrm i will play ql (and qh) with 1/2 probability, which induces
the vector fi
(
1
2
, 1
)
=
(
3
2
, 3
2
)
.
This is not new from a decision theory perspective. In an early reply to Ellsberg (1961),
Raiﬀa (1961) claimed that ambiguous uncertainty can be eliminated by randomizing (see
Example 2.2 and the subsequent discussion). Furthermore, Schmeidler (1989) deﬁnes
uncertainty-aversion as a weak preference for randomization (see Axiom 3). More recently,
Battigalli et al. (2013) study a framework of mixed extensions of decision problems under
uncertainty that involves preference for randomization as an expression of uncertainty-
aversion. They and other authors, e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Saito (2013),
use the term “hedging” to refer to situations in which decision-makers prefer randomized
choices. Although some confusion may arise from the connotations of this traditional
term,27 I will follow this terminology and refer to a preference for playing mixed strategies
27For instance, it could be associated with “hedging” in ﬁnance, which refers to activities that reduce
portfolio risk.
5. Strategic behavior in games with payoﬀ uncertainty 83
as “hedging behavior”.28
In the game theory literature, only a few authors, e.g., Klibanoﬀ (1996) and Lo (1996),
explicitly discuss a preference for randomized strategies in the context of their models,
which involve strategic ambiguity but no environmental uncertainty.
Example 5.2 (Uncertain investment). There is an investor, I, with initial wealth 1 and
a fund manager, M . The investor decides whether to invest her money in the fund, In,
or keep it at the bank, Bk, with a guaranteed payoﬀ of 1. The fund manager chooses
an investment strategy: he can either speculate on falling or on rising share prices. For
simplicity, suppose he can either buy one stock, S, or a put option on the stock, P .
Initially, stock and put are worth 1. The future stock value qs(ω) depends on an uncertain
state of the world, ω ∈ {ω1, ω2}, where q
s(ω1) = 6 and q
s(ω2) = 0. The strike price of
the put is 6, hence, its future value is qp(ω) = 6 − qs(ω). The fee for the fund manager
is performance-based: he gets 1 if the investment is successful, otherwise 0. Players’
state-dependent payoﬀs are:
S P
Bk 2, 0 2, 0
In 5, 1 0, 0
ω1
S P
Bk 2, 0 2, 0
In 0, 0 5, 1
ω2
Again, suppose that each player i ∈ {I,M} has the following non-EU preferences
over state-contingent (expected) payoﬀs: Vi(fi) = min{f
ω1
i , f
ω2
i }. Then, the players’
best-response correspondences, Ri, are given in Figure 5.2. The fund manager (left
graph) has a weakly dominant mixed strategy: buying the stock and the put with 1/2
probability. The investor (right graph) has no preference for mixed strategies. However,
she shows the second type of strategic behavior which diﬀers from behavior of EU players:
she prefers to keep her money at the bank if the investor buys the stock or the put
with high probability. Otherwise, if the fund manager’s action is suﬃciently uncertain
28Klibanoﬀ (2001) suggests the term “objectifying behavior”. In my opinion, another suitable alter-
native is “Raiﬀa behavior” since he was was the ﬁrst who pointed to this eﬀect.
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for her, she will invest in the fund. In other words, her preference for strategy Bk over
In, given S or P , reverses for some mixtures of S and P . Therefore, I will refer to this
type of behavior as “reversal behavior”. In contrast, if an EU player prefers to play a
particular strategy in response to two strategies of her opponent, she will still prefer to
play this strategy in response to any mixture of the two strategies. More formally, the
preimage of each of her best responses is convex under her best-response correspondence.29
✲
✻
σI(Bk)
RM(σI(Bk))
1
1
1/2
✲
✻
σM(S)
RI(σM(S))
1
1
2/5 3/5
Figure 5.2: Players’ best-response correspondences in Example 5.2
The reason for reversal behavior in Example 5.2 is that, no matter what the investor
chooses, her expected proﬁt in ω1 is lower than in ω2 if σM(S) > 1/2 and higher if
σM(S) < 1/2. According to her objective function VI = min{f
ω1
I , f
ω2
I }, she will maximize
fω1I if σM(S) > 1/2, and, otherwise, f
ω2
I . Hence, given σM(S) > 1/2, the investor’s
best-response correspondence equals her best responses in ω1, and, otherwise, her best
responses in ω2.
To summarize, non-EU players can behave diﬀerently than EU players in that they
may prefer randomized strategies and/or change their preferences for strategies due to
mixture operations of one of their opponents. As an aside, note that in both cases, the
matrix-form is an unsatisfactory representation of the game.
29Note that this holds only for two-person games. For the general case, see Deﬁnition 5.4.
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5.1.2 The basic model
This section describes the class of games to be studied. First, we introduce the notion
of a canonical game. This is a more detailed description of a game than a game-form but
it is less detailed than a complete description of a game.
Deﬁnition 5.1. A canonical normal-form game with incomplete information (or canon-
ical game, for short) is an ordered set G =
〈
I,Ω, {Ai, ui}i∈I
〉
, where
(1) I = {1, . . . , n} is a ﬁnite set of players ;
(2) Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωm} is a ﬁnite set of states of nature;
(3) Ai is the ﬁnite set of pure actions of player i. Let A =×
i∈I
Ai;
(4) ui : A× Ω→ R is the payoﬀ function of player i.
Players’ payoﬀs (4) depend not only on an action proﬁle, a ∈ A, but also on an uncertain
state of the world (2). Note that (4) is a simpliﬁcation (see Remark 3.2): let γ : A×Ω→ X
be an outcome function that maps from action proﬁles and states onto a set of outcomes
X, and let vi : X → R be player i’s utility function on the outcomes. Player i’s payoﬀ
function corresponds to the composition ui := vi ◦ γ : A× Ω→ R.
Remark 5.1. A canonical game is a game-form together with ﬁxed state-dependent
payoﬀs.
According to (4), an action proﬁle a ∈ A induces payoﬀ ui(a, ω) in state ω ∈ Ω
for each i ∈ I. Hence, every action proﬁle induces a payoﬀ vector or, an act, fi(a) =(
ui(a, ω1), . . . , ui(a, ωm)
)
∈ Rm for each i ∈ I. Deﬁnition 5.1 does not include private
information. I shall restrict attention to this case to avoid cumbersome notation. As the
following remark shows, private information can be easily introduced into the game.
Remark 5.2 (cf. Bade, 2011a and Azrieli and Teper, 2011). Private information can
be introduced into the game by deﬁning an information partition Pi of Ω for each i ∈ I
which speciﬁes players’ strategy sets. A pure strategy of player i is then a Pi-measurable
function si : Ω→ Ai. If player i has no private information, the partition Pi is trivial. In
this case, player i’s strategies correspond to her actions.
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Remark 5.3. The results in this paper hold also for canonical games with private infor-
mation.
Of particular interest in this paper are mixed actions. The mixed extension of a
canonical game involves, in addition to the elements of Deﬁnition 5.1, players’ mixed
action sets. Recall that a mixed action of player i is a function σi : Ai → [0, 1] where∑
ai∈Ai
σi(ai) = 1. As in Chapter 3, the set of all mixed actions of player i is denoted by Σi,
and σi(ai) denotes the probability which σi assigns to action ai. The BAT-model does
not allow for strategic ambiguity, which means that players’ have correct beliefs about
mixed action combinations. To put it diﬀerently, the probabilities σi(ai) can be viewed as
“objective” or known probabilities. It is assumed that, in any given state ω ∈ Ω, players’
preferences w.r.t. a mixed proﬁle σ ∈ Σ have an EU representation.
Assumption 5.1. Fix a state ω ∈ Ω, then player i’s payoﬀ from a mixed proﬁle σ ∈ Σ is
fωi (σ) =
∑
a∈A
( ∏
j∈I
σj(aj)
)
ui(a, ω) for each i ∈ I.
According to Assumption 5.1, every mixed action proﬁle σ ∈ Σ induces a vector of
expected payoﬀs fi(σ) =
(
fω1i , . . . , f
ωm
i
)
∈ Rm, which is a convex combination of player
i’s payoﬀ vectors induced by pure strategy proﬁles fi(a), formally,
fi(σ) =
∑
a∈A
( ∏
j∈I
σj(aj)fi(a)
)
.
In other words, mixed strategies induce statewise mixtures of acts.
Given the actions of the other players, any degenerate mixed action is payoﬀ equivalent
to a pure action. Therefore, we may associate the set of player i’s pure actions, Ai, with
the subset of Σi that contains i’s degenerate mixed actions. Henceforth, depending on
the context, the symbols ai and Ai may also stand for (the set of) i’s degenerate mixed
actions. Furthermore, we denote the set of all canonical games by Γ.
5.1.3 Preferences over acts and equilibrium points
Deﬁnition 5.1 is not suﬃcient to characterize the solution of a game. In order to
obtain a solvable game from a canonical game G ∈ Γ, we need to specify each player i’s
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preferences, i, over m-dimensional payoﬀ vectors, as in the examples in Section 5.1.1.
That is, for each i ∈ I, there exists a function Vi : Rm → R such that, for all f, g ∈ Rm,
f i g ⇔ Vi(f) ≥ Vi(g).
The preference ordering i of each player i induces, through the associated payoﬀ vectors,
a preference ordering on action proﬁles and hence on actions for any given action combi-
nation of the other players. Let = {i}i∈I denote the collection of players’ preferences
over acts. I shall refer to the set
〈
G,
〉
as G played by, or, with -players, or simply as
game. The analysis in this chapter focuses on the representation function Vi(·) of player i’s
preferences. Throughout Section 5.2, we will impose the following restrictions on Vi(·).
30
Assumption 5.2. For each i ∈ I, function Vi is continuous and quasiconcave on Rm, and
monotonic, i.e., for all f, g ∈ Rm, f(ω) ≥ (>)g(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω implies Vi(f) ≥ (>)Vi(g).
According to Assumption 5.2, the underlying preference relation i of each player i is
complete, transitive, and monotonic. Furthermore, it satisﬁes uncertainty-aversion in the
sense of Schmeidler (1989), which translates into quasiconcavity of the representation
function. There is a huge variety of preferences that are consistent with Assumption 5.2.
For instance, maxmin expected utility preferences, Choquet expected utility preferences
if the capacity is convex, and smooth ambiguity-averse preferences. For more details,
compare Cerreira-Vioglio et al. (2011), who identify the representation of preferences
that satisfy the properties mentioned above.
The following examples illustrate two possible representation functions. Let ∆(Ω) be
the set of all probability measures over Ω, and C be the collection of all nonempty, closed
and convex subsets of ∆(Ω). An element of ∆(Ω) (i.e., a probability vector or prior) is
denoted by π = (π(ω1), . . . , π(ωm)) where π(ω) is the probability of state ω ∈ Ω.
Example 5.3 (Expected utility). The belief of an EU player i is represented by a unique
prior πi ∈ ∆(Ω). She evaluates a state-contingent vector f ∈ Rm by the expected utility
with respect to her prior:
30In Section 5.3, we discuss an equilibrium concept that allows for preferences, which are not repre-
sented by quasiconcave functions.
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EUπi(f) = f · π
⊤
i where f is a row vector and π
⊤
i a column vector.
Hence, for all f, g ∈ Rm, it holds that, f EUi g ⇔ f · π
⊤
i ≥ g · π
⊤
i .
Consequently, a game played by EU players is a game
〈
G,EU
〉
where each player i has
EU preferences, EUi , i.e., i’s preferences are represented by an EU function, Vi = EUπi .
Example 5.4 (Maxmin expected utility). The key idea of the maxmin expected utility
approach is that, in case of ambiguous uncertainty, an individual i has too little infor-
mation to form a unique prior probability distribution πi ∈ ∆(Ω). For this reason, she
considers a set of priors Ci ∈ C as possible. A maxmin expected utility player i evaluates
an act f ∈ Rm by the minimal expected utility over all priors in her prior set:
MEUCi(f) = min
π∈Ci
{
EUπ(f)
}
.
Hence, for all f, g ∈ Rm, it holds that, f MEUi g ⇔ min
π∈Ci
{
EUπ(f)
}
≥ min
π∈Ci
{
EUπ(g)
}
.
Finally, we turn to the solution of a game
〈
G,
〉
. From now on, occasionally, I abuse
notation and write Vi(σ) instead of Vi(fi(σ)). An (ex-ante) equilibrium for (the mixed
extension of) a normal-form game with incomplete information is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 5.2. An equilibrium point in a game
〈
G,
〉
is a proﬁle (σ∗i , σ
∗
−i) ∈ Σ such
that
σ∗i ∈ argmax
σi∈Σi
Vi (σi, σ
∗
−i) for each player i.
Azrieli and Teper (2011) show that, under Assumption 5.1, uncertainty-aversion, i.e.,
quasiconcavity of players’ objective functions, is necessary and suﬃcient for equilibrium
existence, provided that players’ preferences are continuous and monotonic. Their theo-
rem is essentially similar to the existence theorem of Debreu (1952), which shows that in
a ﬁnite game Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist if players preferences are nonlinear
but quasiconcave in their own strategies.
5.1.4 Hedging behavior and reversal behavior
The best-response correspondence of player i is a multivalued mapping Ri : Σ−i ⇒ Σi
deﬁned by Ri(σ−i) = {σi | σi ∈ argmax
σi∈Σi
Vi (σi, σ−i)}. Furthermore, a pure action ai ∈ Ai
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is said to be contained in the support of a mixed action σi ∈ Σi if σi assigns a strictly
positive probability to ai, formally supp(σi) = {ai ∈ Ai | σi(ai) > 0}.
Deﬁnition 5.3. Player i with preferences i represented by function Vi exhibits hedging
behavior in G ∈ Γ if there exists a mixed action σ′i ∈ Σi which satisﬁes
(i) σ′i ∈ Ri(σ
′
−i) for some σ
′
−i ∈ Σ−i and
(ii) Vi(σ
′
i, σ
′
−i) > Vi(ai, σ
′
−i) for some ai ∈ supp(σ
′
i).
Property (i) in Deﬁnition 5.3 restricts the notion of hedging behavior to actions that are
contained in a player’s best-response correspondence. This is necessary since if a mixed
action is not a best response, an EU player may also prefer it over particular pure actions
from its support. However, this is not possible if the mixed action is a best response
due to the linearity of the EU functional.31 Furthermore, non-EU players may strictly
prefer mixed actions. This is the case when property (ii) holds for all ai ∈ supp(σ
′
i). As
a consequence, mixed actions can be unique best responses.
The second type of strategic behavior refers to players’ behavior concerning random-
izing operations of the other players.
Deﬁnition 5.4. Let (σ′j, σ−j), (σ
′′
j , σ−j) ∈ Σ−i, where σ−j denotes a ﬁxed strategy proﬁle
of all players except player i and player j. Player i with preferences i exhibits reversal
behavior in G ∈ Γ if there exist actions a′i, a
′′
i ∈ Ai such that
(i) a′i ∈ Ri(σ
′
j, σ−j), a
′
i ∈ Ri(σ
′′
j , σ−j), and a
′
i /∈ Ri(ασ
′
j + (1 − α)σ
′′
j , σ
′
−j) for some
α ∈ (0, 1) and/or
(ii) a′i ∈ Ri(σ
′
j, σ−j), a
′
i ∈ Ri(σ
′′
j , σ−j), and a
′′
i /∈ Ri(σ
′
j, σ−j) and/or a
′′
i /∈ Ri(σ
′′
j , σ−j),
and a′′i ∈ Ri(ασ
′
j + (1− α)σ
′′
j , σ−j) for some α ∈ (0, 1).
Deﬁnition 5.4 is more technical in nature. Condition (i) refers to a situation like in
Example 5.2 where an action is a best response to some action proﬁles but not to all
convex combinations of the proﬁles. Condition (ii) describes a situation in which a pure
action is a best response to a convex combination of two action proﬁles but not to both
proﬁles, and, at the same time, there exists another action which is a best response to
31This property can be easily shown, see, for instance, Dekel et al. (1991, p. 236).
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both proﬁles. Due to the linearity of the EU function, (ii) is also not possible if player i
is an EU player.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Main theorems
This section analyzes the extent to which the strategic behavior of EU players can be
distinguished from the behavior of non-EU players. It turns out that if non-EU players
exhibit neither hedging nor reversal behavior in a game, they are quasi-expected utility
players. That is, they behave as if if they were EU players. In this case, it is impossible
to distinguish between the players on the basis of their strategic behavior.
In general, it is diﬃcult to infer players’ preferences from their equilibrium actions.
Bade (2011a) shows that the sets of equilibria of a two-player game and its ambiguous
act extension are “observationally equivalent” in the sense that their supports coincide.
My ﬁrst main theorem is similar in nature but holds also for n-player games with state-
dependent payoﬀs. More precisely, it shows that one cannot identify non-EU players by
observing equilibrium actions whenever the players do not show hedging behavior.
Theorem 5.1. Fix a canonical game G¯ ∈ Γ. Consider players with preferences . If
none of the players shows hedging behavior in G¯, then, under Assumption 5.1 and 5.2,
for any equilibrium point σ∗ ∈ Σ in
〈
G¯,
〉
, there exist priors {πi}i∈I such that σ
∗ is
an equilibrium point in game
〈
G¯,EU
〉
in which each player i is an expected utility
maximizer and her beliefs about nature are represented by πi.
Theorem 5.1 shows that if players do not show hedging behavior, we need to consider
their beliefs about nature or their best-response correspondences to distinguish EU from
non-EU players. However, on the basis of beliefs, we are only able to identify non-EU
players who are not probabilistically sophisticated in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler
(1992). Moreover, from an experimental point of view, it might be diﬃcult to measure
players’ beliefs. In complete information games, eliciting players’ ex-ante beliefs about
their opponents’ strategy choice may aﬀect their decisions in the game. In addition, there
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is evidence that players’ ex-post beliefs are biased (see Rubinstein and Salant, 2016).
These diﬃculties could also limit the ability to measure players’ beliefs about nature.
To state the second main theorem, we need to introduce the notion of best response
equivalence. Roughly, two games are said to be best response equivalent if player i’s best
responses coincide in both games for each i ∈ I. The precise deﬁnition is as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.5. Let RGi be the best-response correspondence of player i in G ∈ Γ. Two
games
〈
G,
〉
and
〈
G′,′
〉
are said to be best response equivalent if they consist of the
same number of players and the same set of pure actions for each player, and if
RGi = R
G′
i for each player i ∈ I.
The second theorem says that, in any given two-person game, players exhibit neither
hedging nor reversal behavior if and only if there exists a game with EU players that is best
response equivalent to that game. In other words, non-EU players behave strategically as
if they were EU players if and only if they do not exhibit hedging and reversal behavior.
Consequently, hedging and reversal behavior are the sole behavioral diﬀerences between
EU and non-EU players.
Theorem 5.2. Consider a two-person game
〈
G,
〉
, then, under Assumption 5.1 and
5.2, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) Each player i ∈ I exhibits neither hedging behavior nor reversal behavior in G.
(ii) There exists a game
〈
G′,EU
〉
which is best response equivalent to
〈
G,
〉
.
Taken together, non-EU players who do not exhibit hedging and reversal behavior in
a two-person canonical game G cannot be distinguished from EU players by observing
their equilibrium actions due to Theorem 5.1, and behave structurally as if they were EU
players by Theorem 5.2. Therefore, these players can be termed quasi-expected utility
players.
According to Deﬁnition 5.5, two games, which are best response equivalent, have the
same number of players, and, for each player, the same set of pure actions. However, the
games may still have diﬀerent state spaces and state-dependent payoﬀs. One may ask
under which conditions the game with EU players in statement (ii) of Theorem 5.2 has
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the same canonical game structure as the game with non-EU players, i.e., under which
conditions it holds that G = G′. Proposition 5.1 gives suﬃcient conditions for this to
be true in the context of two-person two-action games, which will be treated in Section
5.2.2. The proposition says that, given that players exhibit neither hedging nor reversal
behavior, it suﬃces that each player has a strictly dominant strategy and/or her state-
dependent payoﬀs satisfy the following condition: there exists two states of the world
such that in one of the two states, player i’s ﬁrst pure action is strictly worse than the
second if the opponent plays her ﬁrst pure action and strictly better than the second if the
opponent plays her second pure strategy, and vice versa in the other state of the world.
This condition can also be viewed as the requirement that player i’s state-dependent utility
function has strictly decreasing diﬀerences in one state of the world and strictly increasing
diﬀerences in another state.32 However, note that the requirement (ii) in Proposition 5.1
below is slightly stronger than the notion of increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences since it
requires increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences with respect to the reference point 0.
Proposition 5.1. Fix a two-person two-actions game G¯ ∈ Γ. Let Ai = {a
′
i, a
′′
i } be player
i’s action set. Consider players with preferences  who do not exhibit hedging and reversal
behavior in G¯. If, for each player i, at least one of the following conditions is met
(i) player i has a strictly dominant strategy (strategic dominance),
(ii) there exist ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω such that (strictly increasing and decreasing diﬀerences)
ui(a
′
i, a
′
−i, ω
′)− ui(a
′′
i , a
′
−i, ω
′) < 0 < ui(a
′
i, a
′′
−i, ω
′)− ui(a
′′
i , a
′′
−i, ω
′) and
ui(a
′
i, a
′
−i, ω
′′)− ui(a
′′
i , a
′
−i, ω
′′) > 0 > ui(a
′
i, a
′′
−i, ω
′′)− ui(a
′′
i , a
′′
−i, ω
′′),
then, there exist priors {πi}i∈I such that
〈
G¯,EU
〉
is best response equivalent to
〈
G¯,
〉
.
The results of this section show that we are only able to behaviorally distinguish non-
EU from EU players if the non-EU players exhibit hedging and/or reversal behavior. In
the next section, we will provide conditions under which players show hedging or reversal
behavior, especially in terms of the payoﬀ structure of a game.
32A function f : X × Y → R has strictly increasing differences if for x′, x′′ ∈ X, x′′ > x′, and for
y′, y′′ ∈ Y , y′′ > y′, it holds that f(x′′, y′′)− f(x′, y′′) > f(x′′, y′)− f(x′, y′).
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5.2.2 Existence of hedging and reversal behavior
General preferences
In this section, we consider games where players are strictly uncertainty-averse. A
player i is said to be strictly uncertainty-averse in G ∈ Γ if her objective function Vi is
strictly quasiconcave on the feasible payoﬀs in the game. The feasible payoﬀs correspond
to the convex hull of player i’s payoﬀ vectors induced by pure action proﬁles, formally
conv{fi(a) | a ∈ A}. Furthermore, the games to be studied in this section have a special
property, called property (P).
Deﬁnition 5.6. A canonical game G ∈ Γ has property (P) if
fi(a
′
i, σ−i) = fi(a
′′
i , σ−i),
for each i ∈ I and all a′i, a
′′
i ∈ Ai, a
′
i = a
′′
i and any given σ−i ∈ Σ−i.
In these games, the existence of hedging behavior is closely tied to the existence of
strictly dominant strategies, as the following proposition demonstrates.
Proposition 5.2. In any canonical game G ∈ Γ that meets property (P), and that is
played by strictly uncertainty-averse players, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) Some players have no strictly dominant pure strategies.
(ii) Some players exhibit hedging behavior in G.
Proof. The proof of the proposition is straightforward.
Although Proposition 5.2 is simple from a mathematical point of view, it has two
interesting implications. Firstly, if we observe a mixed equilibrium in a canonical game
like the one in the proposition and we know that the players are strictly uncertainty-averse,
then we can conclude that some players show hedging behavior.
Corollary 5.1. If we observe a mixed equilibrium in a game
〈
G,UA
〉
where G meets
property (P), and the players are strictly uncertainty-averse, then some players exhibit
hedging behavior.
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Secondly, suppose that it is known that a player is strictly uncertainty-averse but his
particular objective function Vi is unknown. Then, we can exclude that the player exhibits
hedging behavior if and only if she has a pure action that is strictly dominant in each
state of the world.
Corollary 5.2. A strictly uncertainty-averse player i shows no hedging behavior in a
canonical game G which satisﬁes property (P) if and only if she has a pure action a′i ∈ Ai
such that ui(a
′
i, a−i, ω) > ui(ai, a−i, ω) for all ω ∈ Ω and all ai ∈ Ai, ai = a
′
i and any
a−i ∈ A−i.
Maxmin expected utility
This section studies two-person two-strategies games played by players whose prefer-
ences are represented by maxmin expected utility (or MEU players, for short). Experi-
ments on game theory are often based on two-player two-strategies games.
It is worth noting that the results of this section hold also for uncertainty-averse players
with Choquet expected utility (or, brieﬂy, CEU) preferences. This follows from the fact
that uncertainty-averse CEU preferences (i.e., CEU with convex capacities) correspond
to MEU preferences where the prior set equals the set of probabilities in the core of the
capacity (see Section 2.4 in Chapter 2). Hence, preferences that can be represented by
CEU can also be represented by MEU.33
The focus of this section lies on hedging behavior due to Theorem 5.1. All results,
except Proposition 5.4, provide conditions under which we can exclude hedging and re-
versal behavior, respectively, for all possible prior sets. The negations of the results give
existence conditions. One may think of a situation similar to that discussed in the con-
text of Corollary 5.2: suppose that we know that player i has MEU preferences but his
particular prior set Ci is unknown.
Ghirardato et al. (1998) and Klibanoﬀ (2001) provide useful results concerning hedg-
ing behavior. They examine additivity and preference for mixtures, respectively, in the
context of single-person decision problems and MEU preferences. Comonotonicity is a
33Under uncertainty-aversion, MEU is even a strict generalization of CEU (see Klibanoﬀ, 2001).
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natural starting point for the question of additivity of the MEU functional.34 However,
comonotonicity does not ensure additivity as an example in Klibanoﬀ (1996) illustrates.
Ghirardato et al. (1998) show that we need a stronger condition for additivity of the MEU
functional, called aﬃne-relatedness.
Deﬁnition 5.7. Two vectors f, g ∈ Rm are aﬃnely related if there exist a ≥ 0 and b ∈ R
such that fω = agω + b and/or gω = afω + b for all ω ∈ Ω.
Deﬁnition 5.7 says that f and g are aﬃnely related if either f or g is constant or there
exist a > 0 and b ∈ R such that fω = agω + b. We say that two vectors f, g ∈ Rm
are negatively aﬃnely related if f is aﬃnely related to −g. Aﬃne-relatedness implies
comonotonicity, but the converse is not true. For the special case of two states of nature,
aﬃne-relatedness is equivalent to comonotonicity.
Proposition 5.3 (Ghirardato et al., 1998, p. 409). For f, g ∈ Rm, the following state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) f and g are aﬃnely related.
(ii) MEUCi(f + g) =MEUCi(f) +MEUCi(g) for all Ci ∈ C .
Another relation, which we will need later, is dominance-relatedness.
Deﬁnition 5.8. Two vectors f, g ∈ Rm are dominance related if fω ≥ gω and/or gω ≥ fω
for all ω ∈ Ω.
Two vectors f, g ∈ Rm are said to be strictly dominance related if fω > gω or gω > fω for
all ω ∈ Ω. Furthermore, a vector f is constant if fω = fω
′
for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω.
In the sequel, as before, we denote player i’s action set by Ai = {a
′
i, a
′′
i }. By using
negative aﬃne-relatedness, we obtain a strong existence result for hedging behavior. Fix
an action of the other player, if player i’s pure actions induce negatively aﬃnely related
payoﬀ vectors, then player i will show hedging behavior for all prior sets contained in a
particular subset of C . The following proposition makes this precise.
Proposition 5.4. Fix a σ−i ∈ Σ−i. Let C
∗ be the collection of all closed, convex and
nonempty subsets of ∆(Ω) which contain some π′, π′′ such that
34In our context, two vectors f, g ∈ Rm are comonotonic if (fω − fω
′
)(gω − gω
′
) ≥ 0 for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω.
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(i) fi(a
′
i, σ−i)π
′ > fi(a
′′
i , σ−i)π
′ and fi(a
′
i, σ−i)π
′′ < fi(a
′′
i , σ−i)π
′′ and
(ii) fi(a
′
i, σ−i)π
′ = fi(a
′
i, σ−i)π
′′ and fi(a
′′
i , σ−i)π
′ = fi(a
′′
i , σ−i)π
′′.
If fi(a
′
i, σ−i) and fi(a
′′
i , σ−i) are negatively aﬃnely related, then, a MEUCi player shows
hedging behavior for all Ci ∈ C
∗.
In general the set C ∗ can vary strongly across diﬀerent payoﬀ vectors. Apparently, the
set does not contain singletons, but it can be empty. For instance, C ∗ is empty when
fi(a
′
i, σ−i) and fi(a
′′
i , σ−i) are dominance related.
The ﬁrst lemma illustrates that, given an action of the opponent, player i does not
show hedging behavior for all prior sets if and only if i’s pure actions induce payoﬀ vectors
that are strictly dominance related and/or aﬃnely related.
Lemma 5.1. Fix a σ−i ∈ Σ−i. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) fi(a
′
i, σ−i) and fi(a
′′
i , σ−i) are (a) strictly dominance related or (b) aﬃnely related.
(ii) Given σ−i, a MEUCi player i shows no hedging behavior for all Ci ∈ C .
Proof. We omit the proof since Lemma 5.1 is a variant of Theorem 2 in Klibanoﬀ (2001).
The next proposition gives the most important result in this section. It states that, in
many games, player i shows neither hedging nor reversal behavior for all prior sets if and
only if player i’s payoﬀ vectors, which are induced by pure action proﬁles, are pairwise
aﬃnely related.
Proposition 5.5. Consider a two-player two-strategies canonical game G ∈ Γ in which
fi(a
′
i, σ−i) and fi(a
′′
i , σ−i) are not strictly dominance related for any σ−i ∈ Σ−i and
fi(a
′
i, a−i) = fi(a
′′
i , a−i) for any a−i ∈ A−i. If at most one of the vectors from the set
{fi(a) | a ∈ A} is constant, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) Player i’s payoﬀ vectors induced by pure action proﬁles are pairwise aﬃnely related.
(ii) A MEUCi player i shows neither hedging nor reversal behavior in G for all Ci ∈ C .
If statement (i) of Proposition 5.5 is true, the function MEUCi is additive on the convex
hull of player i’s payoﬀ vectors for any prior set Ci ∈ C . Hence, for every prior set
Ci, there exist a prior π
′
i ∈ ∆(Ω) such that a MEUCi player and a EUπ′i player behave
identically.
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The statement in Proposition 5.5 is restricted to canonical games where, given any
action of the other player, the induced vectors of player i’s pure actions are not strictly
dominance related. However, this is not a strong restriction. To see why, note that, in
most games, there exists a closed and convex subset, Σ˜−i ⊆ Σ−i, that satisﬁes the property
that the induced vectors of player i’s pure actions are not strictly dominance related.35
Proposition 5.5 can be analogously applied to these games: player i shows no hedging
and reversal behavior for all prior sets only if MEUCi is additive on the set of all vectors
which are induced by the proﬁles which involve elements of Σ˜−i.
Furthermore, Proposition 5.5 is restricted to canonical games where at most one of
player i’s payoﬀ vectors induced by pure action proﬁles is constant, and where any two
pure action proﬁles induce diﬀerent payoﬀ vectors. The last two propositions discuss the
existence of hedging behavior for canonical games which do not satisfy these properties.
At ﬁrst, we consider the case where more than one of player i’s payoﬀ vectors induced
by pure action proﬁles is constant. In this case, a MEUCi player i exhibits no hedging
behavior if and only if the MEUCi functional is additive for all induced vectors of the
game and/or the vectors of one of player i’s actions are constant, given any action of the
other player.
Proposition 5.6. Consider a two-player two-strategies canonical game G ∈ Γ in which
there exists a σ−i ∈ Σ−i such that fi(a
′
i, σ−i) and fi(a
′′
i , σ−i) are not strictly dominance
related. If at least two of the vectors from {fi(a) | a ∈ A} are constant, the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) (a) Player i’s payoﬀ vectors induced by pure action proﬁles are pairwise aﬃnely
related and/or (b) the vectors fi(a
′
i, a
′
−i) and fi(a
′
i, a
′′
−i) are constant.
(ii) A MEUCi player i shows no hedging behavior in G for all Ci ∈ C .
Finally, we turn to games in which player i’s pure actions can induce equal payoﬀ
vectors, given an action of the other player. In these games, a MEUCi player i shows no
hedging behavior if and only if the MEUCi functional is additive and/or player i’s pure
35Exceptions are games where, for any given action of the opponent, one action induces a payoﬀ vector
which strictly dominates the vector induced by the other action.
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actions induce equal vectors, given any pure action of the opponent.36
Proposition 5.7. Consider a two-player two-strategies canonical game G ∈ Γ where
fi(a
′
i, σ−i) and fi(a
′′
i , σ−i) are not strictly dominance related for any a−i ∈ Σ−i and some
non-degenerate σ−i ∈ Σ−i. Furthermore, it holds that fi(a
′
i, a−i) = fi(a
′′
i , a−i) for some
a−i ∈ A−i. If at most one of the vectors from {fi(a) | a ∈ A} is constant, the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) (a) Player i’s payoﬀ vectors induced by pure action proﬁles are pairwise aﬃnely
related and/or (b) fi(a
′
i, a−i) = fi(a
′′
i , a−i) for any given a−i ∈ A−i.
(ii) A MEUCi player i shows no hedging behavior in G for all Ci ∈ C .
5.3 Discussion
This section ﬁrst discusses a preference for randomization, which is a key aspect of
this chapter. Subsequently, an essential assumption of the BAT-model is questioned.
Finally, I introduce a generalized equilibrium concept that allows for players who are not
uncertainty-averse.
5.3.1 Preference for randomization
A preference for randomization plays a central role in this chapter. One may ask
whether there exists evidence for such a preference. There is little experimental literature
on this topic. One study by Dominiak and Schnedler (2011) ﬁnds no evidence for a
preference for mixtures. However, the study is about single-person decisions and does not
explicitly test for ex-ante and ex-post randomization attitudes, which I will elaborate on
in the next subsection.
A further question is whether a preference for randomization leads to an inﬁnite se-
quence of randomization operations: suppose a player strictly prefers a 1/2-mixture of
two pure actions a1 and a2 over either alone, say, he prefers to ﬂip a coin to determine
his strategy choice. After ﬂipping the coin, it turns out to be a1. Due to his preferences
36Note that the latter is not necessarily equivalent to the case where all payoﬀ vectors induced by pure
action proﬁles are equal since it is still possible that fi(a
′
i, a
′
−i) = fi(a
′
i, a
′′
−i).
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before the coin ﬂip, one may think that he would strictly prefer to ﬂip the coin again and
again...ad inﬁnitum. An argument against this view is dynamic consistency, as Machina
(1989) eloquently argues. In addition, an inﬁnite sequence of randomization operations is
impossible when mixed actions are generated by some kind of exogenous random device
and players accept binding commitments to play a pure action based on the outcome of
this device.
5.3.2 The model
Assumption 5.1 of the model is crucial for the existence of hedging and reversal be-
havior. Recall that Assumption 5.1 states that a mixed action proﬁle induces an expected
utility value in each state of the world. There is no compelling reason for this assumption.
Alternatively, we could have assumed that players’ payoﬀs from a mixed proﬁle equals
the expectation of the representation function values of pure action proﬁles taken with
respect to the distribution given by the mixed proﬁle:
Assumption 5.1′. Player i’s payoﬀ from a mixed proﬁle σ ∈ Σ is
Ui(σ) =
∑
a∈A
( ∏
j∈I
σj(aj)Vi
(
fi(a)
))
.
To see the diﬀerence between Assumption 5.1 and 5.1′, consider the state-dependent
payoﬀ matrices of Example 5.1:
ql qh
ql 2, 2
1
2
, 1
qh 1,
1
2
−2,−2
ω1
ql qh
ql 1, 1 1, 2
qh 2, 1 2, 2
ω2
Again, suppose that each ﬁrm i ∈ {1, 2} has the following non-EU preferences over state-
contingent (expected) proﬁts: Vi(fi) = min{f
ω1
i , f
ω2
i }. Recall that, under Assumption
5.1, the mixed proﬁle (σ1(ql), σ2(ql)) = (1,
1
4
) induces the vector f1(1,
1
4
) = (7
8
, 1) for ﬁrm
1. Hence, ﬁrm 1’s payoﬀ from this mixed proﬁle equals V1(1,
1
4
) = 7
8
.
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In contrast, under Assumption 5.1′, ﬁrm 1’s payoﬀ from (σ1(ql), σ2(ql)) = (1,
1
4
) is
U1(1,
1
4
) = 1
4
V1(ql, ql) +
3
4
V1(ql, qh) =
5
8
. Assumption 5.1′ implies that a player’s objective
function is linear in both her strategies and the strategies of the other players. Conse-
quently, under Assumption 5.1′, players exhibit neither hedging nor reversal behavior.
That is, they are quasi-expected utility players.
Which assumption is the “correct” one? In the class of games we consider in this
chapter there are two sources of uncertainty: strategic risk and ambiguous uncertainty
about the environment. From a decision theory perspective, this situation can be viewed
as a two-stage lottery that involves
1. An ambiguous lottery which represents Nature’s move.
2. A risky lottery which is given by players’ mixed strategies.
In my view, the underlying assumption of the model depends on how players evaluate
the two-stage lottery above. This is closely tied to the distinction between ex-ante and
ex-post randomization. These notions can be thought of as how players perceive the
sequence of lottery 1. and 2., i.e., whether Nature’s move takes place before or after
the randomization by mixed strategies. In a recent paper, Eichberger et al. (2014) show
that dynamically consistent individuals will be indiﬀerent to ex-ante randomizations, but
may exhibit a strict preference for ex-post randomizations. Following this result, we can
associate Assumption 5.1 with ex-post randomization and Assumption 5.1′ with ex-ante
randomization.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the model studied in this chapter does not allow
for strategic ambiguity. As a consequence, it avoids the drawbacks of strategic ambiguity
models described in Section 3.3. From my point of view, it would be desirable to get
an appropriate generalization of the model with a richer state space that incorporates
strategic ambiguity. For instance, we can think of a BAT-model based on the Choquet
approach. Independence between strategies and the environment could be introduced by a
Fubini Theorem for non-additive measures (see, e.g., Ghirardato, 1997 and Chateauneuf
and Lefort, 2008). Moreover, such a model could build on an generalized equilibrium
concept, e.g., on the concept of Eichberger and Kelsey (2014) discussed in Chapter 6.
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5.3.3 Equilibrium without uncertainty-aversion
So far, we have assumed that players are uncertainty-averse. Azrieli and Teper (2011)
show that the equilibrium according to Deﬁnition 5.2 may fail to exist when players are
not ambiguity-averse (or ambiguity-neutral). In the following, I deﬁne an equilibrium
for the BAT-model that allows for more general preferences. This equilibrium concept is
based on the notion of equilibrium in beliefs introduced by Crawford (1990), discussed in
Section 3.3, and a n-player version of equilibrium in beliefs deﬁned in Zimper (2007).
Let ∆(Σi) be the set of all probability distributions with ﬁnite support on player i’s
mixed strategy set. An element βij ∈ ∆(Σi) is a belief of player j about player i’s mixed
strategy choice. Consequently, an element of the product space βi ∈ ×
j∈I\{i}
∆(Σj) is a
belief of player i about the mixed strategy choices of the other players. Let βi(σ−i) be
the probability with which player i believes that her opponents will play the strategy
combination σ−i. In analogy to Assumption 5.1, we assume that, in any given state
ω ∈ Ω, each player’s payoﬀ from a mixed strategy σi ∈ Σi and a belief βi ∈ ×
j∈I\{i}
∆(Σj)
corresponds to her expected utility. The probability which is assigned to a particular
strategy combination of the other players equals the expectation taken with respect to
the belief βi.
Assumption 5.3. Fix a state ω ∈ Ω, then player i’s payoﬀ from a mixed strategy σi ∈ Σi
and a belief βi ∈ ×
j∈I\{i}
∆(Σj) is
fωi (σi, βi) =
∑
a∈A
(
σi(ai) ·
[ ∑
σ−i∈supp(βi)
βi(σ−i) · σ−i(a−i)
])
ui(a, ω) for each i ∈ I.
According to Assumption 5.3, every mixed action σi together with a belief βi induces a
vector of expected payoﬀs:
fi(σi, βi) =
(
fω1i (σi, βi), . . . , f
ωm
i (σi, βi)
)
.
For each player i, let Vi : Rm → R be a continuous function that represents her
preferences i over over m-dimensional payoﬀ vectors. Then, players best responses to
their beliefs can be deﬁned in the usual way.
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Deﬁnition 5.9. Consider a player i with preferencesi represented by function Vi. Player
i’s best responses to her belief βi are
Ri(βi) = {σi | σi ∈ argmax
σi∈Σi
Vi
(
fi(σi, βi)
)
}.
Now, we can introduce the solution concept for a game played by players whose pref-
erences are not necessarily represented by quasiconcave functions.
Deﬁnition 5.10. An equilibrium in beliefs in a game
〈
G,
〉
is a beliefs system (β∗i , β
∗
−i)
such that, for each player i ∈ I,
(i) βi
∗
j ∈ ∆(Σi) is the identical belief of all players j = i about player i’s mixed strategy
choice and
(ii) σi ∈ Ri(β
∗
i ) for all σi ∈ supp(β
∗
j ), i.e., player i’s mixed strategies in the support of
βi
∗
j are best responses to her belief β
∗
i .
An equilibrium in beliefs exists in any game
〈
G,
〉
in which the preferences of each player
i are represented by a continuous functions Vi. This follows from the existence result in
Zimper (2007, p. 69). Finally, observe that the equilibrium according to Deﬁnition 5.10
coincides with the equilibrium in the sense of Deﬁnition 5.2 whenever players’ preferences
are represented by quasiconcave functions.
5.4 Summary
This chapter examines the extent to which we can distinguish expected from non-
expected utility players on the basis of their behavior. Both types of players sometimes
behave observationally equivalent, which means that we cannot infer players’ preferences
by observing their equilibrium actions. It is shown that expected and uncertainty-averse
non-expected utility players can be distinguished from each other on the basis of their
best responses. Non-expected utility players may use mixed strategies diﬀerently, called
hedging behavior, and may respond diﬀerently to mixed strategy combinations, called
reversal behavior.
The ﬁrst main theorem shows that if non-expected utility players do not exhibit hedg-
ing behavior, then they behave observationally equivalent to expected utility players. The
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second main theorem states that hedging and/or reversal behavior are necessary and suﬃ-
cient for distinguishing expected from non-expected utility players by looking at their best
responses, i.e., these are the sole behavioral diﬀerences between the players. Furthermore,
this chapter provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of hedging and
reversal behavior in terms of the payoﬀ structure of two-person two-strategies games. In
the last part of this chapter, I discuss the underlying model and introduce an equilibrium
concept that allows for players who are not uncertainty-averse.
The analysis of this chapter provides insights into the BAT-model. It is useful for
economic applications of this model and can serve as a guide to design experiments testing
the model. Furthermore, this study can be a starting point for further experimental and
theoretical research. Besides the point raised in Section 5.3, one interesting question is,
for instance, whether hedging or reversal behavior can be strategically exploited.
5.5 Proofs
Example 5.1 and 5.2 (Best-response correspondences and equilibria).
Example 5.1. Given a strategy proﬁle (σ1, σ2) =
(
σ1(ql), σ2(ql)
)
, ﬁrm 1’s state-dependent
expected proﬁts are
fω11 (σ1, σ2) =
(
1
2
σ1[5− 3σ2] + 3σ2 − 2
)
and fω21 (σ1, σ2) =
(
2− σ1
)
.
If σ2 ≤ 1/3, then f
ω1
1 (σ1, σ2) ≤ f
ω2
1 (σ1, σ2) for all σ1 ∈ [0, 1]. In this case, ﬁrm
1 will maximize fω11 (σ1, σ2) by playing σ1 = 1. Otherwise, for any given σ2 >
1/3, there exists a mixed strategy σ′1 such that f
ω1
1 (σ
′
1, σ2) = f
ω2
1 (σ
′
1, σ2), which
maximizes V1
(
f(σ1, σ2)
)
= min
{
fω11 (σ1, σ2), f
ω2
1 (σ1, σ2)
}
. By setting fω11 (σ1, σ2) =
fω21 (σ1, σ2), we obtain σ
′
1 =
(
8− 6σ2
)
/
(
7− 3σ2
)
. Due to the symmetry of the game,
the same argumentation applies to ﬁrm 2. Consequently, ﬁrm i’s best-response
correspondence is:
Ri(σj(ql)) =


1, if σj(ql) ≤ 1/3(
8− 6σj(ql)
)
/
(
7− 3σj(ql)
)
, if σj(ql) > 1/3
.
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The game has only one equilibrium:
(
σ∗1(ql), σ
∗
2(ql)
)
≈ (0.74, 0.74).
Example 5.2. Given a strategy proﬁle (σM , σI) =
(
σM(S), σI(Bk)
)
, players’ state-
dependent expected proﬁts are
fω1M (σM , σI) =
(
σM [1− σI ]
)
and fω2M (σM , σI) =
(
σM [σI − 1] + 1− σI
)
, and
fω1I (σM , σI) =
(
σI [2− 5σM ] + 5σM
)
and fω2I (σM , σI) =
(
σI [5σM − 3] + 5− 5σM
)
.
If σI = 1, M is indiﬀerent between all of his strategies since f
ω1
1 (σM , 1) = 0 =
fω21 (σM , 1) for all σM ∈ [0, 1]. Otherwise, M’s unique best response is σM = 1/2,
where fω11 (1/2, σI) = f
ω2
1 (1/2, σI) for all σI ∈ [0, 1]. Hence,
RM(σI(Bk)) =


1/2, if σI(Bk) ∈ [0, 1)
[0, 1], if σI(BK) = 1
Let RI(σM(S) | ω) be the investor’s best-response correspondence in state ω ∈
{ω1, ω2}. Since f
ω1
I (σM , σI) ≤ (≥)f
ω2
I (σM , σI) for σM ≤ (≥)1/2 and all σI ∈ [0, 1],
I’s best response correspondence is
RI(σM(S)) =


RI(σM(S) | ω1), if σM(S) ≤ 1/2
RI(σM(S)| ω2), if σM(S) ≥ 1/2
The game has one equilibrium where the investor buys the stock:(
σ∗M(S), σ
∗
I (Bk)
)
= (0.5, 0), and inﬁnitely many equilibria where she keeps
her money: {
(
σ∗M(S), σ
∗
I (Bk)
)
| σ∗M(S) ∈ [0,
2
5
] ∪ [3
5
, 1] and σ∗I (Bk) = 1}.
Notation 5.1. From now on, f, g, h, k ∈ Rm denote row payoﬀ vectors and π ∈ ∆(Ω)
column probability vectors. A zero vector of proper dimension is denoted by 0. The
following convention for ordering relations will be used. For real numbers, the relations
=, >,≥ are deﬁned as usual. If x, y ∈ Rn, n > 1, then
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x = y ⇔ xi = yi for i = 1, . . . , n;
x ≧ y ⇔ xi ≧ yi for i = 1, . . . , n;
x ≥ y ⇔ x ≧ y and x = y;
x > y ⇔ xi > yi for i = 1, . . . , n.
Furthermore, for any set S, ∂S denotes the boundary of S, int(S) the interior of S, and
cl(S) the closure of S. Matrix operations, e.g. matrix multiplication, inner product,
and scalar multiplication, et cetera, are deﬁned as usual. The same holds true for set
operations such as intersection, union, set diﬀerence, et cetera.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Essentially, the proof of this theorem is based on a separating
hyperplane argument. We will use a theorem of the alternatives to establish this argument.
Fix a canonical game G¯ ∈ Γ and consider players with preferences . Suppose
(σ∗i , σ
∗
−i) ∈ Σ is an equilibrium for the game 〈G¯,〉. Consider an arbitrary player i. Let
Vi be a function which represents i’s preferences i and satisﬁes Assumption 5.2. We
prove the theorem by showing that if σ∗i ∈ argmax
σi∈Σi
Vi (σi, σ
∗
−i), then there exists a
πi ∈ ∆(Ω) such that σ
∗
i ∈ argmax
σi∈Σi
EUπi (σi, σ
∗
−i), whenever player i with preferences i
shows no hedging behavior in G¯. In other words, if player i’s best response to σ∗−i is σ
∗
i ,
given that her preferences are i, then there exists a prior such that σ
∗
i is also a best
response to σ∗−i if i’s preferences are 
EU
i . This proves the theorem since we considered
an arbitrary player i. The proof for general ﬁnite strategy spaces is a bit tedious and
confusing. For this reason, the proof is given for four actions, Ai = {a1, a2, a3, a4}, the
generalization is straightforward. Given σ∗−i, let f, g, h, k ∈ R
m be the payoﬀ vectors
induced by i’s pure actions, i.e., f = fi(a1, σ
∗
−i), g = fi(a2, σ
∗
−i), et cetera. Hence, i’s
payoﬀs are
σ∗−i
a1 f
a2 g
a3 h
a4 k
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We distinguish two cases: player i’s equilibrium strategy σ∗i in 〈G¯,〉 is 1. a degenerate
mixed action (resp. a pure action) or 2. a proper mixed action.
Case 1. W.l.o.g., we may assume that σ∗i = a1 is i’s equilibrium action in 〈G¯,〉. Given
that i exhibits no hedging behavior, we need to show that there exists a prior
πi ∈ ∆(Ω) such that EUπi(a1, σ
∗
−i) ≥ EUπi(ai, σ
∗
−i) for ai ∈ {a1, a2, a3, a4}. Note
that this is equivalent to
∃πi ∈ ∆(Ω) : (f − g)πi ≥ 0, (f − h)πi ≥ 0, and (f − k)πi ≥ 0 (5.1)
Let I be a m×m identity matrix and deﬁne
x =

πi
γ

 ∈ R(m+1), B =


0
I
...
0

 ∈ Rm×(m+1), C =


f − g 0
f − h 0
f − k 0

 ∈ R3×(m+1), and
D =
(
1 . . . 1 −1
)
∈ R1×(m+1).
Then, condition (5.1) is equivalent to the system:
Bx ≥ 0, Cx ≧ 0, andDx = 0 (5.2)
Bx ≥ 0 ensures nonnegativity of the probabilities and Dx = 0 translates into∑
ω∈Ω
πi(ω) = γ, which can be normalized to
∑
ω∈Ω
πi(ω) = 1. Cx ≧ 0 is the condition
that a1 is a best response to σ
∗
−i.
Claim. System (5.2) has a solution x ∈ R(m+1).
Proof. By Tucker’s theorem of the alternative, cf. Mangasarian (1969, p. 29),
either (5.2) has a solution x ∈ R(m+1) or the equation B⊤y2+C⊤y3+D⊤y4 = 0 has
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a solution (y2, y3, y4) ∈ Rm × R3 × R with y2 > 0 and y3 ≧ 0, which equals




y21
...
y2m

+ (f − g)y31 + (f − h)y32 + (f − k)y33 +


y4
...
y4


−y4


= 0 (5.3)
Since y4 = 0 and y2 > 0, (5.3) has a solution iﬀ (if and only if) there exists
y31, y
3
2, y
3
3 ≥ 0 such that (f − g)y
3
1 + (f − h)y
3
2 + (f − k)y
3
3 < 0. This condition is
equivalent to the existence of α, β ∈ [0, 1] such that f < αg + βh + (1 − α − β)k.
Given σ∗−i, the right-hand side of this inequality corresponds to the induced payoﬀ
vector of the following mixed action of player i: σ′i =
(
σ′i(a1), σ
′
i(a2), σ
′
i(a3), σ
′
i(a4)
)
=(
0, α, β, 1 − α − β
)
. Hence, fω(a1, σ
∗
−i) < f
ω(σ′i, σ
∗
−i) for all ω ∈ Ω. Then, by As-
sumption 5.2 (monotonicity), Vi(a1, σ
∗
−i) < Vi(σ
′
i, σ
∗
−i) - a contradiction to the initial
assumption that a1 is the equilibrium strategy σ
∗
i of player i in 〈G¯,〉. Consequently,
(5.3) has no solution, which proves that (5.2) has a solution.
Case 2. The proof of the second case follows the same line as the proof of the ﬁrst case.
W.l.o.g. assume that player i’s equilibrium strategy, σ∗i , is a proper mixed action
with supp(σ∗i ) = {a1, a2}. We need to show that there exists a prior πi ∈ ∆(Ω)
such that such that EUπi(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i) ≥ EUπi(ai, σ
∗
−i) for ai ∈ {a1, a2, a3, a4}. This is
equivalent to the condition
∃πi ∈ ∆(Ω) : (f−g)πi = 0, (f−h)πi ≥ 0, (f−k)πi ≥ 0 , (g−h)πi ≥ 0, (g−k)πi ≥ 0
which can be expressed as
Bx ≥ 0, Cx ≧ 0, andDx = 0, (5.4)
where x =

πi
γ

 ∈ R(m+1), B =


0
I
...
0

 ∈ Rm×(m+1), C =

f − h 0
f − k 0

 ∈ R2×(m+1),
and
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D =

1 . . . 1 −1
f − g 0

 ∈ R2×(m+1).
Claim. System (5.4) has a solution x ∈ R(m+1).
Proof. According to Tucker’s theorem, the alternative to the claim is that the
system 



y21
...
y2m

+ (f − h)y31 + (f − k)y32 + (f − g)y42 +


y41
...
y41


−y41


= 0 (5.5)
has a solution (y2, y3, y4) ∈ Rm × R2 × R2 with y2 > 0 and y3 ≧ 0.
Equation (5.5) has a solution iﬀ (f−h)y31+(f−k)y
3
2+(f−g)y
4
2 < 0 for some y
3
1, y
3
2 ≥ 0
and y42 ∈ R. For y
4
2 ≥ 0, one obtains the same contradiction as before. If y
4
2 < 0,
then there are α, β ∈ [0, 1] such that (α+β)f+(1−α−β)g < αh+βk+(1−α−β)f .
Given σ∗−i, let σ
′
i be the mixed action of i that induces the vector on the left-hand side
of the inequality and σ′′i the action that induces the vector on the right-hand side.
By Assumption 5.2 (monotonicity), Vi(σ
′
i, σ
∗
−i) < Vi(σ
′′
i , σ
∗
−i). Furthermore, since i
shows no hedging behavior, it holds that Vi(σ
′
i, σ
∗
−i) = (α+ β)Vi(a1, σ
∗
−i) + (1− α−
β)(a2, σ
∗
−i) = Vi(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i). Consequently, Vi(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i) < Vi(σ
′′
i , σ
∗
−i), a contradiction to
the initial assumption that σ∗i is i’s equilibrium strategy. This proves that (5.5) has
no solution which implies that (5.4) has a solution.
Since player i was chosen arbitrarily, for any given equilibrium point σ∗ of 〈G¯,〉, there
exists a prior πi for each i ∈ I such that σ
∗ is an equilibrium point of 〈G¯,EU〉, which
proves the theorem.
In order to prove Theorem 5.2, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 5.2. Let ∆d be the d-dimensional unit simplex, d < ∞, and let B be a ﬁnite
collection of closed, convex and nonempty sets . If
(i)
⋃
B∈B
B = ∆d and
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(ii) int(B′) ∩ int(B′′) = ∅ for all B′, B′′ ∈ B,
then each B in B is a polyhedron.
Proof. If B is a singleton, then the statement is trivial by (i). Assume that B is not a
singleton. Since each B in B is closed (i.e., ∂B ⊆ B), (ii) implies that B′∩B′′ = ∂B′∩∂B′′
for all B′, B′′ ∈ B. Furthermore, by (i), if x ∈ ∂B′, then x ∈ ∂B′′ for some B′′ ∈ B
and/or x ∈ ∂∆d, formally ∂B′ =
[ ⋃
B′′∈B\B′
(B′ ∩ B′′)
]
∪ (∂B′ ∩∆d).
It holds that ∂B′ = cl(∂B′) because ∂B′ is closed. Hence, ∂B′ = int(∂B′)
.
∪ ∂∂B′.
Due to ∂∂B′ = ∂B′, it follows that int(∂B′) = ∅. Therefore, int(B′ ∩B′′) = ∅. Further-
more, (∂B′∩∂B′′) is closed and convex since it is an intersection of closed and convex sets
(recall that B′ ∩ B′′ = ∂B′ ∩ ∂B′′). Taken together, (∂B′ ∩ ∂B′′) is a closed and convex
set with empty interior, which implies that (∂B′ ∩ ∂B′′) is contained in a hyperplane. In
addition, (∂B′∩∂∆d) is contained in a hyperplane since ∂∆d is contained in a hyperplane.
Thus, (∂B′ ∩ ∂B′′) is contained in a hyperplane for all B′′ ∈ B \ B′ and (∂B′ ∩ ∂∆d) is
contained in a hyperplane. Therefore, ∂B′ is contained in the union of ﬁnitely many hy-
perplanes, formally ∂B′ ⊆
⋃
n∈N
Hn, where Hn is a hyperplane and N an index set. Let Hn
be a half-space, which is associated with hyperplane n. Then, there exists n half-spaces
such that B′ ⊆
⋂
n∈N
Hn since B
′ is a convex set. Furthermore, it holds that B′ ⊇
⋂
n∈N
Hn
since the boundary of B′ is contained in the hyperplanes associated with the half-spaces.
Consequently, B′ equals the intersection of ﬁnitely many half-spaces. That is, B′ is a
polyhedron, which proves the claim, since B′ was chosen arbitrarily.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. “(i) =⇒ (ii)”. The proof is based on the following fact: con-
sider a ﬁnite two-player normal-form game with complete information or with incomplete
information and EU players. Let i ∈ {1, 2} and j = 3 − i denote the players. Then,
for each player i, it holds that the preimages of i’s pure actions under her best-response
correspondence are either empty or polyhedral subsets of the set of j’s mixed strategies,
Σj, which corresponds to the |Aj|-dimensional unit simplex. For example, consider the
preimages of player i’s pure strategies in the well-known Rock-paper-scissors-game given
in Figure 5.3.37
37Figure 5.3 shows the two-dimensional projection of Σj .
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Consequently, if, for each player i, the preimages of i’s pure actions under her best
response correspondence in a two-player game 〈G,〉 satsify
(*) the union of all preimages equal Σj and
(**) the preimage of every pure action is either empty or a polyhedron,
then there exists a two-player game 〈G′,EU〉 which is best response equivalent to
〈G,〉. In other words, (*) and (**) imply statement (ii) of the theorem. Therefore, if
statement (i) implies (*) and (**), then (i) implies (ii).
σj(scissors)
σj(rock)1
1
1/3
1/3
σj(paper)
paper
scissors
rock
Figure 5.3: Preimages of pure strategies under a player’s best-response correspondence in Rock-
paper-scissors
Consider player i and suppose she has K pure actions: Ai = {a
1
i , . . . , a
K
i }. Let Bk
be the preimage of action aki ∈ Ai under i’s best-response correspondence, formally
Bk = {σj ∈ Σj | σj ∈ Ri(a
k
i )}.
Claim. (i) implies (*).
Proof. By statement (i) of the theorem, i exhibits no hedging behavior in G. This
implies that for every σj ∈ Σj, there exists a pure action ai ∈ Ai which is a best response
to σj, i.e.,
K⋃
i=1
Bk ⊇ Σj. Furthermore, by the deﬁnition of a best-response correspondence,
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K⋃
i=1
Bk ⊆ Σj. Hence,
K⋃
i=1
Bk = Σj, (5.6)
which means that (i) implies (*).
Claim. (i) implies (**).
Proof. Due to (i), i shows no reversal behavior in G. The negation of condition (ii) in
Deﬁnition 5.4 implies:
int(Bk) ∩ int(B
′
k) = ∅ (5.7)
for all k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . , K}, k = k′.
W.l.o.g., we may assume that Bk = ∅ and Bk = Bk′ for all k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . , K}, k =
k′. According to Assumption 5.2, the function Vi(·), which represents i’s preferences, is
continuous. Therefore, each Bk is closed. Furthermore, the negation of condition (i) in
Deﬁnition 5.4 implies that each Bk is convex. Considering these properties together with
equation (5.6) and (5.7) and using Lemma 5.2, we see that each Bk is a polyhedron.
To sum up, (i)⇒ (*) and (**) ⇒ (ii).
“(i) ⇐= (ii)”. The examples in Section 5.1.1 illustrate that ¬(i) ⇒ ¬(ii), which is
logically equivalent to (i) ⇐ (ii).
Notation 5.2. From now on, f, g, h, k ∈ Rm denote player i’s payoﬀ vectors which are
induced by pure actions proﬁles in a given two-person two-strategies canonical game, i.e.,
i’s payoﬀ matrix is:
a′−i a
′′
−i
a′i f g
a′′i h k
Proof of Proposition 5.1. In some parts of the proof, the argumentation is based on
theorems of the alternative like in the proof of Theorem 5.1. These parts of the proof will
be only sketched.
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(i) Consider player i and suppose she has a strictly dominant strategy in 〈G¯,〉.
W.l.o.g. assume that a′i is strictly dominant. If
∃πi ∈ ∆(Ω) : (f − h)πi > 0 and (g − k)πi > 0, (5.8)
then a′i is also a strictly dominant strategy for i in case she has EU preferences and
the subjective prior πi. By applying Motzkin’s theorem, cf. Mangasarian (1969, p.
28-29), we obtain an alternative to condition (5.8). This alternative has a solution
iﬀ αf + (1 − α)g ≦ αh + (1 − α)k for some α ∈ [0, 1]. Then, by Assumption 5.2
(monotonicity), there exists a σ−i ∈ Σ−i such that Vi(a
′
i, σ−i) ≤ Vi(a
′′
i , σ−i). This
contradicts the assumption that a′i is a strictly dominant strategy. Consequently,
(5.8) has a solution.
(ii) Suppose i has no strictly dominant strategy. By Theorem 5.2, 〈G¯,〉 is best response
equivalent to some 〈G′,EU〉. Let f ′, g′, h′, k′ ∈ Rm be i’s payoﬀ vectors induced
by pure action proﬁles in G′. Note that 〈G′,EU〉 is best response equivalent to a
two-person complete information game with identical action sets, where player i’s
payoﬀs equal the expected utility values: Uf ′ = EUπi(f
′), Ug′ = EUπi(g
′), et cetera
(see matrix (a) below). Furthermore, it is well-known that player i’s best response
sets are unaﬀected if we transform her payoﬀ matrix (a) into matrix (b) where z > 0
and ε, δ ∈ R (see, e.g., Weibull, 1995).
(a)
a′−i a
′′
−i
a′i Uf ′ Ug′
a′′i Uh′ Uk′
(b)
a′−i a
′′
−i
a′i zUf ′ + ε zUg′ + δ
a′′i zUh′ + ε zUk′ + δ
To sum up, 〈G¯,〉 is best response equivalent to 〈G′,EU〉 and 〈G′,EU〉 is best
response equivalent to a complete information game where player i’s payoﬀ matrix
is matrix (b) above. Consequently, the second part of the proposition is proven if
∃πi ∈ ∆(Ω), z > 0, ε, δ ∈ R :
fπi = zUf ′ + ε, hπi = zUh′ + ε, gπi = zUg′ + δ and kπi = zUk′ + δ.
(5.9)
5. Strategic behavior in games with payoﬀ uncertainty 113
By using Motzkin’s theorem again, we obtain an alternative to (5.9) which has a
solution iﬀ (f − h)y41 + (g − k)y
4
3 ≦ 0 and (Uf ′ − Uh′)y
4
1 + (Ug′ − Uk′)y
4
3 > 0 for
some y41, y
4
3 ∈ R. For y
4
1 = 0, y
4
3 = 0, y
4
1, y
4
3 > 0 and y
4
1, y
4
3 < 0, we get a similar
contradiction as in case of a strictly dominant strategy. If y41 > 0 and y
4
3 < 0, the
ﬁrst part of the alternative condition equals (f − h)a ≦ (g − k) for some a > 0.
However, by restriction (ii) of the proposition, there exists a ω′′ ∈ Ω such that
(fω
′′
− hω
′′
) > 0 and (gω
′′
− kω
′′
) < 0 which contradicts this condition. Similarly,
restriction (ii) contradicts the ﬁrst part of the alternative if y41 < 0 and y
4
3 > 0.
Therefore, (5.9) has a solution, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5.4. Consider a two-players two-strategies game and ﬁx a σ¯−i ∈
Σ−i. Let f(a
′
i, σ¯−i) = f and f(a
′′
i , σ¯−i) = g denote player i’s payoﬀ vectors induced
by her pure actions. Note that every vector induces, through expectation, an ordering
on probabilities. The proof is based on the fact that aﬃne-relatedness implies that the
induced orderings of two vectors are identical (see Ghirardato et al., 1998). That is, if f
and −g are aﬃnely related, then f and g induce opposite orderings on the probabilities.
Assume that the set C ∗ is nonempty, which implies that f and g are not dominance
related and non-constant. Take an arbitrary Ci ∈ C
∗. Since there are π′, π′′ ∈ Ci such
that fπ′ = fπ′′ and gπ′ = gπ′′, it holds that argmin
π∈Ci
{
EUπ(f)
}
∩ argmax
π∈Ci
{
EUπ(f)
}
= ∅
and argmin
π∈Ci
{
EUπ(g)
}
∩ argmax
π∈Ci
{
EUπ(g)
}
= ∅. Furthermore, if f and g are negatively
aﬃnely related, it holds that argmin
π∈Ci
{
EUπ(f)
}
∩ argmin
π∈Ci
{
EUπ(g)
}
= ∅. Then, by
Lemma 1 in Ghirardato et al. (1998), MEUCi(f + g) =MEUCi(f) +MEUCi(g). Hence,
we are done if MEUCi(f) = MEUCi(g). W.l.o.g. assume that MEUCi(f) > MEUCi(g).
Let MEUCi(f) = fπ˜. Since there is a π
′′ ∈ Ci such that fπ
′′ < gπ′′, we have that
fπ˜ ≤ fπ′′ < gπ′′. Moreover, it holds that gπ′′ ≤ gπ˜ because f is negatively aﬃnely related
to g. Hence, fπ˜ < gπ˜. Then, for suﬃciently high α ∈ [0, 1] : MEUCi(αf + (1 − α)g) =
αfπ˜ + (1 − α)gπ˜ > fπ˜ = MEUCi(f). This means that there exists a mixed action,
(σi(a
′
i), σi(a
′′
i )) = (α, 1 − α), which is a strictly better response to σ¯−i than a
′
i. Since we
assumed that a′i is a strictly better response to σ¯−i than a
′′
i , player i exhibits hedging
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behavior, which proves the proposition.
Before proving Proposition 5.5, we need a couple of lemmas.
Lemma 5.3. Fix a two-player two-strategies canonical game G¯ ∈ Γ where at most one
of f, g, h, k ∈ Rm is constant and f, h and g, k are not strictly dominance related. If a
MEUCi player i exhibits no hedging behavior in G¯ for all Ci ∈ C , then one of the following
statements is true:
(i) f, h and g, k are aﬃnely related, there is no ω′ ∈ Ω such that fω
′
= hω
′
and gω
′
= kω
′
,
and h is weakly dominated by f and k by g or vice versa.
(ii) f, h and g, k are aﬃnely related and f = h and/or g = k.
(iii) f, g, h, k are pairwise aﬃnely related.
(iv) f,−g, h,−k are pairwise aﬃnely related.
Proof. Since f, h and g, k are not strictly dominance related, by Lemma 5.1, if aMEUCi
player i shows no hedging behavior in G¯ for all Ci ∈ C , then f, h and g, k are aﬃnely
related. Hence, for all ω ∈ Ω, it holds that,
(*) hω = a′fω + b′ for some a′ ≥ 0, b′ ∈ R and
(**) kω = a′′gω + b′′ for some a′′ ≥ 0, b′′ ∈ R.
Furthermore, either
(***) αf +(1−α)g and αh+(1−α)k are strictly dominance related for all α ∈ (0, 1)
or
(****) α′fω + (1− α′)gω = a′′′[α′hω + (1− α′)kω] + b′′′ for some a′′′ ≥ 0, b′′′ ∈ R.
(****) follows whenever (***) is false. To see why, observe that if (***) is false, then
i shows no hedging behavior in G¯ for all Ci ∈ C only if α
′f + (1− α′) is aﬃnely related
to α′h+ (1−α′)k whenever α′f + (1−α′) and α′h+ (1−α′)k are not strictly dominance
related. Hence, there exist α′ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all ω ∈ Ω (****) is true.
Claim. (***) implies (i).
Proof. Suppose (***) is true. Since f, h and g, k are not strictly dominance related (***)
is true iﬀ there is no ω′ ∈ Ω such that fω
′
= hω
′
and gω
′
= kω
′
, and h is weakly dominated
by f and k by g or vice versa.
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Claim. (*), (**), and (****) imply (ii) or (iii) or (iv).
Proof. Suppose (***) is not true. Then, there exist α′ ∈ (0, 1) such that α′f + (1− α′)g
and α′h+ (1− α′)k are not dominance related and non-constant.
(ii) If f = h, then (**) implies (****). Similarly, (*) implies (****) whenever g = k.
W.l.o.g. assume that f and g are non-constant and let f = h and g = k.
(iii) If f is aﬃnely related to g, then (*) and (**) imply that h and k are aﬃnely related,
either because one of the vectors is constant or by transitivity. Hence, all vectors
are pairwise aﬃnely related.
(iv) If f and g are not aﬃnely related, then (*),(**), (****) imply that fω = b˜gω + bˆ for
all ω ∈ Ω and some b˜, bˆ ∈ R where b˜ = 0, otherwise f is constant. Since f and g
are not aﬃnely related, it holds that b˜ < 0, which means that f is aﬃnely related
to −g. Then, h and −k are aﬃnely related by transitivity or because one of the
vectors is constant.
Lemma 5.4. Let at most one of the payoﬀ vectors f, g, h, k be constant and f,−g, h,−k
be pairwise aﬃnely related. If there exist π′, π′′ ∈ ∆(Ω) such that fπ
′−fπ′′
gπ′′−gπ′
= hπ
′−hπ′′
kπ′′−kπ′
, then
αf + (1− α)g is not aﬃnely related to αh+ (1− α)k for some α ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. W.l.o.g. assume that fπ
′−fπ′′
gπ′′−gπ′
> hπ
′−hπ′′
kπ′′−kπ′
and fπ′ > fπ′′. The latter implies that
hπ′ > hπ′′, gπ′ < gπ′′, and kπ′ < kπ′′, since f,−g, h,−k are pairwise aﬃnely related.
Therefore, it holds that αfπ′+(1−α)gπ′ ≥ αfπ′′+(1−α)gπ′′ for all α ≥ gπ
′′−gπ′
gπ′′−gπ′+fπ′−fπ′′
and αhπ′ + (1 − α)kπ′ ≥ αhπ′′ + (1 − α)kπ′′ for all α ≥ kπ
′′−kπ′
kπ′′−kπ′+hπ′−hπ′′
. Furthermore,
fπ′−fπ′′
gπ′′−gπ′
> hπ
′−hπ′′
kπ′′−kπ′
implies that gπ
′′−gπ′
gπ′′−gπ′+fπ′−fπ′′
< kπ
′′−kπ′
kπ′′−kπ′+hπ′−hπ′′
. Consequently, αfπ′ +
(1− α)gπ′ > αfπ′′ + (1− α)gπ′′ and αhπ′ + (1− α)kπ′ < αhπ′′ + (1− α)kπ′′ for all α ∈(
gπ′′−gπ′
gπ′′−gπ′+fπ′−fπ′′
, kπ
′′−kπ′
kπ′′−kπ′+hπ′−hπ′′
)
. That is, there exist α ∈ (0, 1) such that αf + (1− α)g
and αh + (1 − α)k induce diﬀerent orderings on probabilities, which means that these
payoﬀ vectors are not aﬃnely related.
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Lemma 5.5. Let e(ω) = (k
ω−gω)
(kω−gω+fω−hω)
for ω ∈ Ω and deﬁne the sets:
E− =
{
e(ω) | (kω − gω + fω − hω) < 0
}
and E+ =
{
e(ω) | (kω − gω + fω − hω) > 0
}
.
The following statements are equivalent.
(i) αf + (1− α)g strictly dominates αh+ (1− α)k for some α ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) (a) For each ω ∈ Ω: fω > hω and/or gω > kω and (b) max{E+} < min{E−}.
Proof. Statement (i) says that there exist α ∈ [0, 1] which solves the following system of
linear inequalities:
αfω1 + (1− α)gω1 > αhω1 + (1− α)kω1
...
αfωm + (1− α)gωm > αhωm + (1− α)kωm
This system is solvable iﬀ each inequality has a nonempty solution set, which corresponds
to condition (ii)(a), and the solutions sets of all inequalities have a nonempty intersection,
which is equivalent to condition (ii)(b).
Proof of Proposition 5.5. The proof of “(i) =⇒ (ii)” is trivial. “(i) ⇐= (ii)”. Under
the assumptions of the proposition, Lemma 5.3 shows that statement (ii) implies either (i)
or f,−g, h,−k are pairwise aﬃnely related. Suppose that (ii) implies the latter. By the
assumptions of the proposition, it holds that ∄ α ∈ [0, 1] : αf + (1− α)g > αh+ (1− α)k
or vice versa. The negation of Lemma 5.5 implies that
fω
′
≤ hω
′
and gω
′
≤ kω
′
for some ω′ ∈ Ω and/or max{E+} ≥ min{E−} and (5.10)
hω
′′
≤ fω
′′
and kω
′′
≤ gω
′′
for some ω′′ ∈ Ω and/or max{E−} ≥ min{E+}. (5.11)
At ﬁrst, consider the case where the ﬁrst condition of (5.10) and/or (5.11) is violated.
W.l.o.g. assume that the ﬁrst condition of (5.10) is violated. That is, for each ω ∈ Ω:
fω > hω and/or gω > kω. Furthermore, max{E+} ≥ min{E−}, otherwise αf +(1−α)g >
αh + (1 − α)k for some α ∈ [0, 1]. If fω > hω for all ω ∈ Ω and/or gω > kω for all
ω ∈ Ω, then f strictly dominates h and/or g strictly dominates k, which contradicts the
assumptions of the proposition. Therefore, suppose that there are ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω such that
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fω
′
≤ hω
′
and gω
′′
≤ kω
′′
. Let e(ω+) ∈ max{E+} and e(ω−) ∈ min{E−}. Due to f
ω− >
hω− and/or gω− > kω− , it holds that e(ω−) > 0. If g
ω+ ≥ kω+ , then e(ω+) ≤ 0 < e(ω−)
- a contradiction. Therefore, gω+ < kω+ and fω+ > hω+ , which implies that e(ω+) < 1.
If fω− ≥ hω− , then e(ω−) ≥ 1 > e(ω+) - a contradiction. Therefore, f
ω− < hω− and
gω− > kω− . Taken together, we have that,
(*) gω+ < kω+ and fω+ > hω+ ; fω− < hω− and gω− > kω− .
W.l.o.g. we may assume that fω+ ≤ fω− . Then, since f is aﬃnely related to h and
negatively aﬃnely related to g and k,
(**) hω+ < hω− , gω+ ≥ gω− and kω+ > kω− .
Now, consider the prior set C¯i = {βδω+ + (1 − β)δω− | β ∈ [0, 1]} where δω denotes the
measure concentrated on ω ∈ Ω. Then, by (*) and (**), MEUC¯i(f) = f
ω+ > hω+ =
MEUC¯i(h) and MEUC¯i(g) = g
ω− > kω− = MEUC¯i(k). This means that action a
′
i is the
unique best response of a MEUC¯i player i to a
′
−i and a
′′
−i. Consequently, it needs to hold
that a′−i is the unique best response to αa
′
−i+(1−α)a
′′
−i for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Otherwise, player
i exhibits reversal behavior, which contradicts statement (ii). Let α = k
ω+−gω+
kω+−gω++fω+−hω+
∈
(0, 1) and α = g
ω
−−kω−
gω−−kω−+hω−−fω−
∈ (0, 1). Then, αfω+ + (1− α)gω+ ≤ αhω+ + (1− α)kω+
for all α ∈ [0, α] and αfω− + (1− α)gω− ≤ αhω− + (1− α)kω− for all α ∈ [α, 1]. Player i
exhibits no reversal behavior only if α < g
ω+−gω−
gω+−gω−+fω−−fω+
< α, which is equivalent to
(***) k
ω+−gω+
fω+−hω+
< g
ω+−gω−
fω−−fω+
and k
ω
−−gω−
fω−−hω−
> g
ω+−gω−
fω−−fω+
.
However, (*), (**), (***), and the aﬃne-relatedness condition from Lemma 5.4, f
ω
−−fω+
gω+−gω−
=
hω−−hω+
kω+−kω−
, lead to a contradiction (see the Mathematica code at the end of this proof). That
is, either a MEUC¯i player exhibits reversal behavior or there exists a Ci ∈ C such that a
MEUCi player exhibits hedging behavior. Consequently, the ﬁrst condition of (5.10) and
(5.11) need to be both fulﬁlled. This implies that there are ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω such that
(****) fω
′′
− fω
′
≥ hω
′′
− hω
′
and gω
′
− gω
′′
≤ kω
′
− kω
′′
.
Deﬁne the prior set C˜i = {βδω′ + (1− β)δω′′ | β ∈ [0, 1]}. If the inequalities in (****) are
strict, it holds that f
ω′′−fω
′
gω
′−gω′′
> h
ω′′−hω
′
kω
′−kω′′
, which means that aMEUC˜i player i shows hedging
behavior due to Lemma 5.4. At least one of the inequalities in (****) is not strict iﬀ
(*****) (fω
′
= hω
′
and fω
′′
= hω
′′
) and/or (gω
′
= kω
′
and gω
′′
= kω
′′
).
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Consider (*****) with ”and”. Then, fω
′
= hω
′
and gω
′
= kω
′
. By the proposition, at
most one of the acts is constant. Suppose that f is constant, which implies that g, h, k
are not constant. Since f = h and g = k, there exists a π′ ∈ ∆(Ω) such that hω
′
= hπ′,
which implies that fπ′ = hπ′, and gω
′
= gπ′, kω
′
= kπ′ and gπ′ = hπ′. Deﬁne the prior
set Cˆi = {βδω′ + (1 − β)π
′ | β ∈ [0, 1]}. Since f,−g, h,−k are pairwise aﬃnely related
either MEUCˆi(f) = f
ω′ and MEUCˆi(h) = h
ω′ or MEUCˆi(g) = g
ω′ and MEUCˆi(k) = k
ω′ ,
but not both. W.l.o.g. assume that MEUCˆi(f) = f
ω′ and MEUCˆi(h) = h
ω′ . Given
αa′−i+(1−α)a
′′
−i, aMEUCˆi player is indiﬀerent between her actions for all α ∈ [0, α
′] and
strictly prefer one of her pure actions for α ∈ [α′′, 1], where α′ is suﬃciently low and α′′
is suﬃciently large. That is, a MEUCˆi player shows reversal behavior - a contradiction.
Similarly, one can show that (*****) with ”or” yields a contradiction.
To sum up, if (ii) implies that f,−g, h,−k are pairwise aﬃnely related, we obtain a
contradiction to the assumptions of the proposition, which proves that (ii) implies (i).
Proof of Proposition 5.6. The proof of “(i)(a) =⇒ (ii)” and of “(i)(b) =⇒ (ii)” is
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straightforward. We prove “(i) ⇐= (ii)” by its contrapositive “¬(i) ⇒ ¬(ii)”. Suppose
that ¬(i)(a) and ¬(i)(b) is true. Then, it holds that f, g, h, k are not pairwise aﬃnely
related and if f (resp. h) is constant, then g (resp. k) is not constant and vice versa.
There are two cases to consider:
Case 1. Let f and h be constant and g and k be non-constant. Since f, g, h, k are not
pairwise aﬃnely related, it needs to hold that g is not aﬃnely related to k. By the
proposition, there exists α′ ∈ [0, 1] such that α′f + (1 − α′)g and α′h + (1 − α′)k
are not strictly dominance related. By Lemma 5.1, a MEUCi player i exhibits
no hedging behavior for all Ci ∈ C only if α
′f + (1 − α′)g is aﬃnely related to
α′h+ (1− α′)k, i.e., (*) α′fω + (1− α′)gω = a[α′hω + (1− α′)kω] + b for all ω ∈ Ω
and some a > 0, b ∈ R.
Since f and h are constant, (*) is equivalent to gω = akω + b˜ for all ω ∈ Ω and
some a > 0, b˜ ∈ R, which means that g is aﬃnely related to k - a contradiction.
Therefore, a MEUCi player i shows hedging behavior, whenever ¬(i)(a) is true.
Case 2. Let f and k be constant and g and h be non-constant. This case can be proven
similarly to the previous one.
Therefore, “¬(i)⇒ ¬(ii)” ⇔ “(i) ⇐ (ii)”.
Proof of Proposition 5.7. The proof of “(i)(a) =⇒ (ii)” and of “(i)(b) =⇒ (ii)” is
straightforward. As in the previous proof, we prove “(i) ⇐= (ii)” by its contrapositive.
Let ¬(i) be true. Then, f, g, h, k are not pairwise aﬃnely related and if f = h (resp.
g = k), then g = k (resp. f = h). W.l.o.g. assume that f = h and g = k. Since g and
k are not strictly dominance related, αf + (1 − α)g and αh + (1 − α)k are not strictly
dominance related for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Due to Lemma 5.1, if there exists a α′ ∈ [0, 1] such
that α′f + (1− α′)g is not aﬃnely related α′h+ (1− α′)k, then a MEUCi player i shows
hedging behavior for some Ci ∈ C , i.e., ¬(ii) is true. If g is aﬃnely related to k, then (*)
gω = a′kω + b′ for all ω ∈ Ω and some a′ > 0, b′ ∈ R. Let α′ ∈ (0, 1). If α′f + (1− α′)g is
aﬃnely related to α′h+ (1− α′)k, then (**) α′fω + (1− α′)gω = a[α′hω + (1− α′)kω] + b
for all ω ∈ Ω and some a > 0, b ∈ R. If f, g, h, k are not pairwise aﬃnely related, (*) and
(**) cannot be true at the same time. Hence, “¬(i)⇒ ¬(ii)” ⇔ “(i) ⇐ (ii)”.
Chapter 6
Nash equilibrium behavior and
uncertainty about others’ preferences
In applications of game theory, it is frequently assumed that agents’ preferences are
commonly or at least mutually known. In recent years, this assumption has been in-
creasingly questioned and relaxed. For example, Healy (2011) ﬁnds that subjects fail to
accurately predict other subjects’ preferences over possible outcomes in two-person two-
strategies games (or, brieﬂy, 2×2 games). In this chapter, which is based on Brunner et al.
(2015), we test whether knowledge about other player’s preferences has a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the frequency of equilibrium play. We ﬁnd that subjects are indeed signiﬁcantly more
likely to play a Nash equilibrium strategy when they are informed about their opponent’s
preferences over the possible outcomes of the game.
Whenever it is unlikely that players know each others preferences, it might be advisable
to use a more general equilibrium concept such as the strategic ambiguity models described
in Section 3.3, or Bayesian Nash equilibrium rather than the standard Nash equilibrium.
We will elaborate further on this point but will ﬁrst discuss our experiment in more detail.
The experiment consists of two treatments, called “baseline” and “info”. Both treat-
ments have two stages. In stage 1, we let subjects rank eight monetary payoﬀ pairs (they
will be referred to as “payment-pairs”). These are then used to construct four diﬀerent
2×2 games. In stage 2, each subject in both treatments plays each of these games exactly
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once. The two treatments diﬀer in that the preferences elicited in stage 1 are only revealed
in stage 2 of treatment info.
This design allows us to avoid the assumption that subjects only care about their own
monetary payments. Instead, we can use the preferences elicited in stage 1 to describe
the game that our subjects are playing. This is illustrated in Example 6.1 below, which
corresponds to one of the games our subjects play in stage 2.
Example 6.1. Consider the prisoner’s-dilemma-type game-form in Figure 6.1. The num-
bers in the matrix correspond to the amount of money paid to the players, where the ﬁrst
number is the row player’s payment and the second number is the column player’s payment.
Suppose that the two players, i ∈ {r, c}, where r stands for row and c for column,
(a) are selﬁsh payment maximizers and only care about their own payments. That is,
each player’s preferences over payment-pairs (xr, xc) ∈ R2 are represented by a strictly
monotone increasing utility function vi(xi) that depends only on his own payment or
(b) have other-regarding preferences represented by a function v˜i : R2 → R,
then the games that result in cases (a) and (b) are depicted in Figure 6.2.
L R
U 4, 4 8, 3
D 3, 8 7, 7
Figure 6.1: Prisoner’s-dilemma-type game-form
In Example 6.1, the game that results if players are selﬁsh (a) is a prisoner’s-dilemma-
type game. In this case, the game has only one Nash equilibrium (U,L), i.e., everyone
defects. That is not necessarily true for the induced game (b), where players have social
preferences. For example, if v˜1(7, 7) > v˜1(8, 3) and v˜2(7, 7) > v˜2(3, 8), then mutual
cooperation, (D,R), is a Nash equilibrium in (b).
L R
U vr(4), vc(4) vr(8), vc(3)
D vr(3), vc(8) vr(7), vc(7)
(a) Players with selﬁsh preferences
L R
U v˜r(4, 4), v˜c(4, 4) v˜r(8, 3), v˜c(8, 3)
D v˜r(3, 8), v˜c(3, 8) v˜r(7, 7), v˜c(7, 7)
(b) Players with social preferences
Figure 6.2: Induced games in Example 6.1
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While we can accommodate preferences that depend on both players’ monetary pay-
ments, we maintain the assumption that the speciﬁc game form, other subjects’ prefer-
ences, or any other factors have no eﬀect on subjects’ utility. We will discuss evidence
suggesting that such considerations do not play an important role in the games used in
this study.
Our main result is that subjects are much more likely to play a Nash equilibrium
strategy in treatment info compared to treatment baseline. Therefore, subjects not only
fail to accurately predict other players’ preferences, the lack of such information also
signiﬁcantly aﬀects their behavior.
If players do not know each other, concepts that are more general than Nash equilib-
rium might provide a more reliable prediction. In our experiment, we ﬁnd that a strategy is
more likely to be played when it cannot lead to the lowest ranked payment-pair (maxmin)
or when it can result in the realization of the highest ranked one (maxmax). Intuitively,
if a subject is uncertain about the strategy choice of her opponent, then, depending on
her attitude towards uncertainty, she will try to avoid the lowest ranked payment-pair,
or, to reach the highest ranked one. We show that the strategic ambiguity model of
Eichberger and Kelsey (2014) can rationalize such strategy choices (see Section 6.3). This
model allows for optimistic responses to strategic ambiguity. The other models mentioned
in Section 3.3, except Marinacci (2000), assume ambiguity-averse behavior. While these
models can explain maxmin strategy choices, they cannot rationalize maxmax behavior.
Another possibility is to take a Bayesian approach by modeling a situation where
preferences are not mutually known as a game of incomplete information, and using the
approach of Harsanyi (1967-68) to transform that game into a Bayesian game. Players
with diﬀerent preferences can be thought of as diﬀerent types and it is then assumed
that the prior distribution of types is commonly known. Such more general models have
increasingly been developed in various ﬁelds.38 We show that the behavior observed in
our baseline treatment is consistent with a noisy version of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium,
38In auction theory, for example, the assumption that all bidders are risk neutral and that this is
commonly known has been relaxed. Instead, the prior distribution of risk preferences rather than other
bidders’ actual risk preferences are assumed to be commonly known (see, e.g., Hu and Zou, 2015).
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which we call Quasi-Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (QBNE).
The papers closest to this study are Healy (2011) and a recent working paper by Wolﬀ
(2014), who considers three-player public good games. In contrast to our experiment,
Wolﬀ does not reveal the primitives of a game, i.e., subjects’ preferences over the material
outcomes, to other subjects. Instead, he discloses subjects’ best-response correspondences
in one of his treatments and ﬁnds a smaller eﬀect than we do. In his experiment, cognitive
limitations might weaken the eﬀect of such a disclosure due to his more complex setting.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the experimental
design. Then, we discuss our results. In Section 6.3, we describe the aforementioned
strategic ambiguity model in detail, and show that the observed maxmin and maxmax
strategy choices can be explained by this model. Furthermore, we specify our notion of
Quasi-Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, and show that the observed behavior in our baseline
treatment is consistent with a QBNE. Section 6.4 concludes with a summary.
6.1 Experimental design, lab and payment details
Experimental design
Our experiment consists of two treatment with two stages each. In the ﬁrst stage of
both treatments, we elicit subjects’ preferences over eight diﬀerent payment-pairs. These
payment-pairs are then used to construct four diﬀerent 2 × 2 games. In stage 2 of each
treatment, subjects play each one of these games exactly once. In treatment “info”,
subjects can see how their opponent ranked the four payment-pairs of the current game,
whereas in treatment “baseline”, this information is not disclosed.
We will now describe stage 1 in more detail, which is identical in both treatments.
Subjects are asked to create an ordinal ranking over the following set X of eight payment-
pairs:
X = {(8, 3), (7, 7), (8, 5), (4, 4), (2, 6), (3, 8), (3, 3), (2, 2)} ⊂ R2 (6.1)
The ﬁrst number, x1, corresponds to the amount of money (in Euros) paid to the decision-
maker. The second number, x2, is paid to some other subject (the “recipient”). Subjects
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are informed that they will not interact with the recipient in any other way in either stage
of the experiment.
The order in which the payment-pairs appear on the screen was randomly determined
beforehand and remains constant in all sessions. Subjects rank the payment-pairs by
assigning a number between one and eight to each pair, where lower numbers indicate
a higher preference. The same number can be assigned to multiple payment-pairs, thus
allowing for indiﬀerence. In treatment info, subjects are told that their rankings would be
disclosed to other participants at a later stage of the experiment. In treatment baseline,
we made it clear that this information would not be revealed. After subjects conﬁrm
their ranking, they proceed to stage 2, in which they play the following four one-shot
2× 2 games (all numbers are payments in Euro):
Game 1
L R
U 4, 4 8, 3
D 3, 8 7, 7
Game 2
L R
U 5, 8 7, 7
D 6, 2 3, 3
Game 3
L R
U 4, 4 8, 3
D 3, 3 7, 7
Game 4
L R
U 8, 3 2, 2
D 7, 7 3, 8
Figure 6.3: Games in the experiment
These games were selected because we conjectured that social preferences might play some
role here. Moreover, they could be constructed using only 8 payment-pairs and exhibit
some diversity with respect to the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria under the
assumption that subjects are selﬁsh payment maximizers.
All subjects play each game exactly once, each time against a diﬀerent anonymous
opponent. Games are played one after another and feedback about the outcome is only
provided at the end of the experiment when subjects are paid, but not while subjects still
make decisions.
In both treatments, subjects can see how they ranked the four payment-pairs of the
current game in stage 1. This information is displayed by assigning 1-4 stars to each
6. Nash equilibrium behavior and uncertainty about others’ preferences 125
outcome, where more stars indicate a better outcome. In treatment info, subjects are
shown their own and their opponent’s ranking in matrix form (see Figure 6.4). Just like
in the payment matrix, the ﬁrst entry corresponds to the subject’s own ranking while
the second entry reveals the opponent’s ranking. In treatment baseline, subjects were
shown the same rankings matrix but this matrix only contained their own rankings.
Figure 6.4: Information screen
Lab and payment details
In both treatments, subjects’ payments are determined by a random incentive system
(RIS), which is a frequently used mechanism in experimental economics. Each subject
is paid for exactly one of her decisions, which is randomly selected at the end of the
experiment. If a decision from stage 1 is chosen, two of the eight payment-pairs from (6.1)
are randomly selected. The subject is then paid the ﬁrst number, x1, of the payment pair
that she ranked more highly in stage 1. The second number, x2, is paid to some other
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subject. The probability that stage 1 is paid is 7
8
while stage 2 is paid with a probability
of 1
8
. These probabilities are consistent with selecting each of the
(
8
2
)
possible pairs of
payment pairs and each of the four decisions made in stage 2 with equal probability.
Paying stage 1 with a substantially higher probability also reduces the odds that subjects
might misrepresent their preferences. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Section
6.2.2.
Subjects were given printed instructions and could only participate after successfully
answering several test questions. Test questions as well as the rest of the experiment
were programmed using Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All sessions were conducted between
August and October 2014 at the AWI-Lab of the University of Heidelberg. Subjects
from all ﬁelds of study were recruited using Orsee (Greiner, 2004). Fewer than half of
the subjects were economics students. Sessions lasted about 40-50 minutes on average.
The following table summarizes the number of participants per session as well as average
payments:
Table 6.1: Summary of treatment information
Treatment Sessions Subjects Average payments
baseline 8 84 e 12.36
info 7 80 e 12.59
6.2 Results
In this section, we ﬁrst characterize subjects’ preferences as measured in stage 1 of the
experiment. Then, we discuss the possibility that subjects might misrepresent their true
preferences and that preferences might change when subjects are shown their opponents’
preferences. We ﬁnd no evidence for either of these eﬀects and thus proceed to present
the main treatment eﬀect: subjects are more likely to play an equilibrium strategy in
treatment info than in treatment baseline. This eﬀect can be observed in each of the
four games, though it is not signiﬁcant when we only use the data from one single game.
We also ﬁnd that a strategy is played more often when it can lead to the highest ranked
payment-pair and less often when it can lead to the lowest ranked one.
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6.2.1 Characterization of measured preferences
In stage 1 of the experiment, we elicit subjects’ preferences over the set of payment-
pairsX ⊂ R2 deﬁned in equation (6.1). To characterize subjects’ preferences, we introduce
four properties: pareto-eﬃciency, strict pareto eﬃciency, maximization of own payoﬀ, and
maximization of total payoﬀ. These properties are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 6.1 (Pareto eﬃciency). A subject’s preferences  on X are said to satisfy
pareto-eﬃciency if, for all x, y ∈ X, x ≻ y whenever x1 ≥ y1 and x2 ≥ y2 with at least
one inequality strict.
Deﬁnition 6.2 (Strict pareto eﬃciency). A subject’s preferences  on X are said to
satisfy strict pareto-eﬃciency if, for all x, y ∈ X, x ≻ y whenever x1 > y1 and x2 > y2.
Deﬁnition 6.3 (Maximization of own payoﬀ). A subject is said to maximize his own
payoﬀ if, for all x, y ∈ X, x ≻ y whenever x1 > y1.
Deﬁnition 6.4 (Maximization of total payoﬀ). A subject is said to maximize total payoﬀ
if, for all x, y ∈ X, x ≻ y whenever x1 + x2 > y1 + y2.
Table 6.2 shows the fraction of subjects whose preferences are consistent with the
properties deﬁned above.
Table 6.2: Measured preferences
Pareto
eﬃciency
Strict pareto
eﬃciency
Maximization
of own payoﬀ
Maximization
of total payoﬀ
n
Percentage consistent 69.5% 92.7% 54.9% 1.8% 164
6.2.2 Did we manage to elicit subjects’ true preferences?
When preferences are elicited in stage 1 of the experiment, subjects in treatment info
are aware that these preferences will be revealed to other subjects. However, they are
not informed about the speciﬁc games that are played in stage 2. Hence, subjects did
not have the information necessary to ﬁgure out what kind of misrepresentation might be
most advantageous: in some 2× 2 games, it could be beneﬁcial to be perceived as having
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social preferences whereas in other games, the contrary is more likely (e.g., in the chicken
game). Moreover, recall that a decision made in stage 2 aﬀects a subject’s payment with
a probability of only 1/8. Therefore, it does not seem plausible that a rational subject
would misrepresent her preferences in stage 1.
We test the claim that subjects truthfully state their preferences in stage 1 of
treatment info by using the frequency with which subjects play strictly dominated
strategies in stage 2 of the experiment. To identify strategies that are strictly dominated,
we use the preferences elicited in stage 1. If these reﬂect a subject’s true preferences,
a rational subject should never play such a strictly dominated strategy. In contrast,
if subjects strategically misrepresent their preferences in stage 1, a strategy that we
classify as strictly dominated may in fact not be dominated according to the subjects’
true preferences. Since preferences in treatment baseline are not revealed to other
subjects, it is clear that subjects in treatment baseline have no reason to misrepresent
their preferences. Therefore, we can compare the frequency with which subjects play a
strictly dominated strategy in the two treatments to test the claim that preferences are
truthfully revealed in stage 1 of treatment info. If that claim is true, no diﬀerence should
be observed. Otherwise, subjects should be more likely to play a strictly dominated
strategy in treatment info than in baseline.
Table 6.3: Violations of strict dominance
Treatment Subjects Games
played
Games
with dom-
inated
strategy
Dominated
strategy
played
Subjects who played
dominated strategy at
least once
Baseline 84 336 136 23.53% 32.14%
Info 80 320 140 25.71% 33.75%
Table 6.3 shows how often subjects play a strictly dominated strategy using the pref-
erences stated in stage 1 to deﬁne the according games. Each subject played 4 games,
thus resulting in 336 games played in treatment baseline and 320 in info. In 136 of these
games in treatment baseline and 140 in info, one of the strategies was strictly dominated.
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In roughly a quarter of these cases, the strictly dominated strategy was played.
In order to check the assumption that subjects do not misrepresent their preferences in
both treatments, we run a regression using the 136 games in treatment baseline as well as
the 140 games in treatment info as observations. The dependent variable “dominated” is
a dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 if the strictly dominated strategy was played.
The only explanatory variable other than the intercept is a treatment dummy (“info”).
We run a probit regression and compute robust standard errors clustered by subject (see
Table 6.4). The coeﬃcient estimate for the treatment dummy is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 0. Hence, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected:
Result 6.1. Subjects are equally likely to play a strictly dominated strategy in both treat-
ments.
We therefore maintain the assumption that subjects truthfully state their preferences in
stage 1 of the experiment in both treatments.
Table 6.4: Probit regression “dominated”, robust standard errors clustered by subject
Dependent variable: Dominated Coeﬃcient SE
Info 0.07 0.18
Constant −0.72∗∗∗ 0,13
n 276
Clusters 160
Pseudo R2 0.0006
∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level
In psychological game theory, Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
introduced models of reciprocity in which players reward kind actions and punish unkind
ones. Reciprocity could lead to a problem equivalent to the misrepresentation of prefer-
ences discussed in this section. For instance, consider Game 1 in stage 2 of treatment
info. Suppose an own-payoﬀ maximizer (row) is matched with a total-payoﬀ maximizer
(column). The row player might then believe that column will cooperate (play R), even
though column expects row to defect (play U). This expected kindness on the part of
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column might then induce row to also cooperate, thus violating our assumption that only
outcomes matter. In other words, subjects’ preferences might change once they are shown
their opponents’ payment rankings in stage 2 of treatment info. If so, the preferences we
use in our analysis would no longer correspond to subjects’ true preferences. Since such
preference adjustments are only possible in treatment info but not in treatment baseline,
we can use Result 6.1 to argue that such eﬀects probably do not matter much in our ex-
periment. If they did, one would expect to observe that subjects play strictly dominated
strategies more often in treatment info compared to treatment baseline.
6.2.3 Main results
The evidence discussed in the previous section suggests that subjects indeed state
their true preferences in stage 1 of the experiment in both treatments. We can therefore
proceed to discuss our main hypothesis that subject behavior is more consistent with the
Nash equilibrium when preferences are mutually known. Aumann and Brandenburger
(1995) showed that the Nash equilibrium does not necessarily require common knowledge
(i.e., all know, all know that all know, and so on ad inﬁnitum). In two-person games,
mutual knowledge (i.e., all know) about the payoﬀs, the rationality and the conjectures
of the players suﬃces to constitute a Nash equilibrium. Consequently, mutual knowledge
about preferences leads to a Nash equilibrium whenever both individuals believe that
their opponent is rational and know each other’s conjectures.
We test this hypothesis by using two diﬀerent subsets of our data. Recall that each
subject played four games. Since there are a total of 164 subjects who participated in
the experiment, we have data on 656 individual decisions, 336 in treatment baseline and
320 in treatment info. We exclude those decisions where both strategies are played with
strictly positive probability in some Nash equilibrium, which leaves us with 425 decisions
(213 in treatment baseline and 212 in treatment info). We also exclude those decisions
where one pure strategy is strictly dominant. In such a situation, the best response does
not depend on the other player’s action and therefore, it should not matter whether or not
the other players’ preferences are known. This leaves us with 149 individual decisions, 77
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in treatment baseline and 72 in treatment info. We test our main hypothesis using these
149 observations and will refer to the according subset of our data as “all subjects”.
We run the same test a second time with a smaller subset of our data which no longer
includes the decisions made by subjects who played a strictly dominant strategy in at least
one of the four games. Either the preferences that these subjects stated in stage 1 do
not reﬂect their true preferences or they are not rational in the sense that their choice in
stage 2 is inconsistent with their stated preferences. Table 6.3 shows that approximately
one third of our subjects violate strict dominance at least once. Just like in subset “all
subjects” we also only use games where the subject has a unique equilibrium strategy that
is not strictly dominant. Removing the choices made by inconsistent subjects therefore
further reduces the number of observations to 110 individual decisions, 56 in treatment
baseline and 54 in treatment info. We will refer to this subset of our data as “consistent
subjects only”.
Figure 6.5: Probability unique equilibrium strategy is played
Figure 6.5 shows that subjects play an equilibrium strategy more often in treatment
info than in treatment baseline, regardless of whether we use all subjects or only
consistent subjects. To test whether these diﬀerences are signiﬁcant, we run a probit
regression. The dependent variable (eplay) assumes a value of 1 if a subject plays the
unique equilibrium strategy and 0 otherwise. We include an intercept as well as a dummy
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variable, which assumes a value of 0 if the observation is generated in treatment info and
0 otherwise. The according results are shown in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Probit regression “eplay”, robust standard errors clustered by subject
Dependent variable: eplay All Subjects Consistent subjects only
Coeﬃcient SE Coeﬃcient SE
info 0.56∗∗ 0.22 0.81∗∗∗ 0.26
constant −0.53∗∗∗ 0.16 −0.67∗∗∗ 0.19
n 149 110
Clusters 110 77
Pseudo R2 0.036 0.074
∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level, ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level
The treatment eﬀect is signiﬁcant using both subsets of our data. Therefore, informing
subjects about their opponents preferences leads to a signiﬁcantly higher frequency of
equilibrium play.
Result 6.2. Subjects are more likely to play a Nash equilibrium strategy when preferences
are mutually known.
6.2.4 Other results
Even though subjects in treatment info play a unique equilibrium strategy signiﬁ-
cantly more often than in treatment baseline, they still fail to do so almost half of the
time. While the uncertainty with respect to the opponent’s preferences is eliminated,
there still is uncertainty about whether or not the other player will pick a strategy
that is consistent with his reported preferences. Given that our subjects play a strictly
dominated strategy roughly one fourth of the time, it seems plausible that some subjects
may not be willing to rely on others to behave rationally. In the presence of such
strategic uncertainty, subjects might try to avoid the lowest ranked payment-pair or
try to reach the highest ranked payment-pair as an outcome. Such choices can be
explained by models of strategic ambiguity (see Section 6.3). We therefore expect
strategies that can yield the lowest ranked payment-pair as a possible outcome to be
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played relatively rarely while strategies that can lead to the highest ranked one should
be played relatively often. Since subjects in the baseline treatment are uncertain not
only about whether other players are rational but also about what their preferences
are, these considerations should matter more in treatment baseline than in treatment info.
Table 6.6: Conditional logit regression “played”, robust standard errors clustered by subject
Dependent variable: Played Baseline Info
Coeﬃcient SE Coeﬃcient SE
equilibrium −0.25 0.35 1.02∗∗∗ 0.34
maxmax 1.60∗∗∗ 0.31 1.07∗∗∗ 0.22
maxmin 1.53∗∗∗ 0.29 1.30∗∗∗ 0.21
n 456 424
Clusters 57 53
Pseudo R2 0.42 0.42
∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level
We test these conjectures by running a conditional logit regression. An observation
corresponds to a pure strategy. The dependent variable (“played”) assumes a value of 1 if
a strategy is played and 0 otherwise. Three independent variables are used to characterize
each strategy: “equilibrium” indicates whether a strategy is a Nash equilibrium strategy.
“maxmax” assumes a value of 1 if a strategy contains a most highly ranked payment-pair.
“maxmin” indicates whether a strategy does NOT contain the lowest ranked payment-
pair. We only use decisions made by subjects who never played a strictly dominated
strategy. Table 6.6 shows that whether or not a strategy is a Nash equilibrium strategy
only matters in treatment info when predicting which strategies subjects will play. In
contrast, the coeﬃcients of maxmax and maxmin are signiﬁcant in both treatments.
Result 6.3. In both treatments, a strategy is more likely to be played when it cannot lead
to the lowest ranked payment-pair and when it can lead to the highest ranked payment-pair.
While the coeﬃcient estimate for the variable “equilibrium” diﬀers signiﬁcantly
among the two treatments, the coeﬃcients for “maxmax” and “maxmin” are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. The Nash equilibrium is only useful to predict play in treatment
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info but not in treatment baseline whereas the highest and the lowest possible payment
seem to aﬀect choices in both treatments.
Figure 6.6: Freq. unique eq. strategy is played, all subjects
Figure 6.7: Freq. unique eq. strategy is played, consistent subjects only
As described in the introduction, the games played in the baseline treatment can also
be considered as Bayesian games in which players with diﬀerent preferences represent
diﬀerent types. It is then assumed that the prior distribution of types is commonly
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known. Recall that a substantial fraction of subjects played strategies that are strictly
dominated and thus inconsistent with the preferences stated in the ﬁrst stage (see Table
6.3). Therefore, we develop a quasi Bayesian model. In this model, we add a noisy type
that randomly selects a pure strategy. All types other than this noisy type play a best
response given the commonly known distribution of types. The model is described in
detail in Section 6.3. While such a model is consistent with the behavior observed in the
experiment, the according predictions are much less precise than those obtained under
the assumption that players’ payoﬀ functions are mutually known, especially because we
only elicit ordinal but not cardinal rankings of outcomes. However, in Section 6.3, we
show that the predictions of Quasi-Bayesian Nash equilibrium could be falsiﬁed using our
data and are not trivially consistent with our observations.
6.3 Possible explanations
In the following section, we ﬁrst describe the strategic ambiguity model of Eichberger
and Kelsey (2014), and show that this concept can rationalize maxmin and maxmax
behavior. Subsequently, we specify the notion of Quasi-Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and
show that the observed behavior in the baseline treatment is consistent with a QBNE.
The models discussed in this section, while more general, are also more diﬃcult to
analyze. Moreover, the assumption of the Bayesian model that type spaces and beliefs
with respect to the distribution of these types are commonly known seems problematic in
some applications. On the other hand, the predictions of these models would hopefully
more often be consistent with observed behavior while still remaining falsiﬁable.
6.3.1 A non-Bayesian approach
The concept of Eichberger and Kelsey (2014) is called “equilibrium under ambiguity
(EUA)”. In their concept, player i’s beliefs about the behavior of other players is repre-
sented by a capacity νi deﬁned on S−i = ×
j∈I\{i}
Sj, where Sj is the set of player j’s pure
strategies. Given her beliefs νi, player i’s payoﬀ from a pure strategy si ∈ Si corresponds
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to the Choquet integral of her payoﬀ function ui(si, s−i) with respect to νi:
Vi(si, νi) =
∫
S−i
ui(si, s−i) dνi
= ui(si, s
1
−i)ν(s
1
−i) +
R∑
r=2
ui(si, s
r
−i
[
ν(s1−i, . . . , s
r
−i)− ν(s
1
−i, . . . , s
r−1
−i )
]
,
where the strategy combinations in S−i are numbered so that ui(si, s
1
−i) ≥ ui(si, s
2
−i) ≥
· · · ≥ ui(si, s
R
−i). Player i’s best responses to her belief νi are deﬁned in the usual way as
Ri(νi) = {si | si ∈ argmax
si∈Si
Vi (si, νi)}.
An essential ingredient of the model is the notion of support for a non-additive mea-
sure. Eichberger and Kelsey deﬁne the support of a convex capacity as the intersection
of the supports of the probability measures in the core of the capacity:39
Deﬁnition 6.5. The support of a convex capacity µ on S−i is deﬁned as
supp(µ) =
⋂
π∈core(µ)
supp(π).
As described in Section 2.4, convex capacities represent ambiguity-aversion. To capture
optimistic behavior, Eichberger and Kelsey use the class of capacities introduced by Jaﬀray
and Philippe (1997) (JP-capacities). A JP-capacity has convex and concave parts. It
is deﬁned as a mixture of a convex capacity with its dual capacity.40 Eichberger and
Kelsey deﬁne the support of a JP-capacity ν, suppJP (ν), as the support of its convex
part according to Deﬁnition 6.5. This support deﬁnition has a useful implication for
neo-additive capacities introduced in Chapter 4:
Proposition 6.1 (Eichberger and Kelsey, 2014). Let ν = δα+(1− δ)π be a neo-additive
capacity on S−i, where α, δ ∈ [0, 1], then suppJP (ν) = supp(π).
39For alternative support deﬁnitions and for arguments supporting Deﬁnition 6.5, see Eichberger and
Kelsey (2014).
40The dual capacity of capacity µ is deﬁned by µ¯(E) = 1 − µ(Ec). Hence, if µ is convex, then µ¯ is
concave.
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We will use neo-additive capacities to discuss the example in this section.
An equilibrium under ambiguity is a belief system in which, for each player i, the
nonempty support of player i’s belief about the opponents’ behavior lies in the Cartesian
product of the opponents best responses given their beliefs about the behavior of other
players. To put it diﬀerently, in an equilibrium under ambiguity, the beliefs that agents
hold are reasonable in the sense that neither player expects other players to play strategies
that are not best responses given their beliefs.
Deﬁnition 6.6. A belief system (ν∗i , ν
∗
−i) is an equilibrium under ambiguity if for all i ∈ I
supp(ν∗i ) ⊆ ×
j∈I\{i}
Rj(ν
∗
j ) and supp(ν
∗
i ) = ∅.
In what follows, we show that an equilibrium under ambiguity can explain maxmin
and maxmax strategy choices.
Example 6.2. Consider Game 3 in stage 2 of treatment info. Suppose that the game is
played by two subjects whose utility functions correspond to their own payment. That is,
the game takes the following form:
L R
U 4, 4 8, 3
D 3, 3 7, 7
Obviously, the row player has a strictly dominant strategy (U). If the column player
believes that row will pick U , she will play L. The game has a unique Nash equilibrium
(U,L). Whether or not the Nash equilibrium is played depends on the belief of the column
player about whether the row player behaves rationally, i.e., whether row will play the
strictly dominant strategy.
Denote the players by I = {r, c}, where r stands for row and c for column. If the
column player is not sure whether row behaves rationally, she may try to reach the highest
possible outcome (7) by playing strategy R. To show that this strategy choice is consistent
with an equilibrium under ambiguity, suppose that the beliefs of the column player about
row’s behavior can be represented by a neo-additive capacity νc with reference prior
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πc = (πc(U), πc(U)) = (1, 0). This can be viewed as a situation where column is uncertain
about the prior πc, i.e., whether row plays U . Furthermore, let column be an ambiguity-
loving player, for simplicity, assume that αc = 0. We may interpret the parameter δc
as the degree of ambiguity about πc. The higher δc, the higher the degree of ambiguity.
Given this belief, column’s payoﬀ from L equals
Vc(L, νc) = (1− δc) · 4 + δc ·
(
max{uc(L, sr) | sr ∈ Sr}
)
= 4,
and column’s payoﬀ from R is
Vc(R, νc) = (1− δc) · 3 + δc ·
(
max{uc(R, sr) | sr ∈ Sr}
)
= 3 + 4δc.
Hence, if column is suﬃciently uncertain about πc (δc >
1
4
), she will choose strategy R.
Suppose that the beliefs of the row player about column’s behavior can also be repre-
sented by a neo-additive capacity νr with reference prior πr = (πr(L), πr(R)) = (0, 1). It
is straightforward that the row player will play U given such a belief. Taken together, for
δc >
1
4
, we have that
Rr(νr) = U and Rc(νc) = R,
and, by Proposition 6.1 it holds that
suppJP (νr) = supp(πr) = R and suppJP (νc) = supp(πc) = U .
Consequently, the system (νr, νc) is an equilibrium under ambiguity in which the
column player plays the maxmax strategy R. Similarly, one can show that the equilibrium
under uncertainty concept can rationalize maxmin behavior if the players are ambiguity-
averse.
6.3.2 A quasi-Bayesian approach
Recall that in a Bayesian game, a strategy σi of player i prescribes a mixed action for
each possible type of player i, formally σi : Θi → ∆(Ai). As before, let Σi be the set of
all strategies of player i and Σ =×
i∈I
Σi. The interim expected utility of player i with type
θi ∈ Θi from a mixed strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ is
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EUi(σ | θi) =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
π(θ−i|θi)
( ∑
a∈A
( ∏
j∈I
σj(aj | θj)
)
ui(a, θi, θ−i)
)
.
where π(θ−i|θi) denotes the probability of θ−i under the condition that i knows she is of
type θi, and σj(aj | θj) is the probability of action aj that strategy σj prescribes for θj.
A situation in which the players do not know each other’s preferences over the set of
physical outcomes can be modeled as a Bayesian game where each player’s type space
corresponds to a set of potential preferences over X. In our quasi Bayesian approach, we
add a noisy type θ˜i to each player’s type space that randomly selects a pure action. A
Quasi-Bayesian Nash equilibrium is then deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 6.7. A Quasi-Bayesian Nash equilibrium for a quasi Bayesian game is a
strategy proﬁle (σ∗i , σ
∗
−i) ∈ Σ such that, for each player i ∈ I,
σ∗i (θi) ∈ argmax
σi∈Σi
EUi(σi, σ
∗
−i | θi)
for all non-noisy types θi ∈ Θi \ {θ˜i}, and
σ∗i (θ˜i) ∈ int(∆(Ai))
for the noisy type θ˜i ∈ Θi, where int(∆(Ai)) denotes the interior of the set of player i’s
mixed actions.
Obviously, a Quasi-Bayesian Nash equilibrium is weaker than a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
since it only requires that non-noisy types play mutual best responses. The existence of
a QBNE follows from the standard ﬁxed-point argument by Nash (1950, 1951).
Modeling the situation in the baseline treatment of our experi-
ment as a quasi Bayesian game
At the ﬁrst stage of treatment baseline, we elicit each subject k′s ordinal preferences
k over eight payment-pairs.
Deﬁnition 6.8. Subject k′s ordinal preference ordering k on the set X deﬁned in
equation (6.1) is a function fk : X → {1, . . . , 8}.
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We do not know subjects k′s utility function vk(·) exactly, but we know that vk(·) is a
representation of the ordinal ordering k, i.e., for all x, y ∈ X and all k, we have that
vk(x) ≥ vk(y) if and only if x k y.
At the second stage of the baseline treatment, subjects play four 2× 2 games. Hence-
forth, given a game played by two subjects, the subject who is the row player is denoted
by r and the column player by c. As described in the previous subsection, in our quasi
Bayesian model, each subject’s type space corresponds to a set of ordinal preference or-
derings and a noisy type.
We will assume that the observed fraction of row and column subjects who played a
strictly dominated action at least once (see Table 6.3) is an estimator for the probability
of the noisy row and column type, respectively.41
Assumption 6.1. The fraction of row and column subjects who played a strictly domi-
nated action at least once corresponds to the probability of noisy types of row and column
players, θ˜r and θ˜c.
We shall assume that the set of non-noisy types corresponds to the set of ordinal
rankings of all subjects, who never played a strictly dominated action. Again, the fraction
of subjects with a speciﬁc ranking is used as an estimator for the probability of this type.
Assumption 6.2. The sets of non-noisy types of row and column players, Θ¯r and Θ¯c, are
Θ¯r = {k |k is a non-noisy row player} and Θ¯c = {k |k is a non-noisy column player}.
As a consequence, we assume that the utility functions of all non-noisy subjects of the
same type are identical:
Assumption 6.3. For any two subjects k and k′, who are either both row or both column
players and who never played a strictly dominated action, if k=k′ , then vk(·) = vk′(·).
The type spaces of row and column players, Θr and Θc, are the union of the set of
non-noisy types and the noisy type, formally Θr = Θ¯r ∪ θ˜r and Θc = Θ¯c ∪ θ˜c.
41Note that this is a biased estimator since “noisy subjects” may accidentally behave consistently.
That is, the estimator systematically underestimates the probability of a noisy type.
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As mentioned above, we take the observed relative frequencies as estimators for the
probabilities of the types. For instance, the probability of the noisy row type equals
π[θ˜r] =
# row subjects who violated strict dominance at least once
# row subjects
. (6.2)
Following Harsanyi (1967-68), we assume that the types and the prior distribution of
types, i.e., the probabilities, are commonly known.
Assumption 6.4. Row and column subjects’ beliefs over types, πr and πc, correspond
to the relative frequencies of types in the experiment.
Subject behavior and Quasi-Bayesian Nash equilibrium
This section provides two propositions. The ﬁrst one shows that the predictions of
Quasi-Bayesian Nash equilibrium are falsiﬁable using our data. In the second proposition,
we show that the behavior observed in the baseline treatment is consistent with a QBNE.
Before we state the propositions, we introduce some notation and deﬁnitions that
will be used throughout this section. Consider stage 2 of the baseline treatment of our
experiment.
Given Assumption 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, suppose that in each of the four interactive
situations in stage 2, the subjects played a quasi Bayesian game. Fix a row or column
type θ¯ ∈ Θi, i ∈ {r, c}, an action a
′ ∈ Ai is said to be contained in the support of a
strategy σi(θ¯) given type θ¯ if the strategy prescribes that the type θ¯ plays a
′ with strictly
positive probability, formally supp
(
σi(θ¯)
)
= {a′ ∈ Ai | σi(a
′ | θ¯) > 0}. Recall that the
action spaces of row and column subjects in each of the four interactions in stage 2 are
Ar = {U,D} and Ac = {L,R} (see Figure 6.3). Hence, for each strategy of row, σr,
given any ﬁxed type θr ∈ Θr, it holds that supp
(
σr(θr)
)
⊆ {U,D}, and, accordingly, for
column supp
(
σc(θc)
)
⊆ {L,R}. Then, the support of a type-contingent strategy of row
or column, σi, equals the Cartesian product of the supports of the strategy for all given
types, formally
supp(σi) =×
θi∈Θi
supp
(
σi(θi)
)
. (6.3)
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Consequently, for any strategy of row, we have that supp(σr) ⊆ {U,D}
|Θr| and for column
supp(σc) ⊆ {L,R}
|Θc|, where |Θr| and |Θc| denote the number of diﬀerent row types and
column types, respectively, in the baseline treatment of the experiment. Finally, the
support of a type-contingent strategy proﬁle, σ ∈ Σr × Σc, is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 6.9. The support of a strategy proﬁle (σr, σc) ∈ Σr × Σc is the set
supp((σr, σc)) = supp(σr)× supp(σc) ⊆ {U,D}
|Θr| × {L,R}|Θc|.
Let aGk be the action played by subject k in Game G ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} at the second stage
of treatment baseline. The actions played in Game G that are associated with a given
row or column type θi are denoted by a
G
θi
. These action sets are deﬁned as the union of
all action choices of subjects who are of type θi, formally
aGθi =
⋃
k is of type θi ∈Θi
aGk ⊆ Ai. (6.4)
The actions played in Game G that are associated with all types of row (resp. column)
Θi, i ∈ {r, c}, are
aGΘi =×
θi∈Θi
aGθi ⊆ A
|Θi|
i . (6.5)
Based on these deﬁnitions, we can specify what an action set combination is.
Deﬁnition 6.10. A potential action set combination in Game G is a set
aG ⊆ {U,D}|Θr| × {L,R}|Θc| and
the observed action set combination in Game G is
aˆG = (aGΘr , a
G
Θc
).
The propositions in this section are based on a notion of consistency between action
set combinations and QBNE. This consistency deﬁnition is the following.
Deﬁnition 6.11. An action set combination aG ⊆ {U,D}|Θr| × {L,R}|Θc| in Game G is
said to be consistent with a QBNE σ∗ ∈ Σr×Σc for the quasi Bayesian game that results
from G if aG ⊆ supp(σ∗).
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Recall that a strategy σi ∈ Σi prescribes a mixed action for each possible type of player
i ∈ {r, c}. The rationale behind Deﬁnition 6.11 is that if aG ⊆ supp(σ∗), then each action
that aG associates with a particular type θi ∈ Θi is a possible outcome of σ
∗ for all θi ∈ Θi
and all i ∈ {r, c}.
Under Assumption 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, given a quasi Bayesian game that results
from Game G and a strategy proﬁle σ′ = (σ′r, σ
′
c), all row subjects have the same belief,
β[L | σ′c], that her opponent will play action L:
β[L | σ′c] =
∑
θc∈Θc
π[θc] · σ
′
c(L | θc), (6.6)
where π[θc] denotes the probability of a column subject with type θc (i.e., according to
Assumption 6.4, the relative frequency of θc types), and σ
′
c(L | θc) the probability with
which a column subject of type θc plays action L. Analogously, each column subject’s
belief that the opponent will play action U is
β[U | σ′r] =
∑
θr∈Θr
π[θr] · σ
′
r(U | θr). (6.7)
Now, we are ready to state the propositions. The ﬁrst proposition shows that the
predictions of Quasi-Bayesian Nash equilibrium could be falsiﬁed using our data and are
not trivially consistent with our observations.
Proposition 6.2. Under Assumption 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, there exist action set combi-
nations a1, a3 ⊆ {U,D}|Θr| × {L,R}|Θc| such that, if a1 is consistent with a QBNE of the
quasi Bayesian game that results from Game 1, then a3 is not consistent with any QBNE
of the quasi Bayesian game that results from Game 3, and vice versa.
Proof. We prove the proposition by showing that two stated ordinal preferences and two
action set combinations a1 and a3 in Game 1 and 3 imply the desired result.
In the baseline treatment of the experiment (see Table 6.7 at the end of this section),
three column subjects stated the ordinal preference θ7 :
(5, 8) ≻θ7 (7, 7) ≻θ7 (3, 8) ≻θ7 (4, 4) ≻θ7 (8, 3) ≻θ7 (3, 3) ≻θ7 (6, 2) ≻θ7 (2, 2),
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and two column subjects stated the preference θ8 :
(7, 7) ≻θ8 (5, 8) ≻θ8 (3, 8) ≻θ8 (4, 4) ≻θ8 (3, 3) ≻θ8 (8, 3) ≻θ8 (2, 2) ≻θ8 (6, 2),
where the second component of the payment-pair is the monetary payoﬀ for column.
Consider the column types θ7 and θ8, and let v7, v8 be utility functions that represent
θ7 ,θ8 . Observe that the types θ7 and θ8 have no dominant action in Game 1 and 3.
Let a1, a3 be action set combinations that satisfy
a1θ7 = a
1
θ8
= a3θ7 = a
3
θ8
= {L,R}. (6.8)
Suppose to the contrary that a1 is consistent with a QBNE σ∗ for the quasi Bayesian
game of Game 1 and, at the same time, a3 is consistent with a QBNE σ∗∗ for the one
that results from Game 3. By (6.8), we know that a1, a3 are consistent with σ
∗, σ∗∗ only
if σ∗ and σ∗∗ prescribe non-degenerate mixed actions for the types θ7 and θ8 in both quasi
Bayesian games. Consequently, in the quasi Bayesian game of Game 1, it needs to hold
that,
β[U | σ∗r ] =
v7(7, 7)− v7(3, 8)
(v7(4, 4)− v7(8, 3) + v7(7, 7)− v7(3, 8))
and (6.9)
β[U | σ∗r ] =
v8(7, 7)− v8(3, 8)
(v8(4, 4)− v8(8, 3) + v8(7, 7)− v8(3, 8))
, (6.10)
and in the quasi Bayesian game that results from Game 2:
β[U |σ∗∗r ] =
v7(7, 7)− v7(3, 3)
(v7(4, 4)− v7(8, 3) + v7(7, 7)− v7(3, 3))
and (6.11)
β[U | σ∗∗r ] =
v8(7, 7)− v8(3, 3)
(v8(4, 4)− v8(8, 3) + v8(7, 7)− v8(3, 3))
. (6.12)
Moreover, since v7, v8 represent θ7 ,θ8 , we have that:
v7(8, 3) > v7(3, 3) and (6.13)
v8(8, 3) < v8(3, 3). (6.14)
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Observe that the equations (6.9), (6.11), and (6.13) imply that β[U | σ∗∗r ] > β[U | σ
∗
r ].
Whereas, equations (6.10), (6.12), and (6.14) imply β[U |σ∗∗r ] < β[U |σ
∗
r ] - a contradiction.
Hence, if a1 is consistent with σ∗, then a3 is not consistent with any QBNE σ∗∗ for the
quasi Bayesian game 3, and vice versa.
The second proposition shows that the observed action set combinations in the baseline
treatment are consistent with a Quasi-Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 6.3. Under Assumption 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, there exists a QBNE σ∗ of
the quasi Bayesian game G such that the observed action set combination aˆG is consistent
with σ∗ for all G ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Proof. The proof is organized as follows. Suppose that row subjects’ expectation that
their opponent will play L in G equals βGr ∈ (0, 1) and column players’ expectation that
their opponent will play U in G is βGc ∈ (0, 1). Let θi be the ordinal ranking that is
associated with type θi ∈ Θi. In Lemma 6.1, we show that there exists a utility function
uθi for all non-noisy types θi ∈ Θi, which represents θi , such that if aˆ
G
θi
= {U,D}
(aˆGθi = {L,R}), then θi is indiﬀerent between her pure actions, given the beliefs β
G
r (β
G
c ).
Subsequently, by using Lemma 6.1, we prove that there exists a QBNE σ∗G for the quasi
Bayesian game of G ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} such that if aˆGθi = {U,D} (aˆ
G
θi
= {L,R}), then σ∗G(θi)
prescribes a proper mixed action for each non-noisy type θi.
Note that we do not have to consider noisy types, and non-noisy types who have a
strictly dominant action. The played actions of both types are always consistent with a
QBNE. Furthermore, the proof is trivial for non-noisy types, who have in only one of the
four games no strictly dominant action. The remaining types are depicted in Table 6.7
at the end of this proof. Table 6.8 shows which games are relevant and the action sets
associated with the types in each game.
Lemma 6.1. Consider the types θj, j = 1, . . . , 11, deﬁned in Table 6.7 and 6.8 . Given
Game G, let βGr ∈ (0, 1) be row player’s belief that her opponent will play L and β
G
c ∈
(0, 1) be column player’s belief that the opponent will play U. If β1r > β
3
r and β
1
c > β
3
c ,
there exist utility functions v
j
for all θj, which represent θj , such that if aˆ
G
θj
= {U,D}
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(aˆGθj = {L,R}), then θj is indiﬀerent between her pure actions in the quasi Bayesian game
that results from G.
Proof. At ﬁrst, consider the types θ1-θ3. The action sets of the types j = 1, 2 in Game
1 are aˆGθj = {U,D}. Given a belief β
1
r ∈ (0, 1) in the quasi Bayesian game of Game 1,
there exists utility functions, which represent 1 and 2, such that the types j = 1, 2 are
indiﬀerent if
β1r =
vj(7, 7)− vj(3, 8)
(vj(4, 4)− vj(8, 3) + vj(7, 7)− vj(3, 8))
. (6.15)
In Game 3, the action set of all three types is {U,D}. Hence, given a belief β3r ∈ (0, 1)
in the quasi Bayesian game 3, there exists utility functions for j = 1, 2, 3 such that the
types are indiﬀerent if
β3r =
vj(7, 7)− vj(3, 3)
(vj(4, 4)− vj(8, 3) + vj(7, 7)− vj(3, 3))
. (6.16)
Finally, in Game 2, only type 1 is a relevant type. The action set of type 1 in Game 2
is {U}. That means, given a belief β2r ∈ (0, 1), a utility function uθ1 that represents θ1
needs to satisfy:
β2ruθ1(5, 8) + (1− β
2
r )uθ1(7, 7) ≥ β
2
ruθ1(6, 2) + (1− β
2
r )uθ1(3, 3) (6.17)
Now, choose vj(7, 7), vj(8, 3), and vj(4, 4) such that the utility values are consistent with
the ordering θj for j = 1, 2, 3. From equation (6.15) and (6.16), we obtain
vj(3, 8)− vj(3, 3) =
(vj(7, 7)− vj(8, 3))(β
1
r − 1)(β
3
r − β
1
r )
β1r q
3
r
.
Since β1r > β
3
r , and for all three types, j = 1, 2, 3, vj(7, 7) > vj(8, 3), we have that
vj(3, 8) > vj(3, 3), which is consistent with the orderings θ1 ,θ2 and θ3 given in Table
6.7. Note that it is now shown that the lemma holds for the types θ2 and θ3 since there
are no further restrictions concerning their utility functions. For type θ1, we may deﬁne
a utility function v1, which represents θ1 , such that the distance v1(6, 2) − v2(5, 8) is
arbitrary small. It follows immediately that the lemma is also true for θ1.
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Now, consider the types θ4-θ6. We omit the obvious proof for type θ4, and turn to
the types 5 and 6. In Game 4, the action set of both types is {U,D}. Given a belief
β4r ∈ (0, 1), the indiﬀerence condition for j = 5, 6 in the quasi Bayesian game 4 is
β4r =
vj(3, 8)− vj(2, 2)
(vj(3, 8)− vj(2, 2) + vj(8, 3)− vj(7, 7))
. (6.18)
In Game 2, the action set of both types is {U}. Hence, given β2r ∈ (0, 1), for j = 5, 6,
β2rvj(5, 8) + (1− β
2
r )uθj(7, 7) ≥ β
2
ruθj(6, 2) + (1− β
2
r )uθj(3, 3). (6.19)
If there is a strict inequality in equation (6.19), it is obvious that one can choose utility
values that satisfy (6.18) and (6.19) and represent θ5 and θ6 . Suppose that (6.19) holds
with equality and choose the utility values vj(5, 8), vj(6, 2), vj(8, 3), vj(2, 2),and vj(3, 8)
for j = 5, 6 such that the utility functions represent θ5 and θ6 . Then, equation (6.18)
and (6.19) imply that vj(7, 7) > vj(3, 3). This is consistent with θ5 and θ6 , which shows
that the lemma holds for type 5 and 6.
For the column types θ7-θ11, the lemma can be proven similarly to the row types
θ1-θ6.
For the quasi Bayesian game of each Game G, consider a strategy proﬁle σ∗G such that
(i) σ∗G(θj) is a proper mixed action for non-noisy row types θj where aˆ
G
θj
= {U,D}.
(ii) σ∗G(θj) is a proper mixed action for non-noisy column types θj where aˆ
G
θj
= {L,R}.
(iii) β[L | σ∗1] > β[L | σ
∗
3] and β[U | σ
∗
1] > β[U | σ
∗
3].
It is obvious that such strategy proﬁles exist. By assumption, noisy types randomly select
a pure action, i.e., they play a proper mixed action. Given any mixed action of noisy types
in the quasi Bayesian game of each Game G, deﬁne utility functions for all non-noisy types
such that these types have no incentive to deviate from σ∗G in each game. By Lemma 6.1,
we know that such utility functions always exist. Then, σ∗G is a QBNE for the quasi
Bayesian game of G for G ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. One can easily check that aˆG ⊆ supp(σ∗G) for all
G ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, which proves the proposition.
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Table 6.7: Row and column types
Type Ordinal preference ranking
Row types
θ1 (7,7)≻θ1(8,3)≻θ1(6,2)≻θ1(5,8)≻θ1(4,4)≻θ1 (3,8)≻θ1(3,3)≻θ1(2,2)
θ2 (7,7)≻θ2(8,3)≻θ2(5,8)≻θ2(6,2)≻θ2(4,4)≻θ2 (3,8)≻θ2(3,3)≻θ2(2,2)
θ3 (7,7)≻θ3(8,3)≻θ3(5,8)≻θ3(4,4)≻θ3(6,2)≻θ3 (3,8)≻θ3(3,3)≻θ3(2,2)
θ4 (8,3)≻θ4(7,7)≻θ4(6,2)≻θ4(5,8)≻θ4(3,8)≻θ4 (4,4)≻θ4(3,3)≻θ4(2,2)
θ5 (8,3)≻θ5(7,7)≻θ5(6,2)≻θ5(5,8)≻θ5(4,4)≻θ5 (3,8)≻θ5(3,3)≻θ5(2,2)
θ6 (8,3)≻θ6(7,7)≻θ6(6,2)≻θ6(5,8)≻θ6(4,4)≻θ6 (3,3)∼θ6(3,8)≻θ6(2,2)
Column types
θ7 (5,8)≻θ7(7,7)≻θ7(3,8)≻θ7(4,4)≻θ7(8,3)≻θ7 (3,3)≻θ7(6,2)≻θ7(2,2)
θ8 (7,7)≻θ8(5,8)≻θ8(3,8)≻θ8(4,4)≻θ8(8,3)≻θ8 (3,3)≻θ8(6,2)≻θ8(2,2)
θ9 (5,8)≻θ9(3,8)≻θ9(7,7)≻θ9(4,4)≻θ9(8,3)≻θ9 (3,3)≻θ9(6,2)≻θ9(2,2)
θ10 (3,8)≻θ10(5,8)≻θ10(7,7)≻θ10(4,4)≻θ10(3,3)≻θ10 (8,3)≻θ10(2,2)≻θ10(6,2)
θ11 (3,8)∼θ11(5,8)≻θ11(7,7)≻θ11(4,4)≻θ11(8,3)≻θ11 (3,3)≻θ11(6,2)≻θ11(2,2)
Table 6.8: Types and associated action sets per game
Type #Subjects No str. dom. action in Observed action sets
θ1 6 G=1,2,3 aˆ
1
θ1
= {U,D}, aˆ2θ1 = {U}, aˆ
3
θ1
= {U,D}
θ2 4 G=1,3 aˆ
1
θ2
= {U,D}, aˆ3θ2 = {U,D}
θ3 2 G=1,3 aˆ
1
θ3
= {D}, aˆ3θ3 = {U,D}
θ4 2 G=1,2,4 aˆ
1
θ4
= {U}, aˆ2θ4 = {U}, aˆ
4
θ4
= {D}
θ5 12 G=2,4 aˆ
2
θ5
= {U}, aˆ4θ5 = {U,D},
θ6 5 G=2,4 aˆ
2
θ6
= {U}, aˆ4θ6 = {U,D},
θ7 5 G=1,2,3 aˆ
1
θ7
= {L,R}, aˆ2θ7 = {L,R}, aˆ
3
θ7
= {L,R},
θ8 2 G=1,3 aˆ
1
θ8
= {L,R}, aˆ3θ8 = {L,R},
θ9 23 G=2,3,4 aˆ
2
θ9
= {L,R}, aˆ3θ9 = {L,R} aˆ
4
θ9
= {L,R},
θ10 2 G=2,3 aˆ
2
θ10
= {L,R}, aˆ3θ10 = {L,R}
θ11 2 G=3,4 aˆ
3
θ11
= {R}, aˆ4θ11 = {L}
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6.4 Summary
The assumption that payoﬀs are mutually known is often not satisﬁed in the labo-
ratory. Healy (2011), for example, ﬁnds that subjects fail to accurately predict other
subjects’ preferences over payment-pairs. It seems plausible that similar diﬃculties exist
in many real-world situations as well. Of course, such assumptions are strong idealiza-
tions but as Weibull (2004, p. 86) properly expressed it: “So what, then, can be tested?
One can test whether the theoretical predictions are at least approximately correct in
environments that approximate the assumptions. Such testing is important, because this
is the way game theory is used in economics and the other social sciences.” In this spirit,
our experiment shows that mutual knowledge is a relevant assumption: making sure that
payoﬀs are mutually known leads to signiﬁcantly more equilibrium play.
When deciding what model to apply to a speciﬁc situation, whether or not agents
can reasonably be expected to know other agents’ payoﬀ functions should therefore play
an important role. At least in the simple 2 × 2 games we analyzed, subjects are very
unlikely to play a Nash equilibrium strategy when payoﬀs are not mutually known. It
might then be worthwhile to apply a more complex model such as a strategic ambiguity
model or the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Harsanyi (1967-68), even though such models
tend to provide less precise predictions. We show that the strategic ambiguity concept of
Eichberger and Kelsey (2014) and a noisy version of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium yield
predictions that are more consistent with our data.
How the trade-oﬀ between tractability, precision and accuracy is resolved will depend
on the speciﬁc situation. This chapter makes a contribution to improve the ex-ante
assessment of the accuracy of a models’ predictions.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis aims at examining how ambiguity-sensitive behavior aﬀects strategic
decision-making in interactive situations. We considered strategic interaction under pay-
oﬀ uncertainty, under strategic uncertainty, and with private information. To capture
ambiguity-sensitive behavior, several alternatives to subjective expected utility theory of
Savage (1954) have been proposed. For our investigations, we used strategic interaction
models that are based on such alternative models of choice under uncertainty.
In Chapter 4, we develop and analyze a Hotelling duopoly game under demand am-
biguity in which ﬁrms’ beliefs are represented by neo-additive capacities introduced by
Chateauneuf et al. (2007). Our model provides a unifying framework for the Hotelling
models developed by Meagher and Zauner (2004) and Kro´l (2012). We show that there
exists a unique subgame-perfect pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the Hotelling game
under ambiguity. Our capacity model incorporates a variety of diﬀerent sources of un-
certainty. For example, there is the variance of the reference probability, the conﬁdence,
or the degree of ambiguity, and the uncertain transportation cost parameter. We present
comparative static results with respect to all model parameters. These results show that
the eﬀects of some parameters are interrelated. Therefore, one should be very cautious
when it comes to drawing conclusions from real-world applications of Hotelling models un-
der uncertainty. In fact, the conclusions from an observed increase or decrease in product
diﬀerentiation might change in light of diﬀerent sources of uncertainty. We illustrate that
the capacity model oﬀers additional explanations for observed real-world phenomena.
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Chapter 5 investigates the extent to which we can distinguish expected and non-
expected utility players on the basis of their behavior. A model of incomplete information
games is used in which players can choose mixed strategies. The key assumption of
this model is that players behave as expected utility maximizers with correct beliefs
concerning mixed strategy combinations, yet they face ambiguous uncertainty about the
environment. Expected and non-expected players sometimes cannot be distinguished
by observing their equilibrium actions since they behave observationally equivalent. It
is shown that uncertainty-averse non-expected utility players can often be identiﬁed by
looking at their best responses. They may behave diﬀerently in the use of mixed strategies,
called hedging behavior, and the response to mixed strategy combinations, called reversal
behavior. It turns out that these are the sole behavioral diﬀerences between expected and
non-expected utility players. Furthermore, the absence of hedging behavior is suﬃcient
for observational equivalence. The chapter provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for the existence of hedging and reversal behavior in terms of the payoﬀ structure of
a two-person two-strategies game. Finally, the underlying model is discussed, and an
equilibrium concept is introduced that allows for players who are not uncertainty-averse.
Chapter 6 experimentally examines several two-person two-strategies games in which
the Nash equilibrium prediction that results if players only care about their own pay-
ments is often not consistent with subject behavior. We test whether revealing players’
preferences leads to more equilibrium play. For that purpose, we ﬁrst elicit subjects’ pref-
erences over monetary payoﬀ pairs. In one treatment, these preferences are then revealed
to other players. We ﬁnd that subjects are signiﬁcantly more likely to play an equilibrium
strategy when other players’ preferences are revealed. Our results thus suggest that one
should be careful in simply assuming that players’ preferences are mutually known. If it
is likely that players do not know each other’s preferences, equilibrium concepts that are
more general than Nash equilibrium might provide a more reliable prediction. We show
that the observed strategy choices are consistent with a strategic ambiguity model.
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